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Authority in politics: an investigation of their place in rationalist and interpretive theories.

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AUTHORITY IN POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THEIR PLACE IN RATIONALIST AND INTERPRETIVE THEORIES

A Dissertation Presented

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To Lillian who made it possible;

to Carol who made it probable;

and to Kathleen, who made it imperative.

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ABSTRACT

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The dissertation is an examination of the relationship amongst theories of authority, theories of rationality, and theories of language in rationalist and interpretive theory. Peter Winch and Hans-Georg Gadamer are taken as representative of interpretive theory; Martin Hollis and Jurgen Habermas are taken as representative of rationalist theory. The thesis argued is that neither the interpretive nor rationalist theorists examined satisfactorily address the problem of political authority. Winch and Gadamer make the mistake of interpreting all forms of authority as instances of epistemic authority. Hence, both overestimate the consistency of authority with freedom of choice and action and underestimate the coercive potential of the exercise of some forms of authority. Of the rationalist theorists examined, Martin Hollis fails to recognize the extent to which rational evaluation of social roles and personal identity is language dependent and Habermas overestimates the independence that his theory of universal pragmatics would provide rational discourse. All four thinkers have an apolitical dimension to

their interpretation of social life.

A theory of democratic authority can, however, be developed from a notion of the common good and an expressivist theory of language. Moreover, the latter also provides the basis for strong evaluation, hence providing the common ground for both a strong form of human agency which the rationalists seek and legitimate political authority which interpretive theorists defend.

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CHAPTER I

THE BOUNDS OF AUTHORITY: LANGUAGE, PERSONAL IDENTITY AND REASON

Philosophy, Sociology and Understanding

At the beginning of The Idea of a Social Science Peter Winch claims there are some fundamental misunderstandings amongst social scientists about the nature of their own enterprise. These misunderstandings flow from misconceptions about both the nature of philosophy and the nature of social science. Briefly put, the view of social science and philosophy that Winch wishes to attack, and which he attributes to both early and contemporary empiricists, claims that knowledge of reality can only be gained through experimental methods and observation. Proponents of this view hold that philosophy has only a limited role in the investigation of reality, i.e. the clarification of particular conceptual confusions. Language is one of the tools used by scientists but it is often defective, imprecise, vague and scientifically unreliable. It is the role of the so-called underlaborers, i.e. philosophers, to clean up this particular tool of science, to eliminate the defects of ambiguity, imprecision, etc. so that the true masters of knowledge, i.e. scientists, can proceed with their work.

Winch rejects this account of the relationship amongst knowledge, language and philosophy. Philosophy, he argues, has a much broader role than what is prescribed by the underlaborer view. It is the role of philosophy to elucidate the very concept of reality. This is not

to deny the importance of science in investigating particular phenomena. But this is quite different from determining what is to count as part of reality itself. This latter question falls within the bounds of philosophy: "...the philosopher is concerned with the nature of reality as such and in general.... For it is not an empirical question at all but a conceptual one. It has to do with the force of the concept of reality."[1]

This discussion of the concept of reality involves questions about its nature, how reality is intelligible, and what possible contact the human mind could have with reality. Because, Winch argues, there is no clear separation between the world and our language, the answer to such questions necessarily involves an investigation of the very nature of language, a task that goes considerably beyond the solution of isolated conceptual problems. The world is available to us only through our language and the concepts we use. "The concepts we have settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world.... The world is for us what is presented through those concepts. That is not to say that our concepts do not change; but when they do that means that our concept of the world has changed too."[2]

If the philosphers' concern is an investigation of the concept of reality as such, and if part of that problem involves a discussion of how reality could be intelligible, then it follows for Winch that epistemology occupies a central role within philosophy. Philosophy is concerned not only with language and the concept of reality but it is also concerned with contributing to "our understanding of what is involved in the concept of intelligibility, so that we may better

understand what it means to call reality intelligible."[3]

Winch's views on epistemology also have a bearing on the study of social life. Human behavior is, for Winch, a reflection of man's understanding of reality and the world around him. "A man's social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality. Indeed, 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word; social relations are expressions of ideas about reality."[4] It is here that philosophy merges with the study of social life. For to demonstrate how an understanding of reality is possible one must necessarily "show the central role which the concept of understanding plays in the activities which are characteristic of human societies. "In this way the discussion of what an understanding of reality consists in merges into the discussion of the difference the possession of such an understanding may be expected to have make to the life of a man; and this again involves a consideration of the general nature of a human society, an analysis, that is, of the concept of a human society."[5] This latter question, the nature of human society, is itself a philosophical question that has been usurped by empirical sociology, claims Winch.

Rules and Meaningful Behavior

As we mentioned Winch argues that there is an extremely close relationship between language and social reality. For Winch our language, concepts and ideas in part constitute our social life. This in itself would be sufficient to make language a focus of the study of

human action. But Winch takes his argument one step further. The relationship that language has to non-linguistic activities magnifies the importance of language for the study of social life. "It is because the use of language is so intimately, so inseparably, bound up with the other non-linguistic activities which men perform that it is possible to speak of their non-linguistic behavior also as expressing discursive ideas."[6] Given this intimacy between language and social action, the investigator of social life must be concerned with forms of activity that have meaning or symbolic content, or, borrowing from Weber, "we are concerned with human 'behavior' if and in so far as the agent or agents associate a subjective sense with it."[7] The social scientist then is concerned with that behavior which has meaning for the participants, i.e. that which is rule governed. Winch puts it very strongly: "I have claimed that the analysis of meaningful behavior must allot a central role to the notion of a rule; that all behavior which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human behavior) is ipso facto rule governed."[8]

This concept of rule-governed behavior does not include only that behavior in which rules are clearly formulated and consciously applied. Such a notion is too narrow from Winch's point of view. There must, of course, be standards by which one can determine whether or not action is in accordance with a particular rule but "the test of whether a man's actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can formulate it but whether or not it makes sense to distinguish between a right and wrong way of doing things in connection with what he does."[9] The idea of there being a right and wrong way of going

about things means that the concept of rule-governed behavior is bound to the notion of a mistake. In other words there must be some standard by which to evaluate what one is doing. The establishing of a standard involves developing external checks on one's behavior; it necessarily in requires a social context. This brings us to two central features of Winch's concept of rule-governed behavior. First, all rules are social rules in the sense that they could not be developed outside the context of human society. Second, they must, in principle, be discoverable by others.

This view of meaningful behavior as rule-governed and the relationship between ideas about reality and social relationships lead Winch to conclude that one cannot explain a way of life or set of activities within a way of life without reference to the concepts, ideas and intentions which help to constitute that way of life. One example that Winch uses is that of voting. One may vote in a variety of ways. Pulling a lever, making an 'X' on a ballot, raising one's hand, writing a name down on a piece of paper are all examples of ways that one might vote. But none of these constitutes voting per se; I may perform each of these activities and may intend and accomplish something other than voting, either because I intend something else by them or because the context within which they are performed will lead others to understand them differently. The point here is that pulling a lever, making an 'X', etc., do not constitute voting unless I first have the concept of voting available to me and, second, that the voting is understood by others to be part of a process of rendering collective decisions.

Winch claims that this view of human behavior makes the application of scientific methods to social action illegitimate. This is not to say that there are no regularities within social life. It does mean that knowledge of such regularities depends on knowledge of the intentions of the actor, the concepts available to him, and the way of life within which his actions are implicated. This is substantially different from the knowledge of regularities in the physical world. "Understanding" in the study of social action "is grasping the point or meaning of what is being done or said. This is a notion far removed from the world of statistics and causal laws: it is closer to the realm of discourse and to the internal relation that link the parts of a realm of discourse."[10]

The rejection of a causal analysis of individual social behavior does not in itself eliminate the possibility of a scientific approach to social life. It can still be argued that the study of social action involves the discovery of general regularities, an empirical task that makes the study of social life the logical equivalent to the study of natural phenomena. To this Winch replies:

> A regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence of the same kind of event on the same kind of occasion; hence, statements of uniformity pre-suppose judgements of identity. But... criteria of identity are necessarily relati e to some rule; with the corollary that two events which count as qualitatively similar from the point of view of one rule would count as different from the point of view of another. So to investigate the type of regularity studied of the rule according to which judgement of identity are made in that enquiry.[11]

In case of social science, the rules that govern criteria of identity are those employed by the object of the sociologists' study and they

are not a set of criteria developed by the sociologist himself. This does not mean that the social scientist is prevented from using concepts to describe social action which are not used by the participants themselves. What it does mean is that these concepts must "imply a previous understanding of those other concepts which belong to the activities under investigation".[12] We must be able to understand the intersubjective rules that govern a way of life or a society and this takes us beyond the so-called purely 'objective' understanding of science.

Forms of Life and Rationality

If social life can only be explained in terms of the ideas, beliefs and concepts that help constitute it, and if these in turn can only be understood from within the practices that they grow in, it follows for Winch that the practices of one culture or form of life cannot be judged logical or illogical, rational or irrational from the point of view of another. Logic is neither the particular property nor something independent of specific forms of life: "criteria of logic are not a direct gift from God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social life. It follows that one cannot apply criteria of logic to modes of life as such. For instance science is one such mode and religion is another; and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself."[13] It is unintelligible to say that "either the practice of science itself or that of religion is either illogical or logical;

both are non-logical."[14]

It further follows that if the criteria of logic and rationality arise out of modes of life and can be understood only in the context of the appropriate mode of life, no single form of life can claim a monopoly on standards of rationality or criteria of logic. Concepts, beliefs and practices can only be judged or evaluated in terms of the context from which they derive their meaning. "Something can appear rational to someone only in terms of his understanding of what is and is not rational. If our concept of rationality is a different one from his, then it makes no sense to say that anything either does or does not appear rational to him in our sense."[15] We cannot criticize the concepts, beliefs or practices of another culture in terms of our own because those concepts, etc. get their sense from the use that they have in their respective cultures or forms of life. For example, when we are examining the Azande belief in witchcraft or their apparent use of ad hoc generalizations to explain why certain predictions of oracles do not come to pass, it is a mistake for us to label these things illogical or irrational. To do so is to use our concept of what is rational to judge another belief and this is an error: "ideas cannot be torn out of their context in that way - the relation between idea and context is an internal one. The idea gets its sense from the role it plays in the system."[16]

Winch takes his argument one step further. It is not just the case that a concept or belief gets its meaning from the form of life within which it is found and therefore can be judged rational only in relation to the context of that form of life. Judgements about

reality are dependent upon context, i.e. language, as well: "Reality is not what gives language sense. What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has.... Further both the distinctions between the real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with reality themselves belong to our language."[17] Science then cannot judge the reality of God and religion cannot judge the reality of Galilean astronomy, and neither science nor religion can judge the reality of Azande magic. And just as one cannot establish the superiority of any particular concept or standard of reality, neither can one establish a concept of reality that is independent of language.

Winch does not mean that we need to see things exactly the same way that the participants of a culture or form of life do. The aim is not to chuck our own concepts in favor of those that we are studying, but rather to relate alien concepts, etc. to our own: "We must somehow bring S's conception of intelligibility into (intelligible!) relation with our own conception of intelligibility. That is, we have to create a new unity for the concepts of intelligibility, having a certain relation to our old one and perhaps requiring a considerable realignment of our categories. We are not seeking a state in which things will appear to us just as they do to members of S, and perhaps such a state is unattainable anyway. But we are seeking a way of looking at things which goes beyond our previous way in that it has in some way taken account of and incorporated the other way that members of S have of looking at things."[18] In other words, we have to extend our categories, concepts, meanings and conception of

rationality and intelligibility to include those categories, etc. of the culture or form of life that we are studying.

A Rationalist Critique (Of Sorts)

Hollis' critique of Winch is tempered by a sympathy for what Winch is trying to achieve, namely to show that human action requires a different structure of explanation and different criteria of identity than do the phenomena of the natural world. Hollis even admits that rules play a role in shaping social behavior and that explanation in terms of rules is at first glance convincing: "The concept of a rule is intoxicating. It gives us a neat and workable notion of social context. It lets us express systematically those images which are so appealing - that the world is a stage, that roles form a stock, that interaction is a game, that reality is negotiated, that norms create a constraining order. Only because there are rules does the actor have the moves to make, cards to play, tokens to exchange."[19]
Nonetheless Hollis argues that any explanation in terms of rules, and Winch's account in particular, fails in its attempt to provide a coherent alternative to naturalistic-causal models of explanation. Generally speaking, Hollis' criticisms fall into three closely related categories:

(1) Explanation in terms of rule-governed behavior is not a sufficiently strong form of explanation. In particular Winch's criteria of verifiability are incoherent and his account of rule-governed behavior is absurd.

(2) Winch's position regarding rationality and reality is mistaken and would make the study of social life impossible.

(3) Explanation in terms of rules relies on a metaphysic of human nature that Hollis labels Platic Man and as such leaves no room for autonomous human action.

Human nature and social theory. In his book Models of Man Martin Hollis argues that all social theories can be grouped into one of two categories distinguished by their metaphysical assumptions about human nature. These assumptions about human nature carry implications for the mode of explanation, the view of rationality, the type of self-identity, and the possibilities for political practice that a thinker can entertain. "Every social theory needs a metaphysic, I shall contend, in which a model of man and a method of science complement each other. There is no shirking questions of quasi fact, of normative analysis and of praxis."[20]

The two competing metaphysics of human nature see man as either passive or active. Passive conceptions of human nature are most often found in those social theories which model themselves after the natural sciences in trying to explain social life in terms of causal laws. Such theories are not limited to one discipline in the human sciences. Explanations in terms of sociobiology, socialization processes, or stimulus-response are examples of theories that assume a passive conception of man according to Hollis.

Such theories rob man of his autonomy. His choice of action is not his own but is determined for him by biological factors,

socialization techniques and social structure, or the manipulation of external environment. His choices as to who he is and what he will do are not his own. "His identity is thrust upon him by contact with a central value system, induction into socio-economic relationships, his drives and disposition, the mechanics of his unconscious or ge etic progrmming."[21] In each case his self and social identity, his beliefs and action are not the result of his own autonomous, rational choices but are determined for him either naturally (sociobiology) or through an external social world (e.g. behaviorism). In such theories men are only 'spuriously individuals'. Lacking a strong notion of self-identity, men are constituted by either their natural drives or the external factors of the social world or some combination of the two.

Such a view of human nature tends toward a manipulative form of political practice. For such a view sees human beings as "essentially programmed creatures and their output is a function of their input, with or without intervention of whatever is between, itself presumably in any case the product of earlier inputs and its own feedback. Programmed creatures can be manipulated by selecting the input or adjusting the programmed - hence talk of social engineering."[22] And again in discussing Plastic Man elsewhere Hollis says, "Apart from any random factors, the creature portrayed behaves predictably in given conditions and can be manipulated by engineering the apt conditions."[23]

Hollis clearly objects to this manipulative approach to political practice and use of social theory. He maintains that even though few

societies offer the opportunity to exercise as much autonomy as he would like to see, the task of social theory is, nevertheless, to inform political practice in such a way that the opportunities to exercise autonomy are increased.

The alternative to those forms of social theory whose explanatory value rests upon a metaphysics of human passivity is a form of social theory that assumes an active role for human beings. Hollis calls this active view of human nature Autonomous Man. Autonomous Man is the author of his own beliefs, ideas, actions and identity; he is the product of neither laws nor of social environment. His actions are always rational in that the reasons he gives for his actions are the best possible reasons that one could have for acting in a particular situation. In short, Hollis is arguing for the assumption of an autonomous subject as the basis for social explanation. "There must be a self whose activity is sufficient explanation of some social behavior. In calling him Autonomous Man, we are demanding a subject, self, the I of 'The I and the Me', perhaps given more independence than G.H. Mead intended."[24] Autonomous Man is a subject who is in control of his life, whose reasons for acting are his own, reflectively arrived at, yet objectively rational. Challenges to those social theories that rest upon a passive conception of man must provide not only a coherent form of explanation but a role for the active self as well.

Rule governed behavior and explanation. According to Hollis there are several reasons why rule-governed behavior, and Winch's version in

particular, fails to provide a complete, coherent alternative form of explanation to those social theories that assume a passive view of man. First, though rules may help us to identify certain actions or behavior they do not tell us why that particular rule and not some other is being followed. "There is an initial gap between saying that the rule constitutes the action and that adding that it explains the action. To close the gap we must at least accept sets of rules, under some such title as 'culture,' 'value systems,' or 'forms of life;' as the data of last resort. Actors can still change a rule or decide to break one, but only if the changing or breaking of one rule is explained as the following of another. Otherwise the claim of rules to be the final category lapses."[25] Hollis then argues that the question that still remains is why does the actor choose to follow this form of life (say become a monk) rather than another (become a libertine) or choose to adopt one value system rather than another.

Winch's brand of rule-governed behavior is particularly guilty of failing to address this last question from Hollis' point of view. Winch, as Hollis reads him, sees rules as public. This eliminates the possibility of a man following a private rule; one cannot follow a rule unless one already has external standards that enable him to identify when a rule is broken. If the social scientist wishes to study social behavior he should begin with the institutions that embody the rules. In summarizing Winch he says: "all rules whatever are to be explained by reference to social institutions. Neither reality nor individual behavior is a given: both depend upon institutions.... Actions are to be explained by reference to the

motives or purposes for which they are done and motives or purposes, in turn, by reference to the institutions that make them intelligible. Thus a man's purposes do not determine this way of life but, rather, his way of life determines his purposes. For a way or form of life gives him a pattern of reasons for action as well as a conception of reality."[26] Hollis realizes that Winch believes actors do have some choice. A man may choose to follow one rule rather than another, or, for example, make one move in chess rather than another. However, the array of alternatives is determined by the institutions of a society and the rules embodied in them. In the end, explanation rests with an account of these institutions and not with individuals.

Hollis claims that if his reading of Winch is correct, Winch's prescriptions for social science threaten social explanation with infinite regress. For if we ask why an actor follows one rule rather than another, the explanation must be in terms of another rule, and the explanation of that in terms of yet another, and so on.

In Hollis' words, "the individual can only experience external standards of correctness if he already has rules for interpreting what is said to him.... If these rules for interpreting what is said also require external criteria, then the individual will need further rules for interpreting these external criteria and so ad infinitum."[27] Winch's response, that explanations must end somewhere, is purely arbitrary, claims Hollis, and evades precisely the questions that Winch is claiming to address. Hence Winch has failed "to dismiss the view that 'institutions' are composed of individuals following rules

on which they (individuals) are in principle the final court of appeal."[28] In failing to do so Winch has also failed to provide us with a compelling alternative to explanation in terms of individuals.

Not only is the notion of rule governed behavior an insufficient or incomplete form of explanation, but any explanatory value that it can have is obtained only at the cost of including precisely what Winch wishes to reject, i.e. a notion of causality. To say that one engages in this or that behavior because of this or that particular rule or way of life does not exclude the possibility of one arguing that the connection between the way of life and the rule in question is causal. In fact it is possible to argue that the way of life is in fact a necessary condition for behavior to be identified as the type that it is. In short, rules "do not exclude causal connections and do not amount to an explanation without them."[29]

Hollis' third objection to Winch's prescriptions for explanation in the social sciences are that Winch makes the importance of quantitative techniques dependent upon the explanation in terms of rules. The findings of econometrics, demographics, antnropometry, etc. are significant only if they are explainable in terms of, or coincide with, a rule followed by the participants. This is too restrictive a concept of social significance for Hollis. There are many correlations and regularities that are significant but are not reducible to or explainable in terms of a form of life. Rates of unemployment, inflation, demographic changes, correlations between personal habits (say smoking) and health (e.g., lung cancer) are significant findings regardless as to what the institutions and rules

of society say. As Alasdaire MacIntyre has put it, the social scientist is interested not just in what people do but in what happens to them as well. And what happens to them is not always explainable in terms of their own concepts and beliefs.

Related to this point is Hollis' final objections to Winch's account of rules as explanation. Winch, says Hollis, will grant that an explanation of a type of behavior is valid only if it is recognized as so by the participants of that way of life. Explanations of behavior which are at odds with the explanation given by the participants must be rejected. The participants are the last court of appeal when it comes to the validation of an interpretation and explanation of their behavior. This puts Winch in a peculiar position, argues Hollis. If the participants agree that an explanation of their behavior offered by an observer is correct only after a long process of argumentation and persuasion, is it not the case that the explanation was significant or correct even before it was admitted to be by the participants. If it is, continues Hollis, then there must exist some criteria of truth or validations that are independent of the consent of the participants. "The growth of knowledge and progress of enquiry requires that what the scientist knows in the end was true all along. He must be entitled to presuppose some criteria of truth and to impute social significance, even though his subjects are unaware of what he claims to discover."[30] The social scientist must be able to assume an epistemologically privileged position. Without that privileged position Hollis fears social science will be stymied in its

accumulation of knowledge.

Rationality and reality. Hollis also takes issue with Winch's prescriptions for evaluating the rationality of beliefs, actions and social practices. The reader will recall that Winch claims that there is no single, objective standard of rationality that the investigator can use to judge social practices in different cultures or forms of life. Standards of rationality grow out of forms of life and therefore depend upon social practices. Hollis takes this to mean that Winch is claiming that the very rules of logic are themselves malleable and that different social relations could very well promote or engender different standards or rules of logic.

Hollis will have none of this epistemological and ontological relativism. To hold such a position would make social science impossible. In order to understand another culture or way of life we must establish a bridgehead into that language, i.e. discover some utterances in the alien culture the meaning of which we can identify with utterances or proposition in our culture. Minimally this means that they and we must share the same reality, i.e. our propositions must be about the same things in the world. In addition we must share the same standards of truth and falsity, for we must know what propositions about the shared reality they will consider correct and which propostions they will condsider false. Finally, they must obey the fundamental rules of logic, i.e. the rules of identity, contradiction and inference. These rules of logic enable us to determine the coherence and consistency of statements. This is what

constitutes the minimal rationality that all cultures must ascribe to.

It is not even a question of trying to discover whether or not we have the same standard of rationality and the same reality as other cultures or ways of life. Standards of rationality and reality are not things that can be tested for. We have to assume the same standard of rationality and the same reality in order to even translate a proposition from their language to ours. Standards of rationality and reality are in fact a priori assumptions that the social scientist is obligated to hold if he is to begin studying another culture at all.

In sum, without similar standards of rationality and reality we would be faced with a vicious circle. In order to understand the language of another form of life we must know their standards of rationality and reality. But since those standards of rationality and reality are language bound, according to Winch, we cannot know these standards until we know their language. The only way into the vicious circle is to assume that we share the same rationality and reality. Without that assumption the study of other forms of life cannot even begin.

The Rationalist Alternative: Ideal Explanation

Hollis claims that there are three dimensions to the structure of explanation which the social theorist must provide. Every form of explanation must have a social context or stage, a theory of human nature (an actor), and an explanatory link that connects the actor to

the stage. These elements of explanation cannot be joined arbitrarily. Some views of human nature would be incompatible with some types of social context as well as some types of explanation. To change one of the elements in a previously consistent and fully developed explanatory model requires that one change each of the other elements as well, or otherwise risk leaving inconsistencies and gaps within the model. Thus, a theory of explanation that claimed to support an active conception of the man, but the social context (or explanatory link) of which required passive actors would, in all likelihood, supply us with, at best, inconsistent and incomplete, or at worst contradictory, explanations of social action.

Social rules and normative explanation. As an ideal form of explanation Hollis proposes a form of role theory that he calls normative explanation. Normative explanation accounts for human behavior by exlaining it in terms of duties, obligations or requirements that are attached to the particular set of roles available to the individual whose behavior is to be explained. These roles provide the social identity of individuals and are the source of reasons for action. Schematically, normative explanation looks something like the following:

(1) The agent occupied a position with roles $R_1 \ldots R_J$ requiring action A;
(2) The agent knew that $R_1 \ldots R_J$ required A;
(3) Conditions (1) and (2) were the agent's reasons for doing A.[33]

This is what Hollis takes to be the elementary form of explanation. But explanation in terms of roles is only a beginning

and does not yet supply us with an alternative to those forms of explanation whose philosophical anthropology is a passive conception of man. If we let the concept of a role function as an explanaudum then what we end up with is a passive conception of man and we fail to answer the question of why the agent chose that particular role to follow and not some other.[34] In addition we need to account for the existence of the roles themselves. To leave explanation at the level of roles is to treat roles as pre-given characters of a play. We need to ask questions of who authors the play and is responsible for the existence of those roles/characters. That is, the roles themselves are to be accounted for, are part of the explanans. In other words, to explain the action of an individual in terms of the reasons legitimized by the norms of the role occupied does not answer the questions of whether those reasons are the real reasons that moved the individual. "In terms of the actor and character, then, we still deny that the actor's motives are the character's reasons since the character has reasons supplied by the play without reference to matters off stage. Nor do we accept that the character's reasons are the actor's motives since this, although holding for a passive homo sociologicus, leaves no room for autonomy.... Normative explanation, instead of being a full first step in a two step explanation, is half an answer to the only question. In strong actionist eyes the actors are as responsible for the context as they are for deciding what to do in it."[35] What must be supplied now is an actor who can autonomously create and choose amongst the social roles in a society.

Autonomy and personal identity. Hollis argues that this latter dimension to social explanation requires a strong notion of personal identity, i.e. an individual whose ideas, beliefs, motives or reasons for acting are his own and not those that he is supplied by virture of the social position he occupies. The social theorist who offers an explanation in terms of reasons must make the case that the reasons given are actually those of the actor and not those that we assume go along with the positions occupied. This means that the autonomous individual must be separable from the character he plays on the social stage.

However, two related though slightly different dilemma's face the social theorist trying to reach the terrain beyond that supplied by roles. When we say that the autonomous individual must have an identity beyond that identity supplied by roles we must be wary of falling into the trap of positing the existence of pre-social, atomistic individuals who constitute society through some version of the social contract. Additionally, by arguing that we must insure that the reasons we offer in the explanation of an action are actually the actor's reasons we are positing the existence of an individual outside of the characters he plays or social roles he occupies. There is then an individual who exists outside of the social context by which we know him. But in separating the character from the actor in this manner we raise the questions of how we can in fact know what motives and reasons the individual entertains.

Hollis wishes to avoid both of these pitfalls since he believes that the self is a social self. But he also wishes to avoid

identifying the individual with his social positions and roles, for this results, he feels, in a weak form of actionism, i.e. a plastic view of man, and no room for individual autonomy. The route by which he tries to solve this dilemma is the following: "Taking the hint from political theory, we can propose an ambitious thesis about autonomy. An autonomous man acts freely by definition. He acts freely, only if he has good reasons for what he does (and no better reasons for doing something else). He has good reasons only if he acts in his ultimate interests. His ultimate interests derive from what he essentially is. What he essentially is depends partly on what is essential to his being any person and partly on what is essential to his being that particular person. The thesis will be defended in latter chapters but its ambitions are vain unless the concept of 'what he essentially is' is, so to speak, load bearing. I shall try to show next that the load requires strict criteria of identity for persons, criteria which let the self stand outside the construction."[36]

To walk the line between an oversocialized view of human nature that would leave no room for an autonomous subject, and the notion of an autonomous albeit pre-social atomistic individual, Hollis believes there is only one possible move to make. There must be times when the actor acting as a character on the social stage is in fact acting in his ultimate or real interests. In other words there must be a time when the real interests of the actor and his responsibilities, duties, actions or interests of his social position(s) coincide. "It must sometimes be true that what the character has good reasons to do, the actor <u>eo ipso</u> also has good reasons to do. Necessarily the autonomous

actor must be himself in some of his characters."[37]

This in itself does not completely solve the problem according to Hollis. For now we must ask how we know what the real interests of the actor are. The dilemma Hollis thinks we face is something like the following. Either they are interests that he has outside of society as would a Robinson Crusoe that so many theorists are fond of, or his real interests come part and parcel with his social positions. Hollis responds by arguing that even though the interests of the actor are acquired in his relations with others, the actor can reflect upon the social positions that he assumes and determine which of those positions are expressions of his essential self and hence consonant with his ultimate interests. "My own view is that,..., real interests are acquired within a social contract. The initial choice of positions, non-rational in prospect, can be rational in retrospect or if irrational in retrospect can be rationally corrected. A man can, I think, have good reasons to be glad today that he got married yesterday without thereby having to have had good reason yesterday to be glad at his impending change of state... at any rate, we can at least secure strict identity by making autonomous men define themselves as characters.... when the individuating actions are essentially those of a character the agent has rationally become, we get strict identity of persons."[38] Hollis admits that an individual could never reflectively evaluate all of the social roles that he occupies at once. To do so would require the possibility of the individual placing himself outside of society altogether and this Hollis denies is possible. It <u>is</u> possible, however, for an individual

to critically evaluate his different roles/positions separately and to decide after the fact that the duties, obligations, responsibilities, etc. that constitute or are attached to that position are expressive of the individual's real interests.

Objective rationality. Hollis now has a stage (a set of roles that co ~titute a social context) and an actor (an individual who reflectively evaluates the social positions that he occupies). What is still required is an explanatory schema that connects the actor to the stage. The schema that Hollis offers is a theory of rational action. Such a schema is the most complete form of explanation for, as Hollis claims in several places, "Rational action is its own explanation."[39]

Given Hollis' other two elements in his theory of explanation, not just any theory of rationality will do. Forms of subjective rationality where individuals act consiste tly with what they believe to be the case, whether those beliefs are true or false, are too weak from Hollis' perspective. Such a standard of rationality fails to ask whether the beliefs on which the individual acts are themselves well founded or rationally held. Hence, there is the danger that virtually all action would be judged rational and the concept of rationality robbed of its explanatory value. "The result is again to make all action rational and so to rob us of any hope that a man's real reasons will, under certain conditions, yield the explanation of his actions. By saturating the description, we empty the explanation, in readiness for a causal account of wants and beliefs. Subjective rationality is

not strong enough to sustain a notion of autonomy."[40]

Neither is the notion of Zweckrationalitat a sufficient account rationality. Zweckrationalitat, though not wholly silent about means and ends, is in some respects too narrow. Because of its bias towards instrumental action it judges certain acts as non-rational (e.g. ritual) while at other times failing to judge the ultimate goals towards which action is directed. From Hollis' point of view a complete account of rationality must be able to judge the rationality of ends as well as means to those ends. "If the ultimate ends are irrational or non-rational then, ...the means cease to be rational. This is not to deny that utilitarian and instrumental accounts of rational action can be used in causal explanation, without assigning rational goals. But autonomous man is relying on the slogan that rational action is its own explanation and he must be found ultimately rational goals."[41]

What is needed, according to Hollis, is a theory of rationality by which we can determine whether or not the actions of an agent are expressive of his real interests, objectively determined. The key to the argument is that rationality is not just a measure of consistency. "Rational action can follow on false belief or misplaced desire but only when the belief is rationally held or the desire rationally supported. Objective standards are being invoked, even though we have to be what they are. So there is no escaping a notion of real interests. Autonomous men are moved not by mere desire but by desire for what is truly, self-expressive. The twin effect is to dethrone instrumental and promote expressive rationality."[42] An

individual's action is to be judged rational if it is an expression of some set of real interests that are consistent with the actor's social identity, the latter of which the actor reflectively determines is consonant with his personal identity.

Summary. In short the account goes like this. A person reflectively decides that certain characters or social roles are expressive of what he essentially is. These roles have real interests that can be used to judge the rationality of the goals that the individual chooses as well as the means to these goals. The choice of real interests will be determined, in part, by the ability of the individual to understand his situation accurately and thereby decide what action is rational. In a sense rational action is a skill. Having adopted a particular social identity as expressive of my personal identity, the ends that I choose or action that I engage in can be evaluated as either supportive or non-supportive, expressive or non-expressive of that social identity.

As we mentioned befo , Hollis claims this standard of rationality must minimally consist of (1) the law of identity, (2) the law of non-contradiction, and (3) a minimal law of inference. Without these minimal rules we could never judge the consistency of statements. In addition, we must assume that those whose behavior we are evaluating share much of the same world that we do. If they perceive everything differently than we do we would have no basis for interpreting what is being said at any given time.

The Interpretive Rejoinder

In response to Hollis' critique of Winch I will focus on four main points. First, I shall try to argue that Hollis' arguments for a private rule and language are unconvincing and that his own account of personal identity and rationality belie this account of the possibility of such a rule. Second, I think Hollis' reading and criticism of Winch's arguments concerning rationality and reality ignore important parts of Winch's argument. Third, I shall try to demonstrate that Hollis' own theory of explanation is not as strong an alternative to causal explanation as he believes. Finally, I will argue that his theory of explanation and social theory pose their own threat to individual autonomy.

Private language and social beings. In discussing the possibility or impossibility of a private language it is perhaps helpful to begin by eliminating what is not at issue. Quite obviously no one has ever proposed that an individual or group of individuals could not develop some secret language or code that could be used to communicate meanings between individuals and that would, in practice, be available to a limited number of individuals. A whole range of human activity, from children's games to military intelligence work, involves such private languages and rules. Similarly, no one is arguing that a normally socialized individual in temporary isolaton (e.g. the privacy of one's study) or not so temporary isolation (a person lost at sea or marooned on an island) would be unable to develop rules to follow or

change his language to incorporate new experiences, etc. What is at issue is whether or not: a) one would have to have been brought up in a social setting in order to be able to act in a manner that we would describe as rule following, i.e. whether it makes sense "to suppose anyone capable of establishing a purely personal standard of behavior if he had never had any exprerience of human society with its socially established rules.",[43] and b) these private rules or language are in principal learnable by others who could then judge whether or not the rule is being correctly followed.

I will not pretend to offer a definitive solution to the questions of the possibility of private rules. What I will try to do is a) show that Hollis' account of the possibility of private rules is unconvincing, b) show that things he says elsewhere regarding personal identity and rationality belie his position regarding the possibility of private rules, and c) demonstrate that even if we grant the possibility of such rules they would be of no use in explaining human action.

Language, rules and Robinson Crusoe. As a grounding for his criticism of Winch that purely private rules are not only possible by necessary for explaining human behavior Hollis, like others, uses the example of an isolated Robinson Crusoe. There are, however, several oddities about Hollis' argument that are indicative of the difficulty of making a convincing argument using the Robinson Crusoe example. The first point to make is that, as will be remembered from the original story, DeFoe's Crusoe was an Englishman who was shipwrecked.

Far from being an individual 'outside' of society, he brought all the trappings of English culture with him (e.g. a strong concept of private property, an imperialistic attitude toward the single native who befriended him, etc.). Obviously this individual, who already had a language, a culture, a way of life, in short, who knows what it means to make a mistake and to follow social rules, cannot be the same Crusoe that Hollis speaks of. DeFoe's Crusoe, having been raised in English society, knows what it means to have socially established criteria of correctness even if he temporarily has no one present to check what he says or does at any particular moment. We must assume then that the Crusoe of whom Hollis speaks is Hollis' own invention; he was never taught a language for he was never raised in the presence of others. (The question of how he got where he is and exactly how he was raised must for the time being remain a mystery.)

Hollis claims this mysterious figure would be able to establish and follow private rules that would constitute a private language in spite of his never having had any prolonged human contact. Abandoned at the pre-linquistic stage of infancy, this individual has nonetheless grown up to entertain several ideas that go into the concept of rule following. Minimally, he must have concepts of and standards for identity and differentation. He must have an idea of a correct or incorrect way of going about things, i.e. he knows what it means to make a mistake and to correct it. Finally, he doesn't just name things but he develops a language. By a language we mean more than just a vocabulary. For example, Crusoe's language would have to distinquish sensations from feelings and, in general, distinquish

descriptions of inner feelings from external objects.

There are, however, several characteristics of our language which cannot be used to describe Hollis' (Crusoe's) private language. First, Crusoe cannot be said to be self-conscious of his language in the same sense that we are self-conscious of ours. Our notion and practice of self-consciousness is framed with reference to other individuals. When we become self-conscious or reflective about our language, it is often with a mind to how our language will affect or be understood by others. Hollis' private rules/language cannot be subject to the same reflection that our language is, since there are no 'others' for Crusoe to be conscious of.

Second, the idea of a dialogue that informs our use of language must be absent from Crusoe's private language. Crusoe's private language is not the development of shared meanings intended to communicate; it can at best only be a private record of Crusoe's reaction to this or that. Crusoe's language is totally at his disposal in a way that ours is not at our disposal. Both are conventional, but Crusoe can make this 'mean' anything he wants while we cannot, and this effects his ability to check his present use of a particular concept to see if it squares with his earlier use. Crusoe's language is more like the language of our dream world than the language of our everyday life.

Related to this is the absence of a distinction between intended meaning and received meaning. By definition Crusoe's language cannot be misunderstood in the sense that ours might be, not just because he is isolated but because his language is not the developmental process

or product of a group or way of life.

Third, Crusoe's language contains no peformative utterances that assume the existence of another. Commands and questions, both directed at an other, are not a part of Crusoe's language. In addition, Crusoe's language cannot be used to manipulate, intimidate, persuade, propagandize or discuss.

Now what must strike one as peculiar at this point is Hollis' choice of terms to describe his Crusoe's actions. He (Hollis) does not find it odd to use our notions of language and vocabulary to describe Crusoe's. But in light of the extremely different nature of Crusoe's 'language' it cannot be taken for granted that Hollis can describe this language with the same vocabulary that is used to describe ours. Hollis simply assumes that whatever it is that Crusoe is doing is indeed a language. But from Winch's point of view this is precisely what is in question. In effect Hollis fails to address whether or not a language can be construed simply as a sign system used to designate or identify phenomena in the external world, or whether a language actually involves more than this, e.g. expressing intentions, feelings, and sensations. The former is a fairly simple system of corresponding signs and phenomena; the latter involves a vocabulary and a grammar, a depth if you will that requires the language to develop within a community of language users. The sign system of a single user could not, for instance, make the distinctions between intended meaning and construed meaning. Because others do not exist for whom the intended meaning could be misconstrued, the distinction would never come up and would make no sense to the

Defoeian language user. Moreover, one of the questions that arises in the distinction between intended meaning is the questions of the sincerity of the speaker. But sincerity is an intention that presupposes the existence of others; it is an example of how some of the most basic elements of language are intersubjectively founded.

In light of the array of activities that our language can perform that Crusoe's does not, it cannot be taken for granted, as Hollis does, that one can use the terms language, meaning, etc. to describe the activity that Crusoe performs. To make his case Hollis would have to show that the activities that our language makes possible, the relations and concepts that shape the very nature of language that we use intersubjectively, are not central features of language. Intention, sincerity, ambiguity, irony, pity, deception, persuasion, manipulation, dialogue, conversation, question, response, are just some of the concepts and activities that are absent from Crusoe's language and without which we would be unable to employ our language.[44]

Personal identity & social identity. Hollis' own arguments concerning social and personal identity seem to undermine his arguments concerning the possibility of private rules and language. If I am said to be following a personal standard of conduct, i.e. a rule, one of the things that is implied by such a claim is that I am potentially self-conscious about having my actions be consistent with some set of ideas or beliefs that I believe to be important guides for action. This means that I must be able to determine when my actions

are and are not consistent with those ideas and beliefs. I must, in short, be capable of critical self-examination. I must be able to reflect upon my actions and adjust my behavior according to the rule I claim to be following. Additionally, I must be able to examine the usefulness, propriety or appropriateness of any particular rule if the occasion warrants it. This means that I must be aware of the context of my rule following and be able to discern new circumstances or evidence that might possibly have a bearing on my continuation of a particular rule, or on the revision of the rule to fit new circumstances unanticipated in its initial formulation. Such a picture portrays a being who has not merely learned a trick, or an individual not merely conscious of his activity, but rather a being who is, potentially at least, self-conscious, who has the potential for self-reflection. This is a brief sketch of the strong notion of personal identity that Hollis claims underlies his social theory and defense of autonomy.

Hollis also argues, however, that an individual conscious of his activity in the manner just described cannot develop outside of relations with other human beings. The self who would possibly exercise these critical abilities is a social creature: "Consciousness does not, even could not, operate in a vaccuum and bodies are just bodies unless relations among them are endowed with shared meaning."[45] If this consciousness is socially developed then without some relations with others we obviously have no consciousness and thus no self-consciousness. Hollis takes this to mean that we could also have no autonomous subjects, for the possibility of the

latter rests on a strong notion of the self that goes with self-consciousness. But if this is the case then the status of Hollis' claims concerning the possibility of a private rule and language comes in to question. More than that, the implication seems to be that whatever else Crusoe is he is not an autonomous subject, for autonomy is characteristic of only those with strong notions of personal identity and pe sonal identity cannot, argues Hollis, be developed outside of relations with others.

Intentions, rules and explanation. Hollis' argument in favor of private rules faces one additional problem. To claim that an individual is following a rule is to make a claim not just about the behavior of the individual but of his intentions and beliefs as well. It is to say that he could potentially recognize contraventions of that rule as well as circumstances in which the following of that rule might not be appropriate. To say that an individual is following a private rule is to say that he is following some rule guided by beliefs, intentions, etc. that are in principle unavailable to us. We would not know what the nature of the private rule was. Indeed, we would probably not know that he was following any rule at all. For to be able to say that someone is following a rule, even an unspecified one, is not only to be able to pick out some regularities in his behavior but to be able to specify the point behind such a rule; i.e. it means we must be able to say something of the inte tions guiding the rule. In order to recognize the action as rule following we would have to be able to give examples of contraventions of the rule or

specify instances in which the following of the rule would be inappropriate. Otherwise we would be unable to distinguish the so-called rule following from mere regularity.

Thus, although we can say that one can imagine (in a very loose sense, e.g. in the way that we can all imagine a unicorn) an individual following a private rule, we could never say that this or that particular individual was following a private rule. To do so would be to claim that we could recognize some behavior as not random or mere regularity but as the 'same' as some other behavior from the actor's standpoint. But to do this would go quite a ways towards specifying, at least generally, what the rule in question is. In short, to be able to claim that an individual is following a rule, private or otherwise, is to be able to specify enough of that rule to refute the claim that it is a purely private rule. In other words, however possible it is to 'imagine' someone following a private rule, we would never be able to point to particular examples without ex-post facto explanations from the actor in question. To be able to describe an activity as rule governed is to claim that it is activity governed by a rule that is in principle discoverable by us and thus a social rule. Thus, even if private rules can be said to exist in some still mysterious sense, they are virtually useless in explaining social action. Yet Hollis at times wants to locate final explanation with such private rules!

Rationality and social action. Many commentators on Winch have argued that Winch's proscriptions for social science constitute an extreme

form of relativism. In all fairness it must be pointed out that Winch is in part responsible for what I will argue is a misunderstanding of the point he is trying to make. At times he does make statements that lead the reader to believe that he thinks standards of rationality are incomensurable: "Something can appear rational to someone only in terms of his understanding of what is and is not reational. If our concept of rationality is a different one from his then it makes no sense to say that anything either does or does not appear rational to him in our sense."[46] Such statements can lead the reader to infer that Winch thinks that standards of rationality in different societies are totally incomparable.

Similar statements concerning reality have led some commentators to claim that Winch also believes that reality itself is different for different cultures or ways of life: "Reality is not what gives language sense. What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has."[47] It isn't just that there is a single reality differently perceived. The implication seems to be that there is no single external reality that can be used as a check on a set of beliefs or way of life. Reality and rationality are relative then. No single form of either can be used to judge another for there is virtually nothing that they can be said to share.

Such readings of Winch are not uncommon. Yet I believe that they ignore important parts of Winch's argument. These are not just qualifications to the above claims but points that lead one to see Winch's argument in a substantially different light. I would also argue that these ignored dimensions render Winch's argument more

plausible than that of many of his critics, specifically more plausible than Hollis'.

The reading given above juxtaposes its own view of rationality vis a vis Winch in the following way. Winch believes, it is said, that there are no standards of rationality and reality that are common to all ways of life. Anything, then, can be interpreted as rational. If anything can be interpreted as rational then the concept is impoverished; it no longer can play the critical role for which it was originally intended. "The result is again to make all action rational and so to rob us of any hope that a man's real reasons will, under certain conditions, yield the explanation of his actions."[48] To say then that this or that action is rational is to say nothing about it on this account.

Competing theories of rationality, on the other hand, because they require that actions, beliefs, etc. conform to the minimal rules of logic, promise to offer more fully developed concept of rationality according to their proponents. To say that a belief or an action is rational or irrational in this sense is to convey a certain amount of information about the action or belief. (e.g. that it does not contradict other beliefs, etc.).

This interpretation of the debate between Winch and rationalists is not quite accurate, however. Winch does not deny that there are certain minimal criteria of rationality. Indeed, the concept of rationality is, for Winch, central to language per se: "Rationality is not just a concept in a language like any other; it is this too, for, like any other concept it must be circumscribed by established

use: a use that is established in language. But I think it is not a concept which a language may, as a matter of fact, have and equally not have, as is, for instance, the concept of politeness. It is a concept necessary to the existence of any language: to say that of a society that it has a language is also to say that it has a concept of rationality."[49]

Although the concept of rationality must be "circumscribed by established use" this does not mean that concepts of rationality in different languages or ways of life can be totally different. In fact Winch insists that their use of language must have some features that are similar to what we would call rational, i.e. to our concept of rationality. "There need not perhaps be any word functioning in its language as 'rational' does in ours but at least there must be features of its members' use of language analagous to those features of our use of language which are connected with our use of the word 'rational'. Where there is a language it must make a difference what is said and this is only possible where the saying of one thing rules out, on pain of failure to communicate, the saying of something else."[50] We could not say that this or that culture has a language unless there were features of the language that resemble what we would call rational. But that is not because there is a concept of rationality that we entertain that is superior to others. It is not a case of it being our concept of rationality so much as it is a question of the requirements that any language must meet. The mistake, from Winch's standpoint, is for us to assume that we have a monopoly or some special access to this notion of rationality.

This in itself would seem to indicate that Winch has been misinterpreted by many on the problem of rationality. But Winch actually takes his argument concerning rationality one step further. To say that to have a language is to have a concept of rationality, and then also to say that there must be similar uses if a language between different languages that constitute a concept of rationality, is to say not only must some uses of language be the same but that different cultures must think about their language in similar, though not identical, ways. Many of Winch's opponents argue that this consists of the minimal rules of logic that Hollis outlines. As we have pointed out Winch is not denying that there must be common features to languages of different cultures. What he is saying is that the criteria of logic are by themselves insufficient for making judgements of rationality: "the forms in which rationality expresses itself in the culture of a human society cannot be elucidated simply in terms of the logical coherence of the rules according to which activities are carried out in that society. For, as we have seen, there comes a point when we are not even in a position to determine what is and what is not coherent in such a context of rules, without raising questions about the point which following those rules has in society."[51] And again later when discussing judgements of rationality, "First, as I have indicated, these possibilities are limited by certain formal requirements centering around the demand for consistency. But these formal requirements tell us nothing about what in particular is to count as consistency, just as the rules of propositional calculus limit, but do not themselves determine what are

to be proper values of P, G, etc. We can only determine this by investigating the wider context of life in which the activities are carried on."[52] We must, in addition to the formal rules of consistency, know what counts as a particular instance of something. Before I can say that in an alien culture, persons X, Y and Z are believed to be witches, I must know what it means for someone to be a witch, what the point behind witchcraft is, and what the rules of evidence are regarding that way of life.

If the argument to this point has been correct, then far from offering an impoverished account of rationality Winch's concept is in fact more fully developed and richer than those who would be content with merely the requirements of formal logic. The latter fail to take into account the fact that the formal rules of logic tell us nothing about the meaning of particular beliefs or statements.

This problem is particularly troublesome for Hollis. His attempt to establish an objective standard of rationality in terms of some set of real interests would, I think, undermine his attempt to take into account the importance of any social context. It will be remembered that Hollis tries to establish a way of judging the rationality of goals as well as the rationality of means. If certain goals can be shown to be expressive of what I take to be my self-identity, then it is rational for me to adopt and pursue them. In addition we can, in principle, establish the one best way to achieve these goals, he claims. But what is not clear still is what he means precisely by an objective standard of rationality, i.e. how we would determine that some goals or forms of expression are objectively rational or how such

goals could be truly expressive of something that a person essentially is.

For example, it may be the case that in the nineteenth century as a member of the working class it would have been rational for me to pursue a way of life in hopes of building, both personally for my own family and collectively with others for our progeny, a better life for them. The evidence available at the time would have been convincing enough to indicate that my sacrifice could result in a better life for them. As I work to make the economic pie bigger, so to speak, I am working for the well-being of my offspring and their children. I can sacrifice now, and rationally so, so that my children will not have to.

Such a vision, though once rational, appears somewhat less rational today. In a society in which such sacrifices are sometimes scorned by those in whose name they are made, or if not scorned, in a society in which it appears that such a sacrifice is unlikely to secure for my offspring a life free from the pressures and condition that I presently face, to commit oneself to such a culture of sacrifice seems self-defeating. In other words, goals, beliefs or ideas that appear rational in one time and place may appear irrational at a different time because of the social developments of that society. Certain types of self-identity will appear rational in one social setting because, among other things, they are sustainable and the expectations (i.e., roles, duties, obligations, responsibilities, etc.) that go along with them are in my power to meet. However a different social position or historical situation may make the adoption of those same types of self-identity impossible to sustain or

make it impossible for me to meet those expectations that are tied to it. In the first instance my adoption of that sustainable, attainable self-identity appears (at least at first glance) rational; in the second instance my adoption of a self-identity that is unsustainable or unattainable appears less rational. The import of this point is that self-identity is more context or socially dependent than Hollis seems willing to admit. Thus it is not clear how Hollis' objective standard of rationality would account for the changing conditions of an individual in the situation described above. It seems that he cannot simply say that the goals that are rational in one society or time in history are irrational in another. That implies relative standards of rationality which he adamantly denies are acceptable. This dilemma is forced on Hollis because his method for securing what he believes is a strong rational actor eliminates any historical dimension from that actor's real interests. I think this is the price he pays for a notion of 'real interests' with the type of distance he is pursuing.

On the other hand, someone adopting Winch's structures regarding rationality could more easily (though not necessarily without difficulty) explain and account for the fact that what appeared rational in one contest appears irrational in another. Winch, aware of the connection between rationality and the possibilities presented in a way of life, could account for the changes that might take place between historical periods and thereby explain why a personal identity and personal way of life that seemed so attractive at one point in time might seem unsustainable, self-defeating, or irrational at

another point in time. But it is unclear what alternative forms of explanation and evaluation are available to Winch in the event the actions of participants fail to live up to their own standards of rationality. Nor is Winch totally convincing except to sympathetic readers that his account of rationality is not in the end of form of relativism. Winch does say that the phenomena of birth, sex and death provide the threads around which we can weave comparisons of standards of rationality, but he provides no hint as to what this might look like. The range of beliefs about birth, sex and death found in different cultures seems to repose the problem of what can be considered rational or what it would mean to say the beliefs of a certain culture about birth, sex and death were rationally held.

Rational explanation and causality. Throughout his writings Hollis emphasizes that one of his goals is to provide an alternative of sorts to causal explanation. Explanation in causal terms, though it has its strengths, namely its single mode of explanation according to Hollis, lacks a self to appy the explanation to. Because of its deterministic tendencies, causal explanation denies a place to human autonomy. However, there remain a variety of ambiguities in both Hollis' intentions as to what he is proving and his account of his alternative.

First, it is not quire clear what Hollis means when he says he is offering an alternative to causal explanation. At times one gets the impressions that causal explanation is to be replaced altogether. One must accept either Hollis' theory of explanation with its active conception of man or side with the determinists and their plastic

conception of man. There is no ground in the middle, no compromise between the two modes of man and hence no compromise between the two types of explanation. He says, "In the broadest terms, passive and active conceptions vie with one another, each requiring a different model of explanation and each model of explanation presupposing a (different) view of human nature."[53] And elsewhere, while addressing the same issue: "I undertake to show that there can be no compromise and to propose a notion of the autonomous self together with its missing mode of explanation."[54]

At other times one gets the impression that Hollis sees the two types of explanation as complimentary. One should try to explain as much as possible using the model of rational action. When this fails one can turn then to causal explanation. In this latter case the only problem with social science is that it has allowed the net of causal explanation to be cast a bit too far. It isn't that causal explanation is an illegitimate form of explanation for social action. It's just that it has been used to describe action that could more accurately be described by other means. As long as social theorists recognize the limits of it and the place of rational explanation, no harm has been done.

I will consider both of these possibilities together. I shall try to show that in both cases Hollis fails to meet his own requirements for limiting the scope of causal explanation and its plastic model of man and that according to his own arguments his form of rational explanation would have very little purchase in explaining social life.

It is part of Hollis' argument that in order for his form of

rational explanation to succeed as an alternative to forms of explanation that assume a plastic view of man, he must offer a strong notion of personal identity. As we have earlier outlined, by a strong notion of personal identity he means one in which the identity of actors can not be said to be determined by the social or natural environment.

Hollis tries to supply a strong notion of personal identity, without falling into pre-social atomism, by arguing that individuals can retrospectively evaluate their positions and roles in society and thereby determine which are expressive of themselves. Having done this, we can say that an actor has autonomously chosen his own identity, and we can then evaluate to what extent his actions are rational in terms of his choice of personal identity. The latter can be determined objectively, for social theorists will be able to determine, according to Hollis, the single best course of action for the individual in question. However, there are several objections that Hollis must meet before such an account of social explanation can be convincing.

First, it is unclear just how a theory of human nature will influence the choice of personal and social identity. At times Hollis states that human nature must be ahistorical, to say that it changes with cultures is to fall into a form of relativism that Hollis finds unacceptable. If human nature is a constant the question that arises is what is it that individuals reflectively and autonomously choose amongst. It would seem that a good deal, if not all, of their personal identity is already determined. If human nature is as

constant as Hollis seems to believe, then only those things that are consonant with that nature can be expressive of my nature and hence much of my own personal identity. Such a view is far from the autonomous individual that Hollis seeks to defend from naturalism.

The second point that Hollis must consider when making an argument for a stront notion of personal identity is that individuals placed in different social contexts in which the range of possible self-interpretations are not identical may make different choices regarding their roles and choice of social action. If range and actual choice of self-interpretation varies with different contemporary social contexts, then it seems that any notion of self-identity is going to be more socially dependent than Hollis admits.

For example, it is conceivable that an individual placed in a society in which personal worth, recognition, security for one's family, and the availability of life chances were dependent upon individual achievement and personal wealth would rationally adopt a personal identity consonant with that environment, particularly if alternatives were seen as foolishly self-sacrificing, a sign of weakness, or a sign of inability. On the other hand, in a society in which unbridled personal ambition and individualism are seen as evidence of evil, a distorted personality, or a disruption of one's relationship with family and friends, a significantly different personal identity would likely to be rationally adopted by the same individual. Hollis has no way of explaining this variability of different identities. His notion of objective real interests seems to

leave little room for maneuver between significantly different cultures or historical periods.

In other words, reflective evaluation of the alternatives available to one will not then necessarily yield a single rational choice. Rational individuals could disagree, or a single rational individual could, after different experiences, chose differently. In each case the choice would be influenced, though not necessarily determined, by the evidence and range of alternatives avilable.

Hollis seems to recognize this at times. In several places he claims that the self, because it is a social self, is the result of self definition within a range of shared meanings. But this means, at the very least, that self-interpretations not available within, or excluded from any particular web of meanings, are either unavailable to an actor or irrational if adopted. If this is true then my self-identity is at least in part constrained by the meaning available to me in my language. One does not have to agree that language is a prison-house to recognize that it exerts a limiting effect. But to recognize this inhibiting influence is to abandon the claim for the strong notion of personal identity <u>such as Hollis wants</u> as well as to abandon the strong claim that human nature is a historical constant. Since Hollis' theory of objective rationality is intimately bound to this type of strong notion of personal identity, the possibility of achieving the goal of his form of rational explanation is subsequently imperiled.

I think that the crux of Hollis' problem is that in order to connect the strong notion of personal identity to the social roles and

context that make that identity a social identity, he needs what has been described as an expressivist view of language. This interpretation of language sees language not just as a tool or sign system for designating and identifying the external world. Language does perform this function. But more importantly the expressivist view of language sees language as the medium through which we become aware of our ideas, feelings and sensations; it is the phenomena that makes reflection on those ideas, feelings and sensations possible. But this view of language insists that language is also a the property of a community and not the tool or instrument of a private individual as Hollis believes it can be and needs to be. As we shall see in the last chapter, it is the expressivist view of language that provides the type of strong evaluation that would be the hub of Hollis' strong notion of personal identity; but at the same time it precludes the private rules and type of distance from language and ways of life that Hollis insists are the foundation of Autonomous Man.[55]

The final objection to Hollis' theory of explanation concerns the accuracy of Hollis' model of rational explanation as an actual description and explanation of what actually occurs. At one point he admits that his choice of Autonomous Man as the metaphysical basis for rational explanation is not grounded on a claim of what is actually the case. He says, "... I propose to take Autonomous Man as not a description but, so to speak, a prescription. In as much as all social theories presuppose a view of human nature, an active conception holds that men are potentially autonomous. Yet not everyone succeeds in acting autonomously all the time - not all social

action can be explained normatively."[56] And elsewhere he states: "I want to suggest finally and fleetingly that the free social individual is the man who creates his own social identity by acting rationally within a consistent role-set of his own choosing and becomes what he has chosen by accepting his 'duties' as his duties. Few men take this course and few societies offer it."[57] The import of such remarks is that Hollis' ideal of rational or normative explanation seems to have little in common with how men usually act in social life. If this is the case, if rational explanation is what Hollis would like to see rather than what actually occurs, and if "whatever is beyond the scope of the ideal is fair game for a causal account.",[58] then it seems that much of what occurs in social life must be explained precisely by that model of explanation that Hollis seeks to reject, i.e. causal explanation. If in fact few societies offer the alternative of acting autonomously (and therefore rationally, according to Hollis), and if few men take that alternative when it is offered it seems to follow from the way Hollis has set up the choice of alternatives that his form of rational explanation has failed to supplant causal variants relying on plastic conceptions of man. In some respects Hollis has made a better case for his opponents than he has for himself. For he has said in so many words that one must choose between the two types of explanation, and yet his, he admits, describes (at best) only occasional instances of social life. It would seem to follow from this that one would be better off using a causal model of explanation exclusively (if in fact there can be no compromise between the two forms of explanation) or at least using

causal explanation as the primary form of explanation.[59]

These shortcomings of Hollis' account of rational action and explanation can be traced, in part, to the nature of choice that Hollis seems to believe is available to actors. There seems to be a tension in Hollis between his recognizing the necessity of at least some limits to choice and the desire to be able to break those limits. In the end Hollis opts for the latter. Hence, Hollis' theory of Autonomous Man is the actor who not only chooses between alternatives but who determines the alternatives as well; it is a theory of radical choice. But surely any order implies some limits, allowing some possibilities and not others. Without such limits it is difficult to imagine how Hollis' rational actor's choice can be anything other than the exercise of pure will. The fact that in the end this view of man in unsustainable, coupled with the way Hollis sets up the alternatives between rational explanation and causal explanation, almost guarantee that causal explanation will appear as the more convincing alternative.

Real interests and autonomy. As a model of explanation Hollis posts an actor who has a set of rationally arrived at goals. What makes these goals rational is that they correspond or are consistent with a set of real interests that are attached to th actors social roles, the latter of which is are expressive of the actor's self. In Hollis' words, a person "has good reasons only if he acts in his ultimate interests. His ultimate interests derive from what he essentially is. What he essentially is depends partly on what is essential to

being any person and partly on what is essential to his being that particular person."[60] The latter, presumably, are in part the real interests that are attached to my role which I have reflectively determined to be expressive of myself. Thus, once I reflectively decide that being an academician is expressive of my self, it can be determined what my real interests are regardless of what I may think them to be. Similarly, to say that I have certain ultimate interests by the very nature of my being a person, and then to add that this human nature is ahistorical, is to say that it is unaffected by what my beliefs about myself are.

Hollis admits that the question of real or ultimate interests shades into the area of ethics and the Good Society. But he repeatedly hesitates to enter into a discussion of what that Good Society looks like, admitting that such a discussion is nonetheless necessary for a complete social theory.

In sum, Autonomous Man is the individual who acts rationally. A person acts rationally by acting in their real or ultimate interests determined by the roles that are expressive of one's self and an unspecified, ahistorical human nature. There is a link between autonomy and real interests: acting autonomously is dependent upon (consists of) acting to fulfill my real interests.

There are two related objections to this account of real interests and autonomy. The first is that the nature of this reflective process that would enable one to rationally determine what is self-defining or expressive is still very unclear. This is exemplified by the fact that although he chides Winch for making man always subject to public

rules and supposedly leaving no room for distance from rules, and therefore no room for personal autonomy, he himself states that "I confess to believing that there can be no self where all rules are played with distance.... In this sense man is a social animal. But, given existing social forms to play without distance is to be passive. The free man therefore distances himself from the outward aspects of his roles, while choosing and commiting himself to real roles whose duties are among his motives."[61] Presumably these 'real' roles are not social roles, otherwise the distance they are supposed to provide would disappear. But this still leaves unanswered a myriad of questions about such real roles. Without further elaboration it is not clear how Hollis' autonomous individual has any more distance than Winch's rule-governed agents.

At times Hollis' version of Autonomous Man looks alarmingly like Englightenment versions of the human subject and freedom. Immune to religious and cosmologically imposed identity, the subject of the Enlightenment is self-defining and self-causing. He looks to neither religious dogma nor to established tradition to find meaning and purpose for this life; he provides it himself. In its most extreme version, the Enlightenment subject makes the existence of God epistemologically dependent upon himself. However, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, "The self-defining subject of modern epistemology is thus naturally the atomic subjectivity of the psychology and politics which grew out of the same movement."[62] This atomistic view of psychology and politics with its implicit mechanistic and technocratic approach to social life is precisely what Hollis seeks to avoid. For

the latter is as much a threat to Autonomous Man as the oversocialization that Hollis feels results from explaining human behavior in terms of rules. Hollis, it seems, is still caught in the classical Enlightenment trap. It seems he wants the autonomy that the Enlightenment's epistemological subject has without the atomistic, mechanistic approach to psychology and politics that accompanied it.

To salvage the strong version of autonomy without having to transport the baggage of atomism into his social theory Hollis introduces what he takes to be a strong version of personal identity, albeit one that is in the end the identity of a social self. Yet this version of personal identity that he settles for rests upon an approach to language that is more closely allied with the Winchian position than the view of autonomy that Hollis seems intent on defending.

As we pointed out earlier, Hollis thinks that his version of Autonomous Man is imperiled unless rock bottom explanation rests with some version of private rules that allow the subject to be self-causing and self-defining. But to avoid the atomism that plagues some political theories (e.g., the old Enlightenment position) he imports a theory of personal identity that assumes a social context, shared meanings, and which is arrived at through reflective evaluation that can only be partial at any given time. Thus, I can only evaluate my personal identity in terms of the array of roles and meanings available to me within a given social context. Even then I can only evaluate some of my roles or part of my identity in terms of other roles and meanings at a given time. To be able to evaluate all the

roles and meanings available to me at once would require that I be able to place myself completely outside of my social context and language, and not even Hollis believes this to be possible.

But this version of personal identity undermines his claim that explanation must, in the end, rest with some version of private rules and is amazingly similar to the Winchian claim that all specifically human behavior is governed by rules that can only be developed in contact with social life. In fact this view of personal identity seems to rest upon an expressivist approach to language that characterizes the Winchian (and similar) positions. But if Hollis is going to accept the expressivist approach to language and pin his hopes for a notion of personal identity on it, he will have to revise his view of the relationship of Autonomous Man to social rules and language.

But perhaps more disturbing than this incoherent view of autonomy and personal identity is the threat to freedom that Hollis' account of real interests poses. When one ties a notion of real or ultimate interests, which have implications for some broader notion of the Good Society, with an epistemologically privileged position of the social theorist, new tendencies emerge that represent a new threat to freedom and autonomy. Its most extreme version is described by Hegel in the dialectic of Absolute Freedom and Absolute Terror. There Hegel argues that the Terror of the French Revolution is the necessary outcome of the Enlightenment and its view of itself. The Enlightenment sees itself as a universal rational consciousness that can determine what is universally just. This is not arrived at by an aggregation of

particular or individual views or interests. It is arrived at by pure insight on the part of the universal knowing subject. The universal knowing subject tries to transform the world according to its universal reason. This Hegel calls Absolute Freedom: rational subjectivity unencumbered by reality outside of itself. It refuses to recognize the legitimacy of any dissenting view or the truth of any independent reality.

Practically speaking, this means that all individuals must will the same thing. The universal rational subject cannot tolerate different realities of interpretations of reality or independent structures outside of this universal will. Otherwise the claim to universality is threatened. That which is at odds with, or those who disagree with the universal will, are portrayed as representing particular wills, i.e. they are self-interested, opposed to the universal or general interest.

But such universality is, according to Hegel, impossible. The universal, rational will, in order to become actual, must find embodiment in a single individual or group. But no single individual or group could ever have the total knowledge that is claimed the universal will has. Those who represent themselves as the universal knowing subject are merely a particular group or faction which usurps the position of universal consciousness that excludes others. In Hegel's words:

> Just as the individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this universal work of absolute freedom qua existent substance, so little does it find itself in the deeds proper and individual actions of the will of this freedom. Before the universal can perform a deed it must

> concentrate itself into the One of individuality and put at the head an individual self-consciousness; for the universal will is only actual in a self, which is one. But thereby all other individuals and excluded from the entirety of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be a deed of the actual universal self-consciousness. Universal freedom, therefore, can produce neither a positive work nor a deed; there is left for it only negative action; it is merely the <u>fury</u> of destruction.[63]

The result is that this false universal consciousness uses its claim to universal reason as a justification for concerning others who it sees as self-interested, i.e. opposed to the interest of all. Historically, Hegel thinks the Reign of Terror was the embodiment of this. Absolute Terror is the expected (necessary for Hegel) outcome of Absolute Freedom, i.e. the claim to universal (including moral or ethical) knowledge.

It is important to reiterate the nature of this claim to universal knowledge in order to understand the connection to Absolute Terror. The claim is that the universal interest is objectively rational and therefore achieved by pure insight. In this sense it is accessible to all who are not captured by the dogma of religious or politically motivated claims. Those who take issue with this universal interest are seen as either dupes captured by the dogma of irrationality (e.g. church or monarchy) or the knowing perpetrators of that dogma, i.e. the clergy, aristocracy or other alleged self-interested individuals. Once the truth is revealed by the universal knowing subject and the mask of dogma removed and its claims disproved, opponents and critics of the universal will must appear complicitous in the efforts of those motivated by particular interests, and therefore morally bankrupt. Individuals opposed to the universal will can no longer claim lack of

knowledge as the reason for their alleged self-interests; the space for ignorance has disappeared. They must either support and comply with the universal will or admit their complicity in the obstruction of the universal will and face the political terror that results from the drive to absolute freedom.

Now I am not claiming that Hegel's account of the dialectic of Absolute Freedom and Terror fits Hollis' view of explanation, rationality and autonomy perfectly. But several of the elements that are necessary ingredients or conditions for what Hegel calls Absolute Terror are to be found in Hollis' social theory. Specifically, he welds an epistemologically privileged position for the theorist to a theory of objective rationality and ultimate interests. This combination threatens to bring substantial moral pressure, if not outright coercion, upon individuals who act irrationally from the point of view of Hollis' real interests to act autonomously as determined by Hollis. At the very least it is incumbent upon Hollis to demonstrate how his account of real interests avoids the tragedy that Hegel claims the Enlightenment fell into.

This is not to identify Hollis with the extremes of the French Revolution. It is perhaps more a question of a tension in Hollis' thought. He seems to want a God's eye view of the world and alternatives for action that would allow for comprehensive criticism of the rationality of social actors. At the same time he seems to recognize that we must start with social roles that are embedded in a web of relationships and from this attempt to achieve greater, more complete forms of reflection. But when push comes to shove, he

sacrifices the latter for the former. Hence, I think he leaves himself open to the criticism that he falls into the trap Hegel claimed plagued the Enlightenment.

A theory of authority extrapolated. Hollis nowhere outlines a theory of authority. But we can extrapolate from his view of rationality and autonomous man. Of the several thinkers we will examine, Hollis comes closest to the pure Enlightenment view of the relationship between autonomy and tradition. Although the social roles available to actors are the raw material of reflection, Hollis believes that actors can rationally determine their real interests if provided sufficient distance from those roles. Given this view of the relationship between autonomy, reason and social roles, Hollis would be led to deny any claim that authority and a way of life on the one hand and autonomy and rationality on the other are identical, complementary, or consistent with each other. Authority, either that of a way of life and tradition or that of an individual or office, sets limits on the range of reflection and alternatives for action available to agents. It is the imposition of an external will, policy or constraint that is not necessarily consistent with my real interests. Hence, authority in any form would be antithetical to the very notion of Autonomous Man.

The necessity of authority. An alternative account of authority and its relationship to autonomy is available from Winch's account of rule-governed behavior. Winch claims that what distinguished human society from other types of life is that the former is based on

communication, speech and mutual understanding. Because of this one can only give a complete account of human social life by considering the way in which concepts, ideas and beliefs enter into social relations. The pivotal role that concepts play in constituting social action means that it is a rule governed activity. To engage in a rule governed activity one must be able (at least tacitly) to distinguish between a right and wrong way of doing things. This right and wrong way of doing things is never simply determined subjectively. I can not capriciously use concepts nor capriciously determine the meanings of my actions. Rather, the possible meanings that a word or action can have are partly determined by the intersubjective rules that govern that particular mode of speech or type of activity. To insure that one's actions conform to these intersubjective rules necessitates an appeal to authority according to Winch. "All characteristically human activities involve a reference to an established way of doing things. The idea of such an established way of doing things in its turn presupposes that the practices and pronouncements of a certain group shall be authoritative in connection with the activity in question."[64] For example, one who wishes to learn chess will appeal to the authoritative pronouncements of a chess master regarding the rules governing not only the mechanics of the game but also how to conduct the best opening, middle and closing parts of the game.

This account of the relationship of authority to human action leads Winch to conclude that authority does not stand in an external (i.e. causal) relation to human action. The relationship of authority to human action is an internal one. One cannot engage in

rule-governed (and hence specifically human) activity without at the same time accepting the exercise of some authority. "The acceptance of authority is not just something which, as a matter of fact, you cannot get along without if you want to participate in rule-governed activities; rather to participate in rule-governed activities is in a certain way, to accept authority."[65] The relationship between human action and authority is not contingent; without authority there could be no meaningful human action for Winch.

Winch's second, and perhaps even more controversial, conclusion flows directly from his argument concerning the relationship and necessity of authority to social life. In order to be able make an autonomous, rational choice one must be able to consider reasons for and against the actions, belief or idea under consideration. To know what constitutes a good reason for doing something presupposes a knowledge of the rules that guide that activity and the point behind that form of life: "reasons are intelligible only in the context of the rules governing the kind of activity in which one is participating."[66] And as was pointed out earlier Winch argues that the notion of a rule presupposes the existence and necessity of authority. It follows that if it is only in the context of rule governed activity that it makes sense to evaluate, accept and reject reasons; and if this deliberation concerning reasons is itself and intrinsic part of exercising autonomy or freedom of choice, it follows then that "it is only in the context of rule governed activities that it makes sense to speak of freedom of choice, to eschew all rules - supposing for a moment that we understood what that meant - would not

be to gain perfect freedom, but to create a situation in which the notion of freedom could no longer find foothold.... the acceptance of authority is conceptually inseperable from participation in rule-governed activities. It follows that this acceptance is a precondition of the possibility of freedom of choice. Somebody who said that he was going to renounce all authority in order to insure that he had perfect freedom of choice would thus be contradicting himself."[67]

It is critical that we understand precisely the point that Winch is making here. He is not making the more common argument that authority is legitimate because it is something we voluntarily agree to subject ourselves to and that it is this voluntary aspect of authority that distinquishes it from power, coercion, etc. Winch is making the more radical claim that because human action is characterized by its rule governedness, it is necessarily subject to authority and it is only in this context of this authority that one can exercise freedom of choice at all. In fact, from Winch's perspective, without authority there can be human action at all, free or otherwise.

From this account of human action and authority in general Winch derives the following conclusions concerning <u>political</u> authority. No rule governed activity exists in a social vacuum. There will always be other groups and the actions of each social group has potential effects on some or all of the other groups. One can go so far as to say that since the ideas, concepts and beliefs and rules that help make up a way of life or social group are expressions of ideas about

reality (including or particularly social reality) that the existence of any one group presupposes the existence of particular other groups or other groups in general. Since conflict may arise between or amongst various social groups, there must be a means of resolving these conflicts. It follows that even though one does not make a deliberate choice to accept existing political authority in the way that one chooses to accept the authority of a chess master, the very nature of human, i.e. rule-governed activity, requires or presupposes some political authority: "the fact that one is a human social being, engaged in rule-governed activities and on that account able to deliberate and to choose, is in itself sufficient to commit one to the acceptance of legitimate political authority."[68] It is political authority that interprets the rules for adjudicating between conflicting groups; political authority determines the right and wrong way of resolving conflict.

Winch recognizes that it is <u>in</u> politics that there is often disagreement over the right and wrong way of proceeding or of resolving conflict. But it is because of this that political authority is bound by the expectation that it can justify its actions as the right thing to do. In other words political authority, when challenged, must appeal to some normative standard. Once those in political authority cease to justify their actions as being in conformity with some set of norms that are (at least tacitly) collectively held, it ceases to function as authority and degenerates into power or coercion, according to Winch. Winch, however, eventually repudiates this account of <u>political</u> authority, while at

the same time maintaining that any account of political authority must nonetheless incorporate his more general account of authority.

Critique of the Winchian Account of Authority

In spite of the untenability of Hollis alternative, Winch's account of authority and freedom of choice will not, as it stands, provide an acceptable alternative. There are several problems with Winch's argument that can be traced to the fact that he focuses on epistemic authority in his argument and in the examples he gives. This leads him to assume that the triadic relationship found in epistemic authority amongst the concepts and ideas that help constitute a way of life, those who are said to be in authority, and those over whom authority is exercised holds for all instances of authority. In effect, Winch violates his own Wittgenstienian strictures in his analysis of authority. Instead of examining the different uses of authority in different language games (e.g. chess, education, politics, etc.), he offers a single version of authority (i.e. epistemic authority) as paradigmatic. Thus, all instances of authority can be analyzed in these terms. But just as we cannot take any single use of the concept game as the paradigm for all games, upon which all other uses of the term game are parasitic, neither can we expect that epistemic authority can be paradigmatic for all forms of life in which the concept and exercise of authority is found.

This focus is the reason why Winch makes the unqualified claim that one who is placed in a position of authority, be it political,

administrative, judicial, or otherwise, is necessarily 'an authority,' i.e. has a certain recognized expertise concerning the area over which he is placed in authority. This leads one to infer that there could never, in Winch's eyes, be an illegitimate exercise of authority. Indeed, it is difficult to see exactly how the question of legitimacy would even come up. This focus also leads Winch to overstate the role of criticism in the actual exercise of non-epistemic forms of authority.

Although I believe that Winch's argument corrects a previously mistaken emphasis, his account of authority rests upon several unexamined assumptions which, when scrutinized, render his account of authority unacceptable in its pure form. Specifically, I would argue that in order for the pure form of epistemic authority to exist six assumptions or pre-requisites must be met:

(1) The point behind the activity or way of life must not itself be in question or challenged. For example, chess novices do not contest the point behind chess.

(2) At least some of the primary or formal rules (e.g. the rules governing the mechanics of chess or basketball) must themselves be available to all or agreed upon by all, although the less formal rules concerning a better or best way to proceed might not.

(3) The 'formal test' or procedure for establishing one as 'an authority' must be relatively clear in that it is generally known what the test consists of and the criteria for establishing that authority are not themselves contested severely.

(4) The criteria by which 'an authority' is determined are themselves internally related to the activity in question.

(5) Because epistemic authority is bound up with systems of ideas, and because systems of ideas must be subject to discussion and criticism,[69] it follows that there must

be a multiplicity of authorities for there to be any pure epistemic authority at all. For if one individual or group of individuals had a monopoly on a particular system of ideas or on the pronouncements concerning the right and wrong way of going about things, their pronouncements could never be subject to the informed criticism of others and therefore we could never check the correctness of their pronouncements in relation to a particular system of ideas.

(6) Those subject to a particular authority are not compelled by coercion, manipulation or other forms of power and influence, nor by material necessity to engage in a particular activity.

When each of the above prerequisites is met we can be said to have a pure case of epistemic authority. In other words, the pronouncements of those in authority are taken as authoritative because it is presumed that those in authority do in fact have greater knowledge about the right and wrong way of going about things and because the shared background to the enterprise gives others the opportunity to subject those claims to some degree of critical scrutiny (an authority is recognized). In such a case it can be said that one who is 'in authority' is also 'an authority' and that the exercise of such authority is consistent with the exercise of freedom of choice. The stronger claim can also be supported, i.e. that this sort of authority is a prerequisite for freedom of choice since it provides the background conditions against which choices are formed.

But his set of idealized conditions does not always pertain. When one or more of the conditions is not met, the claim to superior insight or knowledge, though it may still be present, recedes and other criteria become more prominent. For example, during the early stages of the Viet Nam War, those in political authority in the United States justified U.S. policy in Southeast Asia as being in the

national security of the U.S., national security which those is political authority knew best how to determine and protect. As this claim became the object of criticism, the justification for the war eventually shifted to the President's authority to commit troops to combat situations because of the powers vested in the President as Commander-in Chief of the armed forces by the Constitution. In the first instance the justification based on the claim to know what was in the national interest was most prominent. But when this justification failed to convince an ever growing segment of the population and the Congress as well, the more legalistic (though Constitutionally questionable) justification was offered.

In addition, the role of criticism and the relationship between authority and freedom of choice may change. This is not to say that the epistemic dimension of authority ever disappears altogether. My argument is the more limited claim that other bases for authority become more prominent under these conditions. To support this claim I would like to focus on several examples of social life in which someone is said to be 'in authority' and use these to demonstrate the defects of Winch's argument.

The myopic approach to authority that Winch takes leads him to make the claim that anyone who is 'in authority' is 'an authority'. This can mean two things. Winch can be arguing that one who assumes or is placed in a position of authority somehow becomes 'an authority' on something, presumably the mode of activity or way of life that they are said to be 'an authority' on. Or Winch can mean that a person is only 'in authority' when he is acting as 'an authority.' Those who

are placed in positions of authority but are not in fact 'an authority' do not really exercise authority but exercise power, coercion or influence. (The distinction between authority on the one hand, and power, etc. on the other is important for Winch. The former is internally related to human action, the latter stands in external i.e. causal, relation to it.) The first claim is empirically false. It is not the case that all who assume positions of authority necessarily become authorities on that particular way of life or activity. The second claim attempts to account for authority by definitional fiat. It is a moment of nominalism that strains against Winchian enterprise as a whole. For it is one of Winch's claims that to understand a concept we must understand how it is used within particular form of life. An examination of several examples of relationships in which authority is said to be exercised will indicate that Winch's claim concerning the epistemic basis of all authority needs to be modified.

The workplace and authority. Within the workplace certain actions and statements of owners and managers are taken by their employees as authoritative. Decisions concerning what will be produced and what techniques will be used in the manufacture of those products are generally recognized by employees to be the domain of managers. At the same time workers often dispute the wisdom or knowledge of management concerning how the product might best be produced or improved upon. In effect, workers often deny that management has any monopoly on the right way of producing the good. This denial on the

part of workers has several dimensions to it. First, management and workers perceive the activity of work differently. While there may be some overlap concerning the point of their enterprise, both parties also, in part, perceive the workplace as having different instrumental uses.[78] Hence, there is less than total agreement between workers and managers on the point or purpose behind the workplace. Secondly, all the criteria for determining who will and will not be placed in a position of authority are not internally related to the activity in question. Managers are often hired less for their knowledge of the right and wrong way of producing this or that good than for their ability to control wage demands, increase profits, etc. Finally, many social theorists would argue that the structure of modern capitalist economy is such that the threat of unemployment and the lack of alternatives concerning the organization of production makes the participation on the part of workers in the economy less than voluntary. The choices available to them are severely restricted. They do not voluntarily participate in the production process in the way that one voluntarily takes up chess.

In spite of the fact that conditions (1), (4) and (6) that we established for epistemic authority are not met, it would be inaccurate to describe the relationship between managers and workers as one of merely power or coercion. Workers do recognize the authority of managers in the workplace but not because of any epitemological privilege that managers are thought to have but rather because managers are in the position of ownership or represent those who are. Hence, although managers may not be recognized as 'an

authority' by workers they are nonetheless recognized as being 'in authority' by them.

Family life and authority. The second example is taken from the family. Undoubtedly most people entertain ideas about the right and wrong way to raise children. Yet in modern American society it cannot be said that there is a single set of identifiable rules that each parent must conform to similar to what we might find in a less complex, more ritualized culture. Not just the techniques, but the goals of child rearing are themselves not widely agreed upon. Nonetheless, except in the most extreme circumstances (e.g., actual threats to the child's welfare that can be classified as violations of more general crimes), even when we deny the appropriateness of the techniques, knowledge or even motives of a particular parent concerning childrearing, that parent's authority to 'bring his/her children up as he/she sees fit' is still accepted and recognized. This recognition of authority certainly does not rest on a recognition of their knowledge of the right way to bring up children. In fact their authority may be defended by some who nonetheless view the parents in question as poor parents.

In such a situation the legitimacy of the parents authority in rearing their own children is based on their position as natural parents. This is not to say that we deny altogether that they might have some correct knowledge about how to rear their children; but to the extent that we claim this privileged position for them we do so not so much because of some formal test but because of the fact that

they occupy a certain (biological) position with respect to their particular children.

Legal authority. The final example is taken from the American legal system. In most instances in the United States judges are appointed by elected officials. Though no formal criteria exist concerning the expertise or knowledge of the law, it is generally expected that nominees to such positions will have formal training in law and will have been engaged in some occupation with the law or government indicating a greater knowledge of law than the average layman might have. However, in a number of areas in the United States judges are not appointed and subject to the above expectations, but are elected themselves by popular vote. In many of these elections the requirements or expectations concerning formal legal training of the candidates are nill. At best only a very limited case could be made that the voters require any expertise concerning the law. Nonetheless, the pronouncements of elected judges are taken to be as authoritative as those of judges who have somehow demonstrated their legal expertise. In such cases the mere occupation of the position is taken as sufficient warrant to recognize the judge as in authority regarding the law. This is not to say that knowledge of the law as a determinant of authority disappears altogether. Such judges are still expected to act in accordance with the law. But it is to say that the requirement of superior knowledge as the legitimation of one's legal authority has slipped into the background and the occupation, via election, of formal position is thrown into relief.

It would seem then that Winch's account of authority is unable to account for how the concept of authority is actually used in various forms of life. For some social theorists this would pose only a minimal problem. But because Winch believes that in order to understand a particular concept or idea one must examine the place that it has in a particular culture or way of life, this represents a serious problem for him.

An additional problem with Winch's focus on epistemic authority, the legitimacy of which is dependent on its being potentially subject to critical scrutiny, is that it overestimates the facility with which criticism may emerge. First, the focus on pure forms of epistemic authority tends to ignore the exclusive nature of some tyes of authority. In the case of pure empistemic authority, all who can demonstrate knowledge of a particuar activity are said to be an authority on that subject matter or activity. Hence, in chess there is no theoretical limit to the number of persons who might be said to be authorities on chess. The existence of the one authority on chess (or the English language, philosophy, American politics, etc.) does not exclude the possible existence of other authorities. It may even be the case that those who are recognized as authorities differ in their pronouncements on a particular subject. For example, there may be different interpretations of the strength of the Presidency in American politics, each requiring that the other interpretation(s) be at least partly wrong. We might still recognize each inhterpretaton as a reasonable, defensible interpretation of the Presidency in spite of their disagreement, and not repudiate the one as an authority

because of our acceptance of another's interpretation.

However, there are many cases where the exercise of authority is exclusive, and the acceptance or recognition of one authority precludes the recognition of others. The importance of this point is that in those areas of life that include multiple authorities (e.g. chess, academic life, etc).) the potential for criticism is great. Winch takes this possibility for criticism and subsequent justification to be an important part of authority. It is crucial in establishing its compatibility with freedom of choice as well as the basis for distinguishing it from power, coercion or manipulation. This is not to say that those who occupy exclusive positions of authority do not need to justify their actions. What it does mean is that where exclusive forms of authority exist, i.e. where the knowledge required for the right to declare what is the right way of going about something is available to only one or a limited number of people, the possibilities for those over whom authority is exercised to critically evaluate whether or not a particular action is correct, just, appropriate, etc., are likely to be more (even extremely) limited than in those areas where there are a multiplicity of authorities, while the importance of critically evaluating that exclusive authority is likely to be just as great, possibly greater. In such cases we tend to recognize the pronouncements of those who are epistemologically privileged as authoritative because they are the pronouncements of the epistemologically privileged, rather than because they measure up to some standard of criticism that we have concerning a way of life. Because the possibilities of criticism in

such circumstances are limited, the possibilities of those in authority trading on their authoritative positions to disguise what are actually exercises of power or manipulation are greater. I do not think that Winch would disagree with this last point. But his account of authority tends to underplay it.

Winch's account also tends to obfuscate the meaning of concepts that are derivitives from the term authority, i.e. authoritarian and authoritative, for which criticism plays a less important role. When we speak of someone's attitude as authoritarian we mean that the individual is prone to place the actions and pronouncements of those in authority above critical examination and discussion. The authoritarian individual defers to those who are 'in authority' simply because they are 'in authority'. Similarly, when we take someone's statements to be authoritative we often mean that we accept those statements as accurate, true, lawful, etc., without critically examining their accuracy, truth or legality. The use of both terms implies the suspension of judgement; a failure, refusal or inability to engage in a critical examination of authority and a willingness to accept that authority as legitimate without immediate justification. While it is true that when we take a statement, action or decision as authoritative there is often an assumption that the authority in question is legitimate and could be justified, the use of the term implies that critical examination has not taken place and is thought to be unnecessary, even if only temporarily. And to describe someone's attitude as authoritarian is to imply that one has accepted the exercise of authority in areas of life where such acceptance is

illegitimate or when critical examination of particular actions or statements should have emerged but did not.

This emphasis on the possibility of critical examination and subsequent justification threatens to collapse the concept of authority with that of persuasion. It is true that those in authority are sometimes put on the defensive and are pressed to justify their decisions, statements or actions. And I would agree with Winch that the possibility of such criticism and justification is one of the things that distinguishes authority from naked power. Nonetheless, if those in authority are continually pressed to offer justification for their authoritative decisions, etc., it becomes unclear how their position is any different from those not holding positions of authority who seek another's compliance with their decisions, etc. Indeed, if an authority were always pressed for justification, we would be tempted to say that that individual or institution had lost his/her/its authority.

Authority and Freedom of Choice

The focus on epistemic forms of authority and the subsequent overestimation of the possibility of critical examination lead Winch to overstate the compatibility of authority with freedom of choice. To say that the exercise of freedom of choice is compatible with, and even depends upon, the exercise of some authority is quite different from saying that the exercise of any authority is always compatible with, or never a restraint on, any freedom of choice. I take Winch to

be saying the former. But at times his language, as well as his discussion of political authority, can lead the reader to infer the more extreme claim that every exercise of authority is always compatible with freedom of choice. This latter claim, quite obviously, cannot be sustained. I might recognize the actions of a particular individual or institution as authoritative and legitimate even when those actions are a restriction on my freedom. I might, for example, recognize the authority of the Federal Reserve Board to set interests rates even if it means that, in a particular instance, such action makes it impossible for me to buy my own home. Indeed, it seems to be a crucial aspect of political authority, at least, that I recognize the legitimacy of its restrictions on my freedom at approprite times.

Winch tacitly recognizes the difficulty his discussion of authority has accounting for restrictions on freedom of choice in his account of political authority and his subsequent rejection of that account. His repudiation of his own account of political authority is itself ambivilent. He agrees with Hume, at one point, that the authority of the state stands in an external (and therefore causal?) relation to other social institutions. This leaves one to wonder whether he would revise this earlier claim that authority stands in an internal relation with social action and freedom of choice. On the other hand, he claims that any account of political authority must take account of what he says regarding authority in general. He also implies that there is something of an internal relation amongst the state, political authority and the citizen of a political community

when he says that the state's "force and... authority are what they are by virtue of the fact that there exists a concept of the state in the society within which they ae exercised - a concept that enters into what subjects will and will not submit to from the state; it manifests itself in the spontaneous life of the society, even though its existence makes possible the impositon of certain things in a way that would not otherwise be possible."[70]

I think that Winch's view of the relationship amongst the state, citizens and political authority is, in part, correct, but it lacks a more developed concept of the common good to make it more convincing. I think, nonetheless, that he underestimates the coercive potential of political authority. This is not to say that he is completely wrong regarding the relationship between political authority and freedom, that the former is at times consistent with the latter. But his identification of political authority with freedom of choice must be revised. I would go further and argue that what Winch says about political authority being tied to a notion of the state, and what people will accept fom the state, reinforces his claim that authority has something of an epistemic basis, but that the epistemic legitimation of authority is only a partial basis of political authority. If Winch were to recognize that at times there is a non-epistemic dimension to authority he would be able to give an account of political authority that was both consistent with his notion of authority in general and recognized the coercive potential of political authority.

I think Winch is right when he claims that the notion of the state

enters into what citizens will and will not submit to from the state. In this sense political authority does stand in an internal relation to political action.[71] But this claim by itself is insufficient to support a fully developed concept of political authority. Nonetheless it is the embryo of a more fully developed account of political authority and its relation to the common good. As a preview of a position I will try to defend later, I think that Winch's account of the general concept of authority sheds light on political authority if one looks at political authority as a triadic relationship amongst political authority, citizens and what can be called the common good.

CHAPTER II

TRADITION, AUTHORITY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

The Practical Intent of Philosophical Hermeneutics

It is only recently that the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer has begun to reach a substantial audience in the Anglo-American world. Unfortunately, in spite of the increased familiarity with Gadamer, most of the commentators on his work have come primarily from the field of literary criticism.[1] No political theorist has engaged in a comprehensive analysis of his work, and only a few have even briefly addressed his major arguments.[2] There is something paradoxical about this for even though his magnum opus does not appear to be an explicitly political text on first glance, Gadamer has voiced political aspirations for philosophical hermeneutics, the term he uses to describe his enterprise:

> I think, then, that the chief task of philosophy is... to defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on science. That is the point of philosophical hermeneutic. It corrects the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the anonymous authority of the sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of the citizen - decision making according to one's own responsibility - instead of conceding the task to the expert. In this respect, hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy.[3]

The explicitly political role that Gadamer claims for philosophical hermeneutics might come as a surprise to many familiar with Gadamer's work, for he does not at first glance appear to address

explicitly political issues. Nonetheless, he does see a renewal of a version of Aristotlean practical philosophy as one of the primary goals of philosophical hermeneutics, and it is against this goal that I shall measure his effort.

The Problem of Philosophy and Everyday Life

Perhaps the best way to begin describing Gadamer's work is to say that it is directed at what he believes is the most important question confronting the modern world, one that is the result of the emergence of modern science and technology. "It is the question of how our natural view of the world - the experience of the world as we simply live out our lives - is related to the unassailable and anonymous authority that confronts us in the pronouncements of science. Since the seventeenth century the real task of philosophy has been to mediate this new development of man's cognitive capacities with the totality of our experience of life."[4]

Gadamer detects what he believes is a problem in this relationship between science and everyday life. Science, he argues, has claimed an epistemological scope and status that exceeds what is appropriate or legitimate. Briefly put, the claim on the part of science to an objective form of knowledge that alone can render unassailable truth is, from Gadamer's standpoint, a one-sided view of the nature of truth; science claims a monopoly on truth and knowledge that cannot be legitimated.

Gadamer is careful to distinguish his interpretation of the

problem of the relationship between science and other forms of human life and understanding from what he considers to be an anti-scientific attitude. He insists that his argument does not attempt to dictate to the sciences, natural or otherwise, what type of research they should engage in. Neither does he think that his argument has any import for the methodological disputes within the human sciences. At one point he says of his arguments in Truth and Method: "This does not prevent the methods of modern natural science from having application to the social world. Possibly the growing rationalization of society and the scientific techniques of its administration are more characteristic of our age than the vast progress of modern science. The methodological spirit of science permeates everywhere."[5] And again later, "...it is not my intention to make prescriptions for the sciences or the conduct of life, but to try to correct false thinking of what they are."[6] Such statements resemble Winch's denials of anti-scientism: "But it should not be assumed...that what I have to say must be ranked with those reactionary anti-scientific movements, aiming to put the clock back, which have appeared and flourished in certain quarters since science began. My only aim is to make sure that the clock is telling the right time, whatever it may prove to be."[7] Both Gadamer and Winch, it seems, want to be careful not to assume the role of intellectual luddite.

Nevertheless, Gadamer does believe that the methodological self-consciousness of the sciences has overestimated the monopoly that science has on truth and knowledge, and thereby misunderstood the nature of its own task and its relations to other forms of

experience. At the very least this has resulted in the subversion of other forms of experience and understanding, argues Gadamer: "...the successes of modern sciences rests on the fact that other possibilities for questioning are concealed by abstraction."[8] This concealment that has taken place with the unconcealment of science is critical according to Gadamer, for science can never provide us with the knowledge that we need to answer the most important questions. "For as triumphant as the march of modern science has been, and as obvious as it is to everyone today that their awareness of existence is permeated by the scientific presuppositions of our culture, human thought is nonetheless continually dominated by questions for which science promises no answers."[9]

On the practical side the effects of this misperception of the relationship of science to other forms of life, though less explicit, are somewhat more ominous: "...over against the whole of our civilization that is founded on modern science, we must ask repeatedly if something has not been omitted. If the presuppositions of these possibilities for knowing and making remain half in the dark, cannot the result be that the hand applying this knowledge will be destructive?"[10] Gadamer is not quite clear what form this destruction will take. At times it appears that he believes it leads to the impoverishment or a superficiality of human relationships. He says, "Unavoidably the mechanical industrial world is expanding within the life of the individual as a part of the sphere of technical perfection. When we hear modern lovers talking to each other, we often wonder if they are communicating with words or with advertising

labels and technical terms from the sign language of the modern industrial world. It is inevitable that the levelled life forms of the industrial age also affect language, and in fact the impoverishment of the vocabulary is making enormous progress."[11] In other places he intimates that this growth of science could involve new relationships of power and subordination: "Each science, as a science, has the field of its knowledge set out in advance, and to have knowledge of this field is to have power over it."[12] And earlier he says, "But the knowledge of all the natural sciences is knowledge for domination."[13] It follows that if the methods employed by the natural sciences inherently involve relationships of power and domination over the object of knowledge, then the deployment of such methods in the social sciences or in the social world could result in new systems of power and subordination there as well.

The crux of the problem, from Gadamer's point of view, lies in the fact that science does not exhaust the range of genuine experience and knowledge of the world. Science itself is but one particular way of approaching the world and obtaining knowledge of it. There are other possible approaches to comprehending the world, e.g. artistic, historical and even our everyday attitude toward the world. Though science may ignore these other forms of experience, knowledge, and truth, it can never replace them. Speaking of our everyday experience of the world, Gadamer says, "but we cannot seek to remove or refute natural appearances by the 'eyes' of scientific understanding. This is pointless not only because what we see with our eyes has genuine reality for us, but also because the truth that science states is

itself relative to a particular attitude to the world and cannot claim to be the whole. But it is language which really opens up the whole of our attitude to the world, and in this whole of language appearances find their legitimacy just as much as science."[14] And again later he states that "The 'objective situation' that science knows, and from which it derives its own objectivity, is one of the relativities embraced by language's relation to the world."[15] An exhaustive account of the notions of truth, knowledge and experience must go beyond the self-understanding science. It must adjust its lenses so as to bring into focus the universal, linguistic constitution of the world.

The Linguistic Constitution of the World

The short-sidedness of the scientific attitude toward the world and its self-understanding lies in the fact that science overlooks two constitutive characteristics of the world and our experience of it: its historicality and its linguisticality. The first Gadamer describes in what he calls the principle of effective-history. The latter in the linguistic constitution of the world. Though we shall deal with these two characteristics of the world separately, they do not represent separable aspects of experience for Gadamer. The world, and our experience of it, is linguistic because it is historical and it is historical because it is linguistic.

It is important to realize that the shortcomings that Gadamer sees in the scientific attitude are not its failure to live up to its own

ideal of knowledge, but rather inherent in the nature of its procedure and its identification of objective knowledge with knowledge per se. Unfortunately for science, the world does not have the objective status that science claims, i.e., objective knowledge does not exist independent of us. The world, claims Gadamer, exists for us as human beings only in and through language. We have no access to the world that is not mediated by language.

It is this linguistic experience of the world that is absolute, not the methodologically controlled, objective experience of science or any other particular attitude toward the world. Echoing the sentiments of Peter Winch, Gadamer says, "...in language the world itself presents itself. The experience of the world in language is 'absolute'. It transcends all the relativities of the positing of being, because it embraces all being-in-itself in whatever reltionship (relativities) it appears. The linguistic quality of our experience of the world is prior, as contrasted with everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The fundamental relation of language and world does not, then, mean that the world becomes the object of language. Rather, the object of knowledge and of statements is already enclosed within the world horizon of language. The linguistic nature of the human experience of the world does not include making the world into an object."[16] And again later, "For man's relation to the world is fundamentally linguistic in nature, and hence intelligible."[17] The world, as we experience it as human beings, is available to us only through language.

The linguistic experience of the world is not meant to imply that

language is a barrier to be overcome. Gadamer's point is that it is language that constitutes, mediates and hence allows accessibility to the world. "Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world, but on it depends the fact that man has a world at all. For man the world exists as a world in a way that no other being in the world experiences it. But this world is linguistic in nature."[18] It is important to emphasize the nature of Gadamer's claim. Though his claims resemble those of Winch, his fundamental arguments cut somewhat deeper, positing an ontological status for language: "Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being in the world and the all embracing form of the constitution of the world."[19] There is nothing beyond language that is more fundamental to human experience or existence in the world.

The fundamental, ontological status that Gadamer claims for language should not be construed as meaning that language is itself independent of or separable from the world. There is more interdependence between the two than that: "...language has no independent life apart from the world that comes to language within it. Not only is the world 'world' only in so far as it comes into language, but language, too, has its real being only in the fact that the world is re-presented within it. Thus the original humanity of language means at the same time the fundamental linguistic quality of man's being-in-the-world."[20]

An example might be helpful here. As human beings we have need for flat surfaces that enable us to eat, write, read and do a variety of other things comfortably. Hence, we have slowly and tediously

developed that piece of furniture known as a table. Though the notion or the concept of a table is an open one, not just anything will count as a table. The concept of a table is 'closed' enough to allow us to distinguish tables from other types of furniture, including those that may also have flat surfaces (e.g., dressers, etc.). Moreover, the concept of a table, properly understood, allows us to distinguish good from bad, better from worse tables.

This differentiation of various types of furniture is possible only because of the concepts that we have to describe the different objects. But beings with a different set of needs would not necessarily develop the same type of furniture nor the same vocabulary to re-present that furniture in exactly the same way we do. In effect, that part of our world that deals with furniture is available to us only through the concepts that we have of tables, chairs, dressers, etc. But these concepts could not have developed in a vacuum; in part we have the concepts we have because of the various types of furniture that fit our needs. In other words the language of furniture developed in response to the needs that we have as the creatures we are and those objects of furniture are available to us (i.e., describable, useful, makeable, distinguishable, repairable, variable, etc.) because of the concepts that we have.[21]

Like Winch, Gadamer denies that this linguistic constitution of the world implies what has become known as the prison-house of language. The linguistic constitution of the world does not mean that we are trapped within the language that we grow up in. On the contrary, though we can never totally step out of our language, nor

change our language in the same manner that we change our clothes, we can nevertheless extend our language to include other attitudes and views of the world. Our language is always translatable into other languages. In fact Gadamer goes so far as to say that it is this very linguistic nature of the world that constitutes our freedom.

> It is also the case that, unlike all other living creatures, man's relationship to the world is characterized by freedom from habitat. This freedom includes the linguistic constitution of the world. Both belong together. To rise above the pressure of what comes to meet us from the world means to have language and to have a world;...the linguistic constitution of the world is far from meaning that man's relationship to the world is imprisoned within a linguistically schematized habitat. On the contrary, wherever language and men exist, there is not only a freedom from the pressure of the world, but this freedom from the habitat is also freedom in relation to the names that we give things....22

Finally, the language that we inherit, the language that constitutes our relationship to the world, is historically determined. We can never escape the fact that our language has developed in certain ways, that the concepts in it have come to have the meaning that they have, and that certain ideas pervade that language. This historicality of our language Gadamer calls the principle of effective-history.

The Principle of Effective History

One of the errors of scientism, and one that accompanies its mistaken faith in objective knowledge is that it believes that the historical circumstances that we find ourselves in are barriers to, or

lead to misunderstandings of, the objects of our knowledge. This prejudice against our own history is typified by what Gadamer calls historical objectivism, which attempts to shake off the influence of history which it sees leading to distortions and misunderstandings of historical objects of knowledge. To really understand a text, the objectivist claims, we must forget our own values, beliefs, etc. that have been handed down to us by tradition and influence our understanding of the past or of a text. We must adopt the ideas and language of the historical period we are studying, the intentions of the author, or the world view of the particular era. The latter can only be achieved by a sort of historical and social amnesia. A second version, one heard less frequently today, asks us to neutralize the influence of history by stepping outside of history altogether in order to objectively understand the text, historical actions, or historical era we are studying.

Both prescriptions, claims Gadamer, are ill-advised. In the first place there is no neutral point outside of history from which we can observe that which we wish to investigate. He says, "There is no such thing, in fact, as a point outside history from which the identity of a problem can be conceived within the vicissitudes of the various attempts to solve it. It is true that all understanding of the texts of philosophy requires the recognition of the knowledge that they contain. Without this we would understand nothing at all. But this does not mean that we in any way step outside the historical conditions in which we find ourselves and in which we understand."[23]

If the attempt at an ahistorical neutrality is doomed to failure,

the suggestion that we shed our own historical circumstances for those of the text under consideration is equally misleading. This approach still assumes that we can treat the text or text-analogue (i.e., historical action, historical era, etc.) as an object that we can approach without the influence of our own tradition or prejudices. In that respect it attempts to sidestep the question of the historicity of understanding. It assumes that a state of historical amnesia is possible. In contrast Gadamer argues that "True historical thinking must take account of its own historicity. Only then will it not chase the phantom of an historical object which is the object of progressive research, but learn to see in the object the counterpart of itself and hence understand both. The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship in which exist both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding. A proper hermeneutics would have to demonstrate the effectivity of history within understanding itself. I shall refer to this as effective-history. Understanding is, essentially, an effective-historical relation."[24]

The first characteristic of effective-history is its ineliminability. Our history always determines what the topic and path of research will be, what questions we ask, and what will count as a satisfactory answer. "If we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon from the historical distance that is characteristic of our own hermeneutic situation, we are always subject to the effects of effective-history."[25] We may reflect upon our historical situation, but we cannot escape it.

The problem of the objectivist approach is that it ignores this effectiveness of history or believes it can be neutralized through the proper methodological procedures. But in pretending its immunity to the effectiveness of history it does not transcend effective-history but only conceals its own involvement in it. "But looking at the whole situation we can see that the power of effective history does not depend on its being recognized. This, precisely, is the power of history over finite human consciousness, namely that it prevails even where faith in method leads one to deny one's own historicality."[25] No set of methodological procedures can overcome the effect of effective-history. Moreover, belief that methodological procedures can overcome or make one immune to the demands of effective-history does not simply result in self-misunderstanding, it results in error as well: "...we should learn to understand ourselves better and recognize in all understanding, whether we are expressly aware of it or not, the power of effective-history is at work. When a naive faith in scientific method ignores its existence, there can be an actual deformation of knowledge."[26]

However, the recognitio- of the presence and influence of effective history is itself no guarantee that the latter will be neutralized. Though consciousness of the effects of effective history can help prevent us from committing the errors of those who deny it or believe they have overcome it through methodological sophistication, this recognition does not remove us from its influence. There are two reasons fo First, "We are always within the situation, and to

throw light on it is a task that is never entirely completed. This is true also of the hermeneutic situation, i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the tradition that we are trying to understand. The illumination of this situation-effective-historical reflection, can never be completely achieved, but this is not due to a lack in the reflection, but lies in the essence of the historical being which is ours. To exist historically means that knowledge of oneself is never complete. All self-knowledge means that knowledge of oneself is never complete. All self-knowledge proceeds from what is historically given, what we call with Hegel, 'substance', because it is the basis of all subjective meaning and attitude and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility of understanding any tradition whatsoever in terms of its unique historical quality."[27] It is what we have inherited historically that is the basis for understanding. Our historical throwness allows certain possibilities and imposes certain limits. The result is that there is no standpoint, no high ground from which to view the entire tradition.

Second, since each new attempt at the understanding of that tradition is an appropriation and re-making of it, each new attempt at understanding part of that tradition results in a new understanding, one different, sometimes subtly different, from the last understanding of that same tradition.

Gadamer would, of course, deny that the principle of effective history is reason for despair at the possibility of genuine knowledge. Only those who still accept the scientific ideal of objective knowledge as an absolute or as the highest form of knowledge

will see reason for despondency. But the principle of effective history does demand an awareness of what is involved in the understanding of a historical object, i.e., what actually occurs in genuine hermeneutic experience. Gadamer describes this genuine hermeneutic experience as the fusion of horizons.

Immersed (submerged?) in history as we are, we always find ourselves within particular historical situation. Central to the idea of a situation is the notion of a horizon. A situation, according to Gadamer, both presents us with possibilities and limits our field of vision. "Hence an essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of 'horizon'. The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular standpoint."[28] Our historical situation determines the topography of our horizon. In addition to presenting, framing, connecting and throwing certain problems into relief, it also deflects, refracts, veils and hides other questions. Our historical situation determines what questions we can genuinely ask, which will seem naive, unproblematic, irrelevant, or obvious, and which questions we cannot even yet formulate.

The problem of understanding, then is to extend our horizon to include that horizon of the text or historical era that we are trying to understand. Gadamer describes this as the fusion of horizons. But this phrase does not accurately capture the full meaning of what occurs in the phenomena of understanding. For this formulation implies the separation of different horizons, historically remote and isolated from each other. But this is not exactly the case. As one

might anticipate from Gadamer's discussion of tradition, there are no irruptions, cracks. fissures, breaches, breaks or fractures between the horizon of the present and those of the past. Rather the horizon of the present is connected to the horizon of the past. Within the horizon of the present there are localities, perhaps on its frontiers, that are the central view-points of the horizon of the past and will be the central viewpoints of the horizon of the future. There are, in other words, no historically isolated horizons, rather each of the separate horizons constitutes the single tradition that we are all a part of.

Thus, to understand something does not involve transferring oneself out of one's own historical situation into that of another. "When historical consciousness places itself within historical horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds, unconnected in any way with our own, but together they constitute the one great horizon that moves from within and beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces everything contained in historical consciousness. Our own past, and that other past towards which our historical consciousness is directed, help to shape this moving horizon out of which human life always lives, and which determines it as tradition."[29]

Thus, to place ourselves in the horizon of the past does not involve the historical amnesia that the historicist insists upon in his quest for objective knowledge. It means extending our horizon to attain a broader vision of both ourselves and that which we are trying to understand, be it a text, historical act, or historical era. "This

placing of ourselves is not the empathy of one individual for another, nor is it the application to another person of our own criteria, but it always involves the attainment of a higher universality that overcomes, not only our own particularity, but also that of another.... To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand - not in order to look away from it, but to see it better within a larger whole and a truer proportion."[30] And again later: "In fact the horizon of the present is being continually formed, in that we have continually to test all our prejudices. An important part of this testing is the encounter with the past and the understanding of the tradition from which we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons. Understanding, rather, is always the fusion of horizons which we imagine to exist by themselves."[31] The fusion of horizons produces a new standpoint involving the bringing together of two different points of view.

What Gadamer says about the fusion of horizons and the attainment of a higher universality, a new standpoint from which to view the past, the present, and the future, resembles Winch's prescriptions for those who would study alien cultures. Winch argues that before we can understand and evaluate the intelligibility of the practices, beliefs or ideas of another culture we must extend our concepts, particularly our concept of rationality, to include those of the culture or way of life we are studying. "That is, we have to create a new unity for the concept of intelligibility, having a certain relation to our old one

and perhaps requiring a considerable realignment of our categories. We are not seeking a state in which things will appear to us just as they do to members of S, and perhaps such a state is unattainable anyway. But we <u>are</u> seeking a way of looking at things which goes beyond our previous way in that it has in some way taken account of and incorporated the other way that members of S have of looking at things. Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend our own - not simply to bring the other way within the already existing boundaries of our own, because the point about the latter in their present form is that they <u>ex hypothesi</u> exclude that other."[32] Understanding another way of life or another culture requires a growth and expansion in the ideas and concepts that are available to us from our own way of life.

Three similarities emerge between Winch and Gadamer at this point. First, both place a burden on the investigator to extend his concepts or horizon in his efforts to understand a different way of life or historical era. He cannot simply take his own concepts, way of life or horizon for granted. A re-examination of what is most familiar is one of the conditions for genuine understanding.

Second, Winch and Gadamer agree that understanding is not an act of empathy. We cannot simply place ourselves in another historical era or culture. Such psychologistic suggestions fail to appreciate the linguisticality of understanding.

Finally, because understanding requires that we enlarge our ideas, broaden our concepts, and extend our horizons, and because the world is available to us only through the language, it follows that every

act of understanding is potentially productive of changes in our way of life, how we perceive the world, and our relationships to others. To be sure these changes are rarely, if ever, revolutionary; they are most often subtle and usually unnoticed. Nonetheless, any act of genuine understanding does result in changes in our way of life or tradition.

The Rehabilitation of Prejudice, Tradition and Authority

Even though the ontological priority of language does not lock us in a windowless, linguistic prison, it does nonetheless raise anew the question of the role that prejudice, tradition and authority play in understanding. The Enlightenment, and the scientific attitude that it spawned, saw prejudice, particularly that originating in faith in authority and tradition, as a source of error. Indeed, prejudice resulting from faith in authority was considered by the Enlightenment to be the antithesis of reason, the failure or refusal to use one's own reason at all. For the Enlightenment, reason, unencumbered by the accidents of history or the dogma of authority (be it religious or political), was to replace the prejudices of authority and tradition as the ultimate court of appeal concerning claims to knowledge and the ordering of human affairs. Only be freeing the human mind from the authority, tradition and the prejudices that they perpetuated could dependable, i.e., objective knowledge, be had. This prejudice against prejudices can still be found in modern historicism, rationalism and scientism, claims Gadamer.

But if the rejection of prejudices supported by the authority of tradition was necessary for the liberation and development of modern science, the rejection of all tradition, authority and prejudice was a radical, unwarranted excess claims Gadamer. There are three reasons for this.

The most fundamental flaw in the Enlightenment's denigration of prejudice, particularly that resulting from authority, and the consequent pursuit of human reason free of prejudice, is the impossibility of achieving that ideal. The linguisticality and historicality of our experience of the world and our existence guarantee that we will never, can never, escape the influence of prejudices completely. As Gadamer points out: "...'prejudice' means a judgement that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined."[33] Since, as Gadamer points out in his account of the linguisticality and historicality of our experience, we can never have access to all the elements that determine a situation because we are never totally outside of any situation; because we can never step outside of our language and history and treat our situation as an object, it follows that we can never be free of the prejudices and prejudgements that make up our situation. Gadamer defines the issue this way: "Does the fact that one is set within various traditions mean really and primarily that one is subject to prejudices and limited in one's freedom? Is not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways? If this is true, then the idea of an absolute reason is impossible for historical humanity. Reason exists for us only in

concrete, historical terms, i.e., it is not its own master, but remains constantly dependent upon circumstances in which it operates."[34] And the circumstances in which it operates are determined, in part at least, by the prejudices we inherit from our historical-linguistic situation.

The Enlightenment's error went beyond merely mistaking the disposibility of prejudices. Prejudices are not merely barriers to truth, blinders on our view of the world, or distortions of knowledge: "'prejudice' certainly does not mean a false judgement, but it is part of the idea it can have a positive and a negative value."[35] And elsewhere, more emphatically, "Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are simply conditions whereby we experience something - whereby what we encounter says something to us."[36] In short, there are legitimate prejudices as well as illegitimate ones, prejudices that are productive of knowledge that enable us to have access to the world. Indeed, it is only because of these prejudices that we can have knowledge of the world. They are the fundamental conditions of our knowledge of the world. Gadamer puts is quite strongly: "This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutic problem its real thrust."[37] Moreover, it is only the recognition of the essentiality of prejudice that guarantees the accuracy of understanding of our own historicity. "The overcoming

of all prejudice, this global demand of the Enlightenment, will prove to be itself a prejudice, the removal of which opens the way to an appropriate understanding of our finitude, which dominates not only our humanity, but also our historical consciousness."[38]

The fact that there are both positive and negative prejudices, prejudices that are productive of knowledge as well as prejudices that constrain our experience, determines the nature of the problem of knowledge:

> That which presents itself, under the aegis of an absolute self-construction by reason, as a limiting prejudice belongs, in fact, to historical reality itself. What is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices if we want to do justice to man's finite, historical mode of being. Thus we are able to formulate the central question of a truly historical hermeneutic, epistemologically its fundamental question, namely, where is the ground of the legitimacy of prejudices? What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from all the countless ones which it is the undeniable task of the critical reason to overcome."[39]

Unfortunately, we cannot determine ahead of time which prejudices are legitimate, i.e., productive or contain truth. "The prejudices and foremeanings in the mind of the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible, from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to misunderstanding."[40] The legitimacy or productivity of prejudices can only be determined retrospectively. It is only through the working out of the forestructure of prejudice through the process of understanding and experience that we can determine which of our prejudices are illegitimate, wrong, constraining, and misleading, and which of our

prejudices are accurate, legitimate, correct, illuminating, or encouraged openness to experience.

The working out of our prejudices to determine their legitimacy is achieved through the hermeneutic circle. Prejudices provide us with what Gadamer calls, following Heidegger, the forestructure of understanding, i.e., a set of meanings that in part determine the possible meanings that any text or social action (sometimes referred to as the text-analogue) can have for us. The forestructure of understanding both enables and constrains our understanding. Out of this forestructure of understanding we project a meaning or set of possible meanings when we attempt to understand a text or social action. "A person who is trying to understand a text is always performing an act of projecting. He projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the latter emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. The working out of this foreproject, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into meaning, is understanding what is there."[41] We project some meaning that will be born out, others that will prove fruitless, and still additional meanings may emerge in the course of our understanding a text. "The process that Heidegger describes is that every revision of the fore-project is capable of projecting before itself a new project of meaning, that rival projects can emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is, that interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones. This constant process of new

projection is the movement of understanding and interpretation."[42]

This forestructure of understanding and the process of understanding that takes place do not mean that we cling dogmatically to preconceptions or that we summarily reject our previous understanding (assuming either of these courses of action are actually open to us). The new meanings that emerge and and the revision of our previous understanding are in many respects not at our disposal to ignore or confirm:

> If we examine the situation... closely... we find that meanings cannot be understood in an arbitrary way. Just as we cannot continually misunderstand the use of a word without it affecting the meaning of the whole, so we cannot hold blindly to our own fore-meaning of the thing if we would understand the meaning of another. Of course this does not mean that when we listen to someone or read a book we must forget all our foremeanings concerning content, and all our ideas. All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of another person or of the text. But this openness alway includes our placing the other meaning in a relation with the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it.[43]

In a sense the new understanding that leads to a re-evaluation and revision of the forestructure of understanding is not at our disposal; it forces itself on us, implies Gadamer: "If a person is trying to understand something, he will not be able to rely from the start on his own chance previous ideas, missing as logically and stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through the imagined understanding of it. Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something."[44] Again, this does not mean that we can abandon our prejedices that constitute our forestructure of understanding; but neither an we cling to them dogmatically if we are

committed to genuine understanding. The dialogue with the partner or confrontation of the text will lead to a revision of our forestructure of understanding, and out of that new projected meanings will emerge. This constant projection and revision of meaning, this hermeneutic circle, means that the understanding we achieve at any given moment will always be provisional, subject to further revision. Hence, notions of objective truth, far from being superior claims to truth, are the interruption of this hermeneutic movement; they attempt to freeze what is always subject to movement and are therefore an abstraction from truth.

The Ubiquity of Authority and Tradition

Gadamer insists that the problem of prejudices reawakens the problem of authority as well. The Enlightenment critique of prejudice was initially tied to its rejection of authority, the latter being the source of prejudice and hence, from the Enlightenment's standpoint, human error. But if there can be legitimate prejudices, prejudices that are the source not of error but of genuine knowledge, then the Enlightenment rejection of all authority is problematic and the question of legitimate authority re-merges:

> That the prejudices that determine what I think are due to my own narrowness of vision is a judgement that is made from the standpoint of their dissolution and illumination and holds only of unjustified prejudices. If, contrariwise, there are justified prejudices productive of knowledge, then we are back with the problem of authority. Hence, the radical consequences of the enlightenment, which are still contained in Schleiermacher's faith in method, are not tenable.[45]

The Enlightenment's failure to appropriately address the question of authority is not limited to its misunderstanding of the relationship amongst authority-prejudice-knowledge. It extends to a misunderstanding of the relationship between authority and tradition on the one hand, and freedom and reason on the other. According to the Enlightenment the acceptance of authority and tradition is diametrically opposed to the exercise of one's reason and freedom. Accordingly, the totally rational, autonomous subject is one who rejects all authority and tradition and the prejudices they foster. He allows neither the authority of individuals nor that of tradition to intrude on the deliberations of reason and exercise of free choice. He is, in Martin Hollis' terms, the autonomous man one who is completely self-determined. Or as Herbert Marcuse unqualifiedly puts it: "The recognition of authority as a basic force of social praxis attacks the very roots of human freedom: it means (in a different sense in each case) the surrender of autonomy (of thought, will, action), the tying of the subject's reason and will to pre-established contents in such a way that these contents do not form the 'material' to be changed by the will of the individual but are taken over as they stand as the obligatory norms for his reason and will."[46]

This view of the acceptance of authority as the subjugation of one's reason and will to that of another misapprehends the essence of authority, argues Gadamer. Dealing first with the authority of particular individuals, Gadamer argues, like Winch, that there is an epistemological basis for authority. Rejecting the equation of the acceptance of authority with authoritarianism, he says, "But this is

not the essence of authority, it is true that it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection and abdication of reason, but on the recognition and knowledge - knowledge namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgement and insight and that for this reason his judgement takes precedence, i.e. it has priority over one's own."[47] The esscence of authority is not the failure to exercise one's own reason or carry out one's own will. Gadamer, like Winch, insists that authority "rests on recognition and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, accepts that others have a better understanding. Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. Indeed, authority has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge."[48]

Thus, the acceptance of authority is not necessarily a restriction on freedom and reason but is consistent with their exercise. For it is no restriction on my reason to recognize the superior knowledge of another. Moreover, the carrying out of any freely chosen action may require the recognition of another's superior knowledge and insight pertaining to that action. Authority, then, is not something that is imposed but a guide to action that is accepted by the individual who places himself under the direction of authority. "Thus the recognition of authority is always connected with the idea that what authority states is not irrational and arbitrary, but can be seen in principle, to be true. This is the essence of the authority claimed by the teacher, the superior, the expert. The prejudices they implant are legitimized by the person himself. Their validity demands that

one should be biased in favor of the person who presents them. But this makes them then, in a sense, objective prejudices, for they bring about the same bias in favor of something that can come about through other means, e.g. through the solid grounds offered by reason."[49]

There is a second dimension to the problem of authority that stems from our historicality, "...namely tradition. That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that it nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that always the authority of what has been transmitted - and not only what is clearly grounded - has power over our attitudes and behavior."[50] Tradition is not merely a constraint on our behavior that we could choose to leave behind. We always act within the boundaries of tradition.

Unfortunately, from Gadamer's standpoint, both the Enlightenment and the Romantics defined tradition in opposition to reason and freedom. But whereas the Enlightenment saw the constraint that tradition imposed on reason and freedom as unnecessary and harmful, the Romantics insisted that unbridled reason and freedom would doom human society. But neither side denied the inherent opposition between reason and freedom on the one hand and tradition on the other. In this sense the Enlightenment and the Romantics were mirror images of each other, differing only in their respective preferences. Both missed the essential connection, claims Gadamer, between reason and freedom, and tradition.

Tradition does not survive and persist simply out of blind unreflective adherence to what has always been the case. The continuation of tradition depends itself on the exercise of reason.

"The fact is that tradition is constantly an element of freedom and of history itself. Even the most genuine and solid tradition does not persist by nature because of an inertia that once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, preservation, such as is active in all historical change. But preservation is an act of reason, though an inconspicuous one.... At any rate, preservation is as much a freely chosen action as revolution and renewal. That is why both the enlightenment's critique of tradition and its romantic rehabilitation are less than their true historical being."[51] Contrary to there being an antithesis between reason and tradition, the two are inseperable elements of man's historical being.

This last point cannot be understated, from Gadamer's perspective. There is no possibility of exercising reason outside of tradition. To insist that reason can step outside of tradition completely is to insist there is an abstract, independent seat of reason outside of society. No such independent perspective exists, claims Gadamer. In short, it is tradition that makes reason possible. There is no place outside of tradition form which we can examine that tradition: "...we stand always within tradition, and this is no objectifying process, i.e. we do not conceive of what tradition says as something other, something alien. It is always part of us, a model or exemplar, a recognition of ourselves which our later historical judgement would hardly see as a kind of knowledge, but as the simplest preservation of tradition."[52]

The inescapability of tradition holds not just for everyday life

but for the reflective understanding of that life and tradition as well. What we perceive to be the problems of our age, our interest in the past, the issues to be investigated, are all determined by tradition. There is no possibility of an objective approach to the study of tradition for such an approach would have no starting point, it would have no contact with the world which it seeks to know and explore. To study tradition one must let it speak and let oneself be addressed by it. Hence Gadamer, like Winch, denies the antithesis between tradition and knowledge. In Gadamer's words, "Our historical consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is heard."[53] Tradition, then, is the foundation on which reason must build. Attempts to construct an objective rationality like that advocated by Martin Hollis, one that is free of tradition, untouched by historical circumstances, is bound to flounder. For the goal of an ahistorical, objective reason is a mere mirage and formulations of objective rationality must either be so abstract as to be meaningless or they must implicitly rely on some unacknowledged tradition.

The example of academic life illustrates Gadamer's point in several respects. In order for us to pursue academic life as we know it we must accept a set of traditional standards regulating the activities that constitute academic life. These standards and norms are binding on those engaged in academic life. Norms concerning plagiarism, a certain etiquette regulating academic conferences, and standards of criticism are some of the traditions that those involved in academic life take as authoritative. They are not standards and

norms that are constantly scrutinized or in need of justification, even though some of those standards may occasionally undergo revision.

Moreover many of these standards of behavior that are taken as authoritative within academic life are constitutive of that life. If they were to be discarded or altered significantly, academic life as we know it would cease to exist. In short, the traditional standards (such as those prohibiting plagiarism) of academic life make that way of life possible. Without those traditions we could not even choose to engage in academic life as we know it; it would not even be an option for us.

Consequently these standards and norms are not merely restrictions on those engaged in academic life. They are, in fact, the necessary foundations of that way of life, the foundations that make our freedom to pursue academic life possible. Hence, the elimination of those traditional standards would make it impossible for us to exercise our freedom of choice to follow that way of life as we know it.

What is perhaps equally important, though underdeveloped in Truth and Method, is the extent to which the traditons and standards of academic life make possible the establishment and recognition of individuals as authorities within particular academic fields and areas of specialization. It is only within the contexts of the traditional standards and practices governing academic life, standards taken as authoritative for the conduct of that life, that it is possible to determine who might legitimately be considered an authority within a particular field, say on the philosophy of Kant. Moreover, those particular traditions help determine the nature of those

authoritities. Accordingly, a different set of background traditions might very well establish authorities of a different nature. It is the authority of academic traditions, in other words, that provides the foundation for the personal authority of the academic in his particular field or area of specialization.

In turn, those of us seeking to understand a particular subject matter (staying with our example, say the philosophy of Kant) woulo seek out those considered to be authorities in that particuar field (Kant's philosophy), and consult them regarding difficult aspects, passages or points of Kant's work. Our freedom to pursue the study of Kant, and our understanding of it, is made possible by the authority of academic traditions and ways of life. In sum, the authority of academic traditions and the individual authority that they give rise to are the necessary requirements for our being free to pursue academic life and the study of those fields that interest us. The relationship between this authority and tradition on the one hand and freedom and knowledge on the other is not a contingent relationship but is internal; the former helps constitute the latter.

It would be a mistake to interpret Gadamer's account of authority as an authoritarian defense of all de facto authority. Indeed, his aim is, in some respects at least, just the opposite. It is precisely the acceptance of the pronouncements of scientific authority, which he sees as partially anonymous and therefore unaccountable, that Gadamer believes to be one of the primary problems facing industrial Western societies. He hopes to shake both the unconscious acceptance and the conscious but uncritical acceptance of scientific authority in areas

of human life that are beyond the legitimate realm and expertise of science or where truth claims resulting from other forms of understanding are denigrated. This concern is reflected in his criticism of science's self-understanding and its reslutant position towards both social life and nature. In this respect Gadamer's work can be interpreted as a continuation of the themes that Heidegger lays out, particularly in "The Question Concerning Technology." Hence, Gadamer's position places him squarely at odds with the most dominant form of authority existent in contemporary industrial society, i.e. the authority of those who exercise technocratic control over the everyday lives of individual citizens.

Second, Gadamer should not be interpreted as attempting to resurrect older forms of authority that some conservative thinkers see in decline in the twentieth century (e.g. the decline of the authority of the aristocracy in political life). Such an interpretation fails to take account of Gadamer's expressed aim of rehabilitating Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom as a resource with which the common citizen could fight the encroachment of science as a standard and way of organizing, conducting and controlling everyday life.

Gadamer's defense of genuine authority and the challenge that it constitutes to those who insist on interpreting authority as antithetical to freedom and something which must therefore be limited can be summarized as follows. Language and history do not just bind us to a linguistic-historical situation but also make possible the distanciation necessary for the critical understanding of our past, and the possibilities for the present and our future. A necessay part

of that linguistic-situation is constituted by tradition, the authority that tradition holds for us, and those authorities that it engenders. Authority itself, then, is not something that is eliminable for beings whose life is linguistically and historically constituted. Whether or not social theorists and actors wish to admit the inevitability of authority, it persists.

Moreover, this is true no less for science as it is for other forms of life and understanding. Within science the increasing tendency towards specialization has made the pronouncements of specialists in any particular field incomprehensible to their counterparts in other fields. In many respects the growing division of labor in science has made laymen of us all. The result is that even the most sophisticated researcher in one field must take the statements of those in other specialized fields on authority. Ironically, the division of labor that has resulted from the virtual boundless growth of science, a science that once set for itself the task of criticising and eliminating all forms of authority, has led to the creation of new forms of authority within science as well as new forms of authority between the scientific community and society as a whole. Moreover the authority of science itself rests on a tradition that it takes uncritically, a posture towards nature that science has never openly challenged or scrutinized: the idea of objectivity that reduces nature to a mere pool of natural resources, the instrumental means to man's purposes.

Given this inescapability of authority, evidenced even within the growth of science itself, it can be seen in retrospect that the

Enlightenment attack on authority could only have resulted in the creation of new forms of authority that mask themselves under the guise of freedom and reason. The task of the social theorist, then is to come to a full understanding of genuine authority that would make the existence of authority recognizable. Such an achievement would be the first step in laying the foundation for the appropriate critical evaluation of those in authority and thereby enable them to be held publicly accountable.

Several parallels emerge between Gadamer's and Winch's respective accounts of authority. First, both insist that authority, because it is tied to tradition (Gadamer) or a way of life (Winch), is an ineliminable aspect of human social existence. It is not something we could eliminate even if we wanted to.

Second, both see an epistemological basis to authority. Those who are in authority are those whose superior knowledge, skill or insight has been established. Hence, authority cannot be defined in opposition to knowledge and reason. Authority is founded on the exercise of superior knowledge and reason and subsequently helps to determine better and worse, good and bad instances, applications, extensions or interpretations of a particular set of traditions.

Third, and related to the previous point, authority cannot simply be defined in opposition to freedom. On the contrary, both Winch and Gadamer insist that the existence of authority is one of the conditions for the exercise of freedom. For both, the authority of established ways of life or traditions enable us to act in the world and provide standards of criticism for the reflective evaluation of

those actions, enable us to determine good and bad, better and worse reasons for acting and ways of proceeding. Authority enables rational free choice.

In spite of these similarities one subtle difference does exist between the two accounts of authority. Winch is somewhat more explicit in connecting the authority of individuals, those recognized as authorities concerning a way of life, to the established standards of that way of life. A triadic relationship exists, he claims, amongst a way of life, those in authority, and those over whom authority is exercised. The last remain in a position to hold the second accountable by standards provided by the first. In other words, a way of life provides those over whom authority is exercised with a set of standards with which to judge the actions and pronouncements of those in authority, even when those actions and pronouncements are claimed to be interpretations of that way of life.

Gadamer, on the other hand, though he connects the authority of individuals to knowledge of tradition and established standards of conduct, is not quite so explicit about how those over whom authority is exercised are able to check the pronouncements of those <u>in</u> authority. At times he seems to give those in authority almost complete hegemony in interpreting ways of life and underplays the extent to which the recognition of individuals as authorities can itself only be an act of reason if those placing themselves under authority have themselves some insight into that tradition, some notion (even if unarticulated or only vaguely articulated), of the good and bad, right and wrong, better and worse applications,

interpretations, adaptations and extensions of that tradition.

Philosophical Hermeneutics and Self-Identity

The ontological priority that Gadamer claims for language has several consequences for the concept of the autonomous individual. It would, for instance, take issue with the concept of the individual that emerges with the Enlightenment and the possibilities of self-determined actions. Specifically, it would mean that "Language maintains a kind of independent life over against the individual member of a linguistic community and introduces him, as he grows into it, to a particular attitude and relationship to the world as well."[54] What this means for human actions might best be demonstrated by Gadamer's examples of conversation and play.

In a genuine conversation it is somewhat misleading, argues Gadamer, to say that we conduct the conversation. A genuine conversation is one that takes on a life of its own. It takes turns, leads in directions and arrives at conclusions that are not within the will of either partner: "the people conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows what will come out in a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like a process which happens to us."[55]

Similarly, in discussing the concept of play, both in the artistic and non-artistic sense, Gadamer argues that the real subjects are not the players of the game or the actors in the play, but the game and play itself. In relationship to the author of the play as well as to

the actors, "the play has in relation to them all, an absolute autonomy."[56] The possibilities for action by the players or actors are determined by the play or the game.

Moreover, the self-knowledge that would be the basis for individual action is itself available only through language. There is no self-knowledge outside of the linguistic tradition that we inherit and grow in. "Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves, and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is our own. We grow up and become acquainted with men and in the last analysis with ourselves when we learn to speak."[57] Before we can be an I we must be the Thou that language constitutes.

This view of the relationship between language and self-knowledge would lead Gadamer to dismiss the possibility of a self-identity that is totally independent of the historical-linguistic situation that individual actors find themselves in. The fundamental ontological status that Gadamer claims for language and the prejudices that it embodies implies that any actual, non-abstract account of personal identity would have to recognize that the self-identity of the social actor is constituted by some combination of these prejudices of the particular historical period. In effect Gadamer's rejection of the so-called strong notion of personal identity, such as that defended by Martin Hollis, would run parallel to his rejection of the possibilities for understanding that are free of the effects of effective-history. Hollis' version of self-identity is more accurately described as self-deception, from Gadamer's standpoint, for Hollis requires the same objectivity, the same social amnesia, that

the objectivist advocates and that Gadamer insists is impossible.

I think, however, that Gadamer would push his argument one step further and argue that the so-called strong notion of personal identity is in fact just the opposite, a form of social identity which, even if achievable, would make the social actor vulnerable to some forms of social control that a thinker like Hollis wants to protect the individual from.

Hollis' project for autonomous self-identity, it will be remembered, is that the autonomous man must be able to distance himself from the social roles available to him in order to rationally decide which of those roles is constitutive of his true identity and embodies purposes, ends and a way of life that are consonant with his real interests. The autonomous man, fom Hollis' standpoint, can accurately evaluate the social roles of his social-historical situation only if they no longer have any immediate effect on him. He must be able to shed his roles in the same manner the historicist insists we must shed our historical prejudices and values.

Opposed to Hollis' rationalist account of personal identity the Gadamerian would offer an account of personal identity that binds it intimately to the language and traditions of one's historical situation. Our personal identity is possible because of the constant dialogue that we have with and within our language. It is our participation within our language and traditions that allows us to situate ourselves both historically and with respect to our contemporaries, to reflect upon the situation and those relationships and thereby determine and reflect upon who and what we are.

Our participation in this language, at least in its most developed forms, takes the form of a conversation or dialogue. Each of the partners of the conversation poses questions to the other, advances a series of claims or pursues a line of questioning, requiring the partner in the dialogue to respond. This genuine conversation requires that each participant remain open to what the other has to say without giving up his own perspective. Hence, in the course of the dialogue some ideas, arguments, beliefs, prejudices will come to nought and subsequently be discarded while others will be affirmed or allow further understanding. It is out of this dialogue that one's identity emerges. The dialectic of agreement, disagreement, questions and answer result in a form of identity that is anchored in not just one's subjectivity, but in the mutual recognition of the other. Hence, my self-perceptions, my self-knowledge and self-identity are all recognized (and thereby affirmed) as well as challenged by the other in the dialogue.

The identity that each participant experience is not unlike that described by Hegel in the master-slave dialectic. In both instances genuine recognition, recognition that corroborates one's self-identity, is dependent upon mutuality between partners. Moreover, since the dialogue involves another, one with a different horizon and set of prejudices, the possibility of a genuinely critical evaluation of one's self-identity is always imminent. Interestingly enough, the more socially inclusive the dialogue, the greater the number of different horizons one is exposed to and therefore the greater the possibilities for criticism.

On the other hand, an identity that is rooted outside of any on-going linguistic tradition (assuming for the time being that such an identity were possible) would not experience the mutuality of partners in a dialogue. It would be an identity that would have difficulty sustaining itself if and when not corroborated by others when the subject 're-emerged' in social life. It would face the same problems that Hegel outlines for self-consciousness prior to the master-slave dialectic. The self-identity of the individual, whatever he determined it to be, would still lack the necessary requirement to make it the social identity that Hollis pays lip service to. Hence, the identity that would emerge from Hollis' ahistorical rationality, lacking the confirmation of an other self-consciousness, would be susceptible to a shattering upon contact with others whose identity was firmly rooted in the mutuality of a dialogical relationship. In the company of self-conscious individuals with a so-called weak personal identity, weak because, according to Hollis, it is not distanced from the social fabric it emerges from, the individual with 'strong' personal identity of Hollis' autonomous man would live a precarious, fleeting existence.

CHAPTER III

FROM PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS TO CRITICAL THEORY

The Habermasian Critique of Technological Society

The growth of science, the diffusion of scientific method, and the consequences that these trends have had for social life are as much a concern for Jurgen Habermas as they are for Gadamer. Moreover, both Gadamer and Habermas use the Aristotlean model of practical philosophy as a contrast model for the relationship between theory and practice. However, Habermas' concern with the growth of science and technology appears to have had a slightly different emphasis than Gadamer's. Whereas Gadamer's concern with the growth of scientific objectivism has focused primarily, though not exclusively, on the interpretation of texts and the evolution of German philosophy, Habermas has been more explicit in his focus on the social and political implications of the development of science and technology.

Habermas agrees with Gadamer that the growth of science and technology has been characteristic of modern society. Not only has science become a primary and consciously applied factor of production in industrial societies but the modern world has witnessed the reflexive application of scientific methods to the study and organization of social-political life, resulting in a decline in the classical doctrine of politics as a prudential art and skill and the rise of a Hobbesian notion of a science of politics. Among the positive outcomes of this phenomena, claims Habermas, was the empirical knowledge it made possible. "The affirmative achievement of

the modern sciences consists in statements about empirical uniformities."[1] This empirical knowledge, in turn, enabled greater technical control over nature and society.[2]

A second positive achievement, and one that flows from the first, is that the critical capacity that scientific reason made possible resulted in the rational challenge to and subsequent undermining of traditional dogmatisms. At its inception, "Reason takes up a partisan position in the controversy between critique and dogmatism, and with each new stage of emancipation it wins a further victory. In this kind of practical reason, insight and the explicit interest in liberation converge. The higher level of reflection coincides with a step forward in the progress toward the autonomy of the individual, and with the elimination of suffering and the furthering of concrete happiness. Reason involved in the argument against dogmatism has definitely taken up this interest as its own.... Reason has not as yet renounced the will to be rational."[3] Reason at this point still aspires to the critical evaluation of practical questions.

However, the relationship between theory and practice changed significantly, argues Habermas, with the positivist appropriation of reason and its concommitant separation of facts and values. Reason now is restricted to the realm of empirical statements. Statements not reducible to empirical claims become <u>mere</u> value judgements, the adjudication of which lies outside the boundaries of rational argument. Consequently, "Every single value appears as a meaningless agglomerations of meaning, stamped solely with the stigma of irrationality, so that the priority of one value over the other - thus

the persuasiveness which a value claims with respect to action - cannot be rationally justified."[4]

In spite of the positivist claim that reason can no longer address and resolve questions of value, instrumental reason is extended to more and more areas of modern life in an attempt to rationalize the means to achieve pre-determined ends. Reason, in its narrowly defined, purposive-rational form, is extended to more areas of social life. But it addresses only those questions that can fit the narrow field of instrumental rationality or restates practical questions so that they can fit that form of reason, leaving the most fundamental, practical questions and issues untouched. Reason is now installed in a different position with respect to the relationship between dogmatism and practice:

> Now this constellation of dogmatism, reason and decision has changed profoundly since the eighteenth century, and exactly to the degree to which the positive sciences have become productive forces in social development. For as our civilization has become increasingly scientific, the dimension within which theory was once directed towards praxis has become correspondingly constricted. The laws of self-reproduction demand of an industrially advanced society that it look after its survival on an escalating scale of a continually refined administration of human beings and their relations with each other by means of social organization. In this system, science, technology, industry and administration interlock in a circular process. In this process the relationship of theory to praxis can now only assert itself as the purposive-rational application of techniques assured by empirical science. The social potential of science is reduced to the powers of technical control - its potential for enlightened action is no longer considered. The empirical, analytical sciences produce technical recommendations, but they furnish no answer to practical questions.[5]

The evolution of modern science, at least since its appropriation by

positivism, means that the promise of the Enlightenment that science once held remains unfulfilled. Ultimately, practical questions are relegated to the realm of mere value judgements and hence outside the boundaries of rational argument. Consequently, reason no longer serves as the guiding force in the enlightenment of citizens and the development of their potential to take control of and shape their own history. "Thus on this level the critique of ideology involuntarily furnishes the proof that progress of rationalization limited in terms of empirical science to technical control is paid for with the corresponding growth of a mass or irrationality in the domain of praxis itself. For action still demands an orientation as it did before. But now it is dissected into a rational implementation of techniques and strategies and a irrational choice of value-systems. The price paid for the economy in the selection of means is a decisionism set wholly free in the selection of the highest-level goals."[6]

However, what presents itself at this point as the neutrality of scientifically grounded reason toward ultimate questions of social practice is, claims Habermas, a facade. In fact scientific rationality and control are now assumed as values in themselves. Having gained a monopoly in the evaluation of rational action, science can now undermine competing claims to the guidance of social action. "Any theory that relates to praxis in any way other than by strengthening and perfecting the possibilities for purposive rational action must now appear dogmatic. The methodology of the empirical sciences is tacitly but effectively rooted in a technical cognitive

interest that excludes other interests: consequently all other relations to life-praxis can be blocked out under the slogan of ethical neutrality or value-freedom. The economy in the selection of purposive-rational means which is guaranteed by conditional predictions in the form of technical recommendations is the sole admissible value, and it too is not seen explicitly as a value, because it simply seems to coincide with rationality as such."[7] Any theoretical approach to social practice which does not fit within the boundaries of purposive-rational action appears ipso facto irrational and dogmatic.

Not only does the apparent value neutrality of scientific method exclude competing approaches to social theory on the basis of their inherent irrationality and dogmatism (i.e. value commitment), but, moreover, within that scientific technique lurks the inherent value of control and manipulation of the object of scientific knowledge and organization. The original Enlightenment goal of the creation of an informed, emancipated citizenry is replaced by the goal of systematic, behavioral control by social engineers. In Habermas' words, "Emancipation by means of enlightenment is replaced by instructions in control over objective or objectified processes. Socially effective theory is no longer directed toward the consciousness of human beings who live together and discuss matters which with each other, but to the behavior of human beings who manipulate. As a productive force of industrial development, it changes the basis of human life, but it no longer reaches our critically beyond this basis to raise life itself, for the sake of life, to another level."[8]

One consequence of the unrestrained spread of scientific forms of rationality to all areas of social life is the foreclosing of the very possibility of emancipation. Habermas puts this point sharply: "...the danger of an exclusively technical civilization, which is devoid of the interconnnection between theory and praxis, can be clearly grasped; it is threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting of human beings into two classes - the social engineers and the inmates of closed institutions."[9] The installation of reason as a guide to social action, though it once held out the hope of the creation of a society of autonomous individuals, freed from dogmatism, ignorance and traditional forms of authority, threatens to recreate the division of society into a minority with access to the means of social control and the majority that is the object of that control.

It is perhaps here that we should take note of the similarities between Habermas' and Gadamer's views of the growth of science and technology. First, both claim to detect an inherent value in the scientific approach to knowledge and social organization: the relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge is one of control or power. Second, there are similarities in their attempts to unite theory and practice in and attempt to replace the relationship of control and domination inherent in scientism and the scientific organization of society. As we mentioned earlier, both use the Aristotlean model of practical philosophy as a contrast model for the relationship of theory to practice, though the tendency to rehabilitate that practical philosophy is more pronounced in Gadamer

than it is in Habermas. Nonetheless, oth do see an important role for philosophy in countering the growth and extension of scientific forms of knowledge and control, either directly (Gadamer) or indirectly through social theory (Habermas). It is in the context of this very general agreement that Habermas appraises Gadamer's work and finds several strengths in it.

Habermas' Appreciation of Philosophical Hermeneutics

Most fundamentally Habermas believes that Gadamer is quite correct in his account of the historicity of understanding. The interpretation of the present will always and necessarily be made with a reference to the past and an eye to the possibilities for the future. This in turn has led Gadamer, again quite rightly claims Habermas, to emphasize the objectivity of language through which our history is transmitted. Language is not merely an instrument at our disposal to shape as we see fit. Its objectivity requires that the speaking subject recognize not only his freedom from language but his dependence on it as well.[10]

Habermas further agrees with Gadamer that this objectivity of language does not totally close off the possibilities of reflection: "...reflexivity and objectivity are fundamental traits of language, as are creativity and the integration of language into life-praxis."[11] In recognizing the inherent reflective potential of language Habermas is acknowledging that Gadamer's claim that natural language posseses the means to eludicate the language itself or foreign languages is

correct. Natural languages possess the reflexive potential that enable the speaker to confront and make sense of both opacities within his own language and external, incomprehensible symbolic systems. In Habermas' words, "the means of natural language are, in principle, sufficient for elucidating the sense of any symbolic complex, however unfamiliar and inaccessible it may initially appear.... Hermeneutic experience brings to consciousness the position of a speaking subject vis-a-vis his language. He can draw upon the self-referentiality of natural languages for paraphrasing any changes metacommunicatively."[12] Each natural language has, in principle, the self-sufficiency for self-translation and for the translation of other languages.

Moreover, the creativity of natural languages, the fact that their grammar allows infinite number of combinations and formulations, enables the speaker to comprehend new situations. "This productivity extends,..., not only to the immediate generation of sentences in general, but also to the long-term process of the formation of interpretive schemes which are formulated in every-day language and which both enable and pre-judge the making of experiences."[13]

This reflexivity and creativity enable each natural language to transcend itself. Philosophical hermeneutics emphasizes the extent to which it is language itself that enables transcendence, that enables each language to go beyond its immediate self. In doing so, "Hermeneutics mistrusts any mediatizing of ordinary languages and refuses to step out of their dimension; instead it makes use of the tendency to self-transcendence embedded in linguistic practice.

Languages themselves possess the potential of a reason that, while expressing itself in the particularity of a specific grammar, simultaneously reflects on its limits and negates them as particular. Although always bound up in language, reason always transcends particular languages; it lives in language only by destroying the particularities of language through which alone it is incarnated."[14] By insisting on the embeddedness of reason in language and the resulting tendency toward transcendence, philosophical hermeneutics serves as an antidote to those views of language that see language as a prison-house or a monadically sealed symbolic system.

In additon to its insights into the objectivity of language and the connection between reason and language, Habermas believes that Gadamer's work has several positive consequences for the sciences. First, it demonstrates that science is only one way of understanding; it does not have a monopoly on truth. Moreover, science itself is dependent on natural language within which its is located. "Hermeneutic consciousness also affects the scientific self-understanding of the natural sciences but not, of course, their methodology. The insight that natural language represents the 'last' metalanguage for all theories expressed in formal language elucidates the epistemological locus of everyday language within scientific activity."[15]

Secondly, by focusing on the importance of intersubjectivity and its role in structuring the social life world, it reminds the social sciences that the social life-world cannot be exhaustively accounted

for through operationalized procedures; the intersubjective pre-structuring presents unique problems to the study of the social life. Specifically, "If the access to data is no longer mediated through controlled observation but through communication in everyday language, then theoretical concepts can no longer be operationalized within the framework of the pre-scientifically developed language game of physical measuring."[16]

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, "Hermeneutic consciousness destroys the objectivist self-understanding of the traditional Geisteswissenschaften. It follows from the hermeneutic situatedness of the interpreting scientist that objectivity in understanding cannot be secured by an abstraction from pre-conceived ideas, but only by reflecting upon the context of effective-history which connects perceiving subjects and their objects."[17] Philosophical hermeneutics shows that the objectivist understanding that is the goal not only of positivism but also of historicism is merely an abstraction. It misperceives the possibilities of understanding, language and history.

In its analysis of language and the nature of understanding Habermas insists that philosophical hermeneutics is a substantial improvement upon phenomenology and, more importantly, the linguistic analytic traditon that begins with the latter Wittgenstein, of which Winch is a part. Wittgenstein, as Habermas reads him, characterized understanding and the use of language as the application of the pre-established rules of a language game into which one is socialized. These language games are congealed in two senses. First,

there is little or no room for movement within the language game itself or for its further development. Secondly, Wittgenstein's language games are, on Habermas' reading, monadical unities. There is no possibility of genuine translation between language games. "In his (Wittgenstein's) hands the language game congeals to an opaque unity."[18]

By emphasizing the historical dimension of language, Gadamer demonstrates its reflexivity and the creative potential of language and is thereby able to show that "language spheres are not monadiacally sealed off but are inwardly as well as outwardly porous. The grammar of a language cannot contain a rigid design for its application. Whoever has learned to apply its rules has not only learned to express himself but also to interpret expressions in his language. Both translation (outwardly) and tradition (inwardly) must be possible in principle."[19] What is at stake here is not a battle between two esoteric views of language. Habermas' sensitivity to practical questions enables him to spell out what the practical implications of the competing views of language are. A completely closed language game, one monadologically sealed from alien language games and firmly congealed internally, would absorb individuals and threaten the autonomous subject that Habermas wishes to protect:

> Whosoever starts from the normal case of conversation- and not from the model of precision langluage - immediately grasps the open structure of ordinary language. An 'unbroken' intersubjectivity of the grammar in force would certainly make possible identity of meaning and thereby constant relations of understanding; but it would at the same time destroy the identity of the self in communication with others.... Languages that are no longer inwardly porous and have hardened into rigid systems remove the breaks of

> intersubjectivity and, simlultaneously, the hermeneutic distance of individuals from one another. They no longer permit the vulnerable balance between separation and union in which the identity of the ego has to develop.[20]

With no room for distanciation, a completely closed and congealed language game, while providing complete identity of meaning and unbroken communication, would close off the possibility of autonomous self-development. One possible political ramification would be the increased potential for systematic control of the way of life partly constituted by the language game.

But Gadamer's account of language and history show how this problem is avoided, claims Habermas. Gadamer, by accurately describing the historicity of language, is able to account for the space that is available to the speaking subject resulting from "his specific freedom from, and dependence on, language."[21] In short, Gadamer's work is an improvement on Wittgenstein's analysis of language, or at least Habermas' reading of it, in two respects. It takes account of both the translatability that exists between language games and the nature of historical transmission of particular language games, specifically the creativity inherent in language the enables transcendence of that language.

The features of Gadamer's account of language and intersubjectivity that are the basis of its superiority to Wittgenstein's notion of language games also provide it with another strength. Gadamer's work provides the foundation for understanding which is translatable into social practice of those engaged in that communication, claims Habermas. "I find Gadamer's real achievement in the demonstration that hermeneutic understanding is linked with

transcendental necessity to the articulation of an action-orienting self-understanding."[22] This appraisal of Habermas' is particularly interesting since one of the criticisms of interpretive or hermeneutic theory has been that its account of understanding short-circuits the translation of that understanding into social practice.

Once again Habermas sees positive political implications from this feature of philosophical hermeneutics. It helps to provide the basis of a form of communication that makes the use of force less likely:

> Hermeneutic understanding is structurally oriented toward soliciting from tradition a possible action-orienting self-understanding of social groups. It makes possible a form of consensus on which communicative breakdown in two directions: vertically in one's own tradition, and horizontally, in the mediation between traditions of different cultures and groups. If these communication flows come to an end and the intersubjectivity of understanding either hardens or falls apart, an elementary condition of servival is disrupted - the possibility of constraint and recognition without force.[23]

Hence, on Habermas' reading, philosophical hermeneutics goes part of the way toward achieving precisely the explicit goal that Gadamer sets out for it and that we mentioned at the beginning of the previous chapter.

Finally, philosophical hermeneutics with its claim to universality, hopes to mediate between the findings of science and the language of everyday life. "Hermeneutic consciousness is, finally, called upon in one area of interpretation more than any other and one that is of great social interest: the translation of important scientific information into the language of the life-world."[24] The growth and importance of science in the modern world has created a

need to relate scientific knowledge to everyday life. "It is my opinion that a philosophical hermeneutic tries to satisfy this need with its claims to universality."[25]

Habermas' Critique of Philosophical Hermeneutics

It is in its claim to universality that Habermas detects two related flaws in Gadamer's account of hermeneutic understanding. The first flaw consists of an underestimation of the necessity of and possibilities for controlled, methodical forms of reason and reflection. The second flaw, flowing from the first, is an inability on the part of hermeneutic understanding to detect and correct what Habermas refers to as systematically distorted communication.

Although Gadamer's critique of objectivism and the self-misunderstanding of science that follows from it is correct argues Habermas, Gadamer underestimates the efficiency of methodically controlled reflection and overestimates the superiority of understanding that occurs in unmediated natural language. The claim for the superiority of unmediated understanding threatens to undermine the very goal that Gadamer sets out for philosophical hermeneutics. The task of mediating between the language of science and the language of everyday life requires that philosophical hermeneutics must translate the findings of a monological system of communication formulated in a language that is removed from everyday speech to the dialogical system of communication that characterizes natural language. This requires not a reflection within natural language but

mediation between different language systems, claims Habermas. Formulated this way, the problem would require that: "a philosophical hermeneutic ... clarify the condition for the possibility to, as it were, step outside the dialogical structure of everyday language and to use language in a monological way for the formal construction of theories and for the organization of purposive rational action."[26] It is precisely this type of activity that Gadamer shuns denying its necessity (and possibility) for intergrating the scientific world and everyday life. The immunity Gadamer claims fromhaving to engage in methodological disputes[27] allows the sciences to ignore the implications that philosophical hermeneutics has for the study of social life. "The claim which hermeneutics legitimately makes good against the practically influential absolution of a general methodology of the empirical sciences, brings no dispensation from the business of methodology in general. This claim will, I fear, be effective <u>in</u> the sciences or not at all."[28] In short, the ontological nature of Gadamer's claims, the oppositon between hermeneutic experience and knowledge obtained methodologically, and the claims for the superiority of the unmediated understanding transmitted through natural language, succeeds only in securing the irrelevance of philosophical hermeneutics in a society on the verge of total scientific and technological control.

Accompanying this irrelevancy, and once again flowing from the claim of the universality and ontological priority of language, is a form of irrationalism. From Habermas' standpoint Gadamer has adopted something like Hegel's view of history and substituted for Absolute

Spirit the infinity of language. In doing so he denies reason the role of a moving force in history. Consequently, the development of language is the development of non-rationally founded tradition:

> At the level of objective Spirit, language becomes a contingent absolute. It can no longer comprehend itself as absolute spirit; it only impresses itself upon subjective spirit as absolute power. This power becomes objective in the historical transformation of horizons of possible experience. Hegel's experience of reflection shrinks to the awareness that we are delivered up to a happening in which the conditions of rationality change irrationally according to time and place, epoch and culture. Hermeneutic self-reflection embroils itself in this irrationalism, however, only when it absolutizes hermeneutic experience and fails to recognize the transcending power of reflection that is also operative in it. Reflection can, to be sure, no longer reach beyond itself to an absolute consciousness, which it pretends to be. The way to absolute idealism is barred to a transcendental consciousness that is hermeneutically broken and plunged back into the contingent complex of tradition. But must it for that reason remain struck on the path of relative idealism.[29]

The inflated claims that Gadamer makes for language and hermeneutic understanding are the complement to his underestimation of the power and independence of reflection. The connection between tradition and understanding does not protect that tradition from changes that are made possible by the exercise of reason. Gadamer's view that "understanding - no matter how controlled it may be - cannot simply leap over the interpreters relationship to tradition"[30] is correct. "But from the fact that understanding is structurally a part of the tradition that it further develops through appropriation, it does not follow that the medium of tradition is not profoundly altered by scientific reflection."[31] In new and unanticipated situations tradition must be prudently developed in ways that are not simply the

blind assertion fo previous ideas and ways of conducting affairs. It is in such situations that reason most clearly shows its independence from tradition. "Gadamer fails to appreciate the power of reflection that is developed in understanding. This type of reflection is no longer blinded by the illusion of an absolute, self-grounded autonomy that does not detach itself from the soil of contingency on which it finds itself. But in grasping the genesis of the tradition from which it proceeds and on which it turns its back, reflection shakes the dogmatism of life practices."[32] The capacity of reason to shake the nature-like appearance of existing social practices and arrangements is not altered by the fact that reason always confronts a particular set of practices and tradition and hence is always situated within an historical context.

In effect, Habermas interprets Gadamer as saying that the exercise of reason is merely the appropriation and extension of tradition. Consequently, Gadamer fails to appreciate the changes that are the potential results of the exercise of reason. "In Gadamer's view, on-going traditon and hermeneutic inquiry merge to a single point. Opposed to this is the insight that the reflected appropriation of tradition breaks up the nature-like substance of tradition and alters the position of the subject in it."[33] In fact it is only through controlled reflection that philosophical hermeneutics could make the transition from an ad hoc, non-systematic apprehending of tradition to a genuine, critical science. "A controlled distanciation can raise understanding from a prescientific experience to the rank of a reflected procedure. In this way hermeneutic procedures enter into

the social sciences."[34]

Habermas detects an additional, equally serious flaw in the claim to universality of philosophical hermeneutics. He insists that this claim to universality, as formulated by Gadamer, can be made good only on the condition that (1) there is no structure of meaning that exists or develops outside of natural language and to which natural language has no unmediated access; (2) all that constitutes human reality is somehow reflected in language, i.e. is linguistic in nature; and (3) all flaws in understanding are necessarily endogenous. If any or all of the above conditions are unmet, if structures of meaning or structures that determine meaning develop outside and alongside the structure of meaning available to natural language; if there is more to human reality than what is reflected in natural language; or if the barriers to genuine understanding are endogenous or the result of the very organization of understanding, then the Gadamerian claim to universality on behalf of philosophical hermeneutica cannot be sustained.

Habermas believes that the development in linguistics and Piaget's work in genetic epistomology are sufficient reason for calling the hermeneutic claim to universality into question. But the most serious challenge to that claim to universality is posed by psychoanalysis. Habermas formulates the challenge this way:

> I shall only consider the question whether a critical science such as psychoanalysis can by-pass the way skillful interpretation is tied to the natural competence of everyday communication with the help of a theoretically based semantic analysis - and thereby refute the hermeneutic claim to universality. Can there be an understanding of meaning in relation to symbolic

> structures formulated in everyday language that is not tied to the hermeneutic pre-supposition of context dependent processes of understanding, an understanding that in this sense by-passes natural language as the last meta-language.[35]

In other words is it possible that there exists structures of meaning whose ultimate explanation lies outside of the range of meanings available in the context of natural language? Habermas believes that there are and that psychoanalysis provides the example. "I shall...consider the question whether a critical science such as psychoanalysis can by-pass the way skillfull interpretation is tied to the natural competence of everyday communication with the help of a theoretically based semantic analysis - and thereby refute the hermeneutic claim to universality."[36]

One of the primary goals of psychoanalysis is the interpretation of a variety of phenonmena previously thought to be meaningless, unexplainable, or accidental. Dreams, parapraxes, neuroses, as well as a variety of other common types of behavior became, with the advent of psychoanalysis, phenomena that could be explained by demonstrating the hidden sense or meaning the such isolated and seemingly unimportant phenomena had for the patient. "It was a triumph of the interpretive art of psychoanalysis when it succeeded in demonstrating the hidden sense or meaning that certain common mental acts of normal people for which no one had hitherto attempted to put forward a psychical explanation, were to be regarded in the same light as the symptoms of neurotics; that is to say had meaning, which was unknown to the subject but which could easily be discovered by analytic means."[37]

The problem for psychoanalysis, however, is that often the object of explanation appears in fragments (as in the case of dreams) or there is no immediate connection to any other event or behavior (as is often the case with obsessions, fantasies or parapraxes). A process of desymoblization has occurred which disconnects the original event for drive from the symptoms or the dream thereby removing the original experience or conflict from public communication. As Habermas puts it, "...what is uncounscious is removed from public communication. Insofar as it expresses itself in symbols or actions anyway, it manifests itself as a symptom, that is as a mutilation and distortion of the text of everyday habitual language games."[38]

The exclusion of the meaning of the psychoanalytic text includes the interruption of the patients dialogue with himself. "Because the symbols that interpret suppressed needs are excluded from public communication, the speaking and acting subject's communication with himself in interrupted. The privatized language of the unconscious motives is rendered inaccessible to the ego, even though internally it has considerable repercussions upon that use of language and those motivations of action that the ego controls. The result is that the ego necessarily deceives itself about its identity in the symbolic structures that is consciously produces."[39] The subject himself does not have access to the meanings of the symptoms and furthermore may not even perceive them as symptoms of anything.

Faced with this dilemma, the analyst attempts to draw out the missing parts of the phenomena (dreams) or hidden drives, events or wishes that the object of explanation is tied to . Through scenic

understanding, i.e. the reconstruction of the original scene in which the psychological conflict that resulted in repression and the subsequent sympton formation took place, the analyst attempts to increase the patients capacity for self-reflection. In the case of dreams it requires first a reconstruction of the dream and then an interpretation of the dream as a whole in terms of the residues of daily life. In the case of the neurotic behavior the analyst attempts to show the connection to some frustrated wish or drive.

Two features of scenic understanding place it outside the process of everyday understanding achieved through natural language, thereby challenging the hermeneutic claim to universality. First, scenic understanding takes place within the analytic relationship between patient and analyst. It is a methodologically controlled artificially created situation that Habermas insists fulfills experimental conditions that Gadamer would characterize as a form of objectivism. Without this analytic situation the meanings of the dreams or symptoms could not emerge.

Second, psychoanalytic interpretation depends upon theoretical assumptions that circumscribe the possibilities of meaning that can emerge from the analytic situation: "the analyst's pre-understanding is directed at a small segment of possible meanings: viz early, conflictive object relations. The linguistic material that emerges in talks with the patient is classified within a closely circumscribed context of possible double meaning. This context consists of a general interpretation of infant patterns of interaction which is correlated with a theory of personality that exhibits specific phases

of development."[40] In other words, the theoretical assumptions concerning the possible meanings of what emerges from analysis are a framework that is not available to the everyday speaking subject simply because of his natural linguistic competence. Habermas specifies three dimensions of the analyst's pre-understanding.

(1) The analyst entertains a pre-conception of 'normal' or distorted communication. Undistorted communication is characterized by a congruence between levels of communication; is public, i.e. follows intersubjective rules; allows the differentiation between subject and object, appearance and reality; enable the subject to secure his identity and that of others within the language community; and finally enables the speaker to make a distinction between objective states of affairs and subjective experiences of speaking subjects. This preconception of undistorted communication provides the analyst with a basis for determining where and when distortion in a patients communication exists; it throws into relief irregularities in communication itself.

(2) The analysts' second assumption is that the organization of symbols occurs in two distinct stages. "In the first stage the process of symbolization does not rely on the intersubjective rules that govern public communication. "This layer of paleo-symbols is...devoid of all the properties of normal speech. Paleo-symbols are not integrated into a system of grammatical rules. They are unordered elements and do not arise within a system that could be transformed grammatically."[42] Hence, they are not part of public communication; they are privatized meanings. Moreover, the organization of

paleo-symbols does not follow any particular system of classification or categorization. It is idiosyncratic.

The second stage of symbolic organizaton is that which is mediated by linguistic rules and grammar. It is this second stage that enables re-symbolization through the translation of pre-linguistic paleo-symbols into recognizable linguistic expression. This "transference of semantic contents from he pre-linguistic stage to the linguistic state of aggregation widens the sphere of communicative action at the expense of the unconsciously motivated one. The movement of successful, creative use of language is one of emancipation."[43]

It is important to emphasize that the first stage is a pre-linguistic stage, it genetically preceeds the linguistic stage of symbolic organization. This helps account for the fact that when the original symbolization emerges from the unconscious it is not immediately completely translatable into normal communication. "The assumption that neurotic behavior is guided by paleo-symbols and only subsequently rationalized by linguistic interpretation also provides an explanation for the characteristics of this form of behavior: for its status as pseudo-communication, stereotyped and compulsive behavior, emotional attachment, expressive content and inflexible situational tie."[44]

(3) Finally, psychoanalysis relies on theoretical assumptions about the structure of mind which itself is prior to language, i.e. the structure of mind does not develop within language but rather language develops through it. "Depth hermeneutical understanding

requires, therefore, a systematic pre-understanding that extends onto language in general, whereas hermeneutical understanding always proceeds from a preunderstanding that is shaped by tradition and which forms and changes itself within linguistic communication."[45] The structural theory of mind the Freud articulated, consisting of the ego, id and super-ego, does not itself have a linguistic basis. Hence, its existence is not ultimately explained in terms of tradition or language.

The organization of paleo-symbols and the structure of mind that serve as the theoretical context for interpretation also provide the analyst with a theory of systematically distorted communication. The paleo-symbols of an individual's pre-linguistic background and the dynamics of the constitutive parts of the mind systematically distort the communication of the individual with others and with himself. It is this systematic distortion that the analyst and patient aim to remove when they enter into the analytic situation. "The omissions and distortions that it rectifies have a systematic role and function. For the symbolic structures that psychoanalysis seeks to comprehend are corrupted by the impact of internal conditions. The mutilations have meaning as such. The meaning of a corrupt text of this sort can be adequately comprehended only after it has become possible to illuminate the meaning of the corruption itself. This distinguishes the peculiar task of a hermeneutics that cannot be confined to the procedures of philology but rather unites linguistic analysis with the psychological investigation of causal connection."[46] Any attempt to explain or understand the types of

behavior that psychoanalysis is concerned with and which does not recognize the structural problems involved in that understanding will find itself woefully inadequate both as a form of explanation and as a means of remedying the symptoms.

Finally, the idea of systematically distorted communication, that emerges from the theoretical presuppositions of the analyst, itself pre-supposes a theory of communicative competence, argues Habermas. "I would say,..., that each depth-hermeneutical interpretation of systematically distorted communication, irrespective of whether it appears in an analytic encounteror informally, implicitly relies on those assumptions which can only be developed and justified within the framework of a theory of communicative competence."[47]

Finally, the idea of systematically distorted communication, that emerges from the theoretical presuppositions of the analyst, itself pre-supposes a theory of communicative competence, argues Habermas. "I would say,..., that each depth-hermeneutical interpretation of systematically distorted communication, irrespective of whether it appears in an analytic encounter or informally, implicitly relies on those demanding assumptions which can only be developed and justified within the framework of a theory of communicative competence."[47] In short, psychoanalysis implicitly invokes a notion of undistorted communication, an idea of what is required for there to be normal intersubjective relations between two speaking subjects.

Habermas believes that this account of psychoanalysis with its emphasis on the structural theory of mind and the prelinguistic stage of symbolic organization is sufficient to refute Gadamer's claim to

universality of hermeneutic understanding. Not only are these phenomena that are a part of and effect human life outside of language, but the means of understanding and explanation that are required for access to these phenomena are not available to the speaking subject through the capacities developed within natural language. In Habermas' words, "Hermeneutic consciousness remains incomplete as long as it does not include a reflection upon the limits of hermeneutic understanding. The experience of a hermeneutical limitation refers to specifically incomprehensible expressions. This specific incomprehensibility cannot be overcome by the exercise, however skillful, of one's naturally acquired communicative competence; its stubborness can be regarded as an indication that it cannot be explained by sole reference to the structure of everyday communication that hermeneutic philosophy has brought to light."[48] And again later, "Already the implicit knowledge of the condition of systematically distorted communication which is pre-supposed in an actual form in the depth-hermeneutical use of communicative competence, is sufficient for the questioning of the ontological self-understanding of the philosophical hermeneutics which Gadamer propounds by following Heidegger."[49] If language itself is subject to systematic distortion, a distortion that is beyond the boundaries of the reflexivity of that language, it follows that ordinary or natural language is insufficient for rendering a complete account of meaning; something beyond hermeneutics is required to give an account of the distortions of that meaning.

Habermas' challenge to the hermeneutic claim to universality and

its subsequent identification of the complex of language, tradition and authority with reason, knowledge and freedom does not rest only with Habermas' interpretation of psychoanalysis. In addition to the challenge posed by pychoanalysis, Habermas argues that the hermeneutic claim to universality is further circumscribed by our relationship to nature and the arrangements concerning social control: "An interpretive sociology tht hypostasizes language to the subject of forms of life and of tradition ties itself to the idealist presupposition that linguistically articulated consciousness determines the material practice of life. But the objective framework of social action is not exhausted by the dimension of intersubjectivity intended and symbolically transmitted meaning. The linguistic infrastructure of a society is part of a complex that, however symbolically mediated, is also constituted by the constraint of reality - by the constraint of outer nature that enters into procedures for a technical mastery and by the constraint of inner nature reflected in the repressive character of social power relations."[50] The techniques of production and the relationships of power and domination are not reducible to rules of intersubjectivity. Moreover, developments in these two spheres have important implications for the sphere of intersubjectivity. As was previewed in our discussion of the similarities between Habermas and Gadamer, Habermas takes the developments of institutionalized science and technology to be particularly important. "I suspect that the institutional changes brought about by scientific-technical progress indirectly exert an influence on the linguistic schema of

world-comprehension not unlike that formerly exerted by changes in the mode of production. For science has become first among the productive forces."[51].

One of the more pernicious effects of the influence of technology and relations of domination on language has been the ideological use that language has been put to in hiding, misdescribing, and managing the awareness of social domination and the effects of developments in technology and science. Language is and has been used not only as a medium for the intersubjective transmission of knowledge. Language can be and is used to distort, manipulate, decieve and mislead. In this respect, "Language is also a medium of domination and social power; it serves to legitimate relations of organized force. Insofar as the legitimations do not articulate the power relations whose institutionalization they make possible, insofar as these relations merely manifest themselves in the legitimations, language is also ideological. Here it is a questions not of deception within a language but of deception with languge as such. Hermeneutic experience that encounters this dependency of the symbolic framework on actual conditions changes into critique of ideology."[52] In short, the systematically distorted communication that occures on the psychological level has its analogue on the social level. Given this capacity or use of language, it is naive to assume that the mere appropriation of tradition can guarantee the breakdown of those prejudices that do not contain truth or lead to greater understanding, but rather which function to mislead and divert our understanding of our actual social conditions and the possibilities and alternatives

available to us.

Habermas further develops his critique of the hermeneutic claim to universality and its 'prejudice for prejudice' into a critique of Gadamer's defense of authority. Summarizing Gadamer's positions, he says, "Gadamer deduced the rehabilitation of prejudice from his hermeneutic insight into the prejudgemental structure of understanding. He does not see any opposition between authority and reason. The authority of tradition does not assert itself blindly but only through its reflective recognition by those who, while being a part of traditions themselves, understand and develop it through application."[53] From this Gadamer concludes that "true authority need not be authoritarian."[54]

What Gadamer ignores, according to Habermas, is that in order for authority and tradition to merge with knowledge and reason it would have to be the case that all authority and tradition could be validated by reason. "That authority converges with knowledge means that the tradition that is effectively behind the educator legitimate the prejudices inculcated in the rising generation; they could then only be confirmed in this generation's reflection. In assuring himself of the structure of prejudgement, the mature individual would transfer the formerly unfree recognition of the personal authority of the guardian to the objective authority of a traditional framework. But then it would remain a matter of authority, for reflection could only move within the limits of the facticity of tradition. The act of recognition that is mediated through reflection would not at all have altered the fact that tradition as such remains the only ground of the

validity of prejudices."[55] This amounts to the claim, argues Habermas, that nothing new has ever come of reflection, that reflection can only re-affirm what has previously existed in tradition. In making such a claim, "Gadamer's prejudice for the rights of prejudice certified by tradition denies the power of reflection. The latter proves itself, however, in being able to reject the claim of tradition. Reflection dissolves substantiality because it not only confirms but also breaks up dogmatic forces. Authority and knowledge do not converge."[56] That reason and reflection have the potential to both reject and affirm tradition and prejudices indicates an independence for reason that Gadamer seems not to detect or concede. Habermas claims not to be arguing that reason can establish itself outside of the contingencies of tradition or that reason comes to tradition from the abstract heights of objectivity. "Reflection can, to be sure, no longer reach beyond itself to an absolute consciousness which it then pretends to be."[57]

Nonetheless the power of reson does not leave everything as it was. Its retroactive application to tradition which is inculcated by authority can result in the rejection of that tradition or change the nature of it. "Reflection recalls the path of authority along which the grammars of language games were dogmatically inculcated as rules for interpreting the world and for action. In this process the element of authority that was simply domination can be stripped away and dissolved into the less coercive constraint of insight and rational decision."[58]

A second dimension of the Habermasian critique of Gadamer's

defense of authority follows from his view that language plays a double role within our political life, i.e. that it not only conveys truth and knowledge but it can also be used to manipulate and distort, and hence is a means of domination as well as enlightenment. To the extent that institutionalized authority is dependent on the systematically distorted communication, either for its existence or for its continued operation and policies, it can not be accepted as legitimte authority and equated with reason and knowledge. Indeed, in such forms, it must rely on the containment of reflection and understanding for one if its conditions of continued existence. But Gadamer, argues Habermas, fails to address this problem seriously enough, tending to minimize or underestimate the extent to which authority has relied on obfuscation and untruth rather than promulgating reason and knowledge.

Given the inadequacies that Habermas purports are inherent in the philosophical hermeneutics as detailed by Gadamer, Habermas rejects the hermeneutic insistence that the commitment to enlightenment must be brought under a self-imposed discipline by the social theorist. "If then, such opposition between authority and reason does in fact exist, as the Enlightenment has always claimed, and if it cannot be superceded by hermeneutic means, it follows that the attempt to impose fundamental restrictions upon the interpreter's commitment to enlightenment becomes problematic too."[59]

Instead of insisting upon an unjustified limitation of the scope of reflection, a hermeneutically informed social science should be concerned with outlining the conditions under which critical

reflection could be brought to bear on the prejudices of tradition and the constraints imposed by developments in technology ano by relations of domination: "...hermeneutic understanding can, at the same time, lead to the critical ascertainment of truth only to the extent to which it follows the regulative principle: to try to establish universal agreement within the framework of an unlimited community of interpreters. Only this principle can make sure that the hermeneutic effort does not cease until we are aware of deceptions within a forcible consensus and of the systematic distortion behind seemingly accidental misunderstanding. If the understanding of meaning is not to remain a fortiori indifferent towards the idea of truth then we have to anticipate, together with the concept of a kind of truth which measures itself on an idealized consensus achieved in unlimited communication, also the structures of solidary co-existence in communication free from force."[60] Habermas implies that it is only the anticipation of such a radical understanding that can possibly achieve the goals that Gadamer stakes out for philosophical hermeneutics; i.e. the protection of everyday practical, political judgement from the increasing influence of technology and scientific control of society. For one of the purposes of that rdical understanding is the laying bare of the social relationships and relationships with nature that entail domination and false prejudice: "The idea of truth, which measures itself on a true consensus, implies the idea of the true life. We could also say: it includes the idea of being-of-age (Mundigkeit). It is only the formal anticiption of an idealized dialogue, as the form of life to be realized in the future,

which guarantees the ultimate supporting and counterfactual agreement that already unites us; in relation to it we can criticize every factual agreement, should it be a false one, as false consciousness.... Basic metahermeneutic experience makes us aware of the fact that critique, as a penetrating form of understanding which does not rebound off delusions, orients itself on the concept of ideal consensus and thereby follows the regulative principle of rational discourse."[61] Gadamer's very participation in metahermeneutic debates is itself testimony to the fact that Gadamer himself anticipates the consensus regulated by the principle of rational discourse, implies Habermas. Hence, Gadamer implicitly recognizes the strength of reason and its ability to distinguish false prejudices, and hence the potential it has for changing language and tradition.

The Gadamerian Rejoinder

For the time being we will postpone Habermas' development of a theory of communicative competence since that theory is intended to answer many of the questions that arose in his debate with Gadamer and is best understood in that context. Presently, being we will examine Gadamer's response to Habermas' critique of philosophicl hermeneutics and Habermas' own rejoinder.

Gadamer's response to Habermas' critique and project focuses on four related issues:

1. the goal of critical theory as outlined by Habermas;
2. the universality of language;
3. the power of reflection and reason;

4. the character and necessity of authority.

Understanding and controlled, methodical reflection. Gadamer begins his counter-critique of Habermas by examining the very goal of this latest version of critical theory, i.e. the claim that is is necessary to raise hermeneutic reflection to a higher, more systematic, self-conscious activity. "The modern social scientists..., in so far as they recognize hermeneutic reflection as unavoidable, nevertheless advance the claim (as Habermas has formulated it) of raising understanding up out of a prescientific exercise to the rank of a self-reflecting activity by controlled alienation - that is, through 'methodical development of intelligence'."[62] The assumption underlying this claim is that only the distance that such controlled alienation provides can make the reflective appropriation of tradition possible. Hence, it assumes a conflict between ongoing tradition and the rational evaluation of that tradition. This assumption cuts right to the heart of the hermeneutic account of tradition and reason, and displays, claims Gadamer, the same error and unredeemed faith in objectivism that plagued the Enlightenment, historicism, and earlier accounts of hermeneutics:

> My thesis is - and I think it is a necessary consequence of recognizing the operativeness of history in our conditionedness and finitude - that the thing that hermeneutics teaches us is to see through the dogmatism of asserting an opposition and separation between the ongoing, natural tradition and the reflective appropriation of it. For behind this assertion stands a dogmatic objectivism that distorts the very concept of hermeneutic reflection itself.

In effect this objectivism denies the power or presence of effective history with respect to the observer (or in Habermas' case,

the critical theorist), argues Gadamer. The hope of objectivism is that through controlled alienation the theorist is able to neutralize or minimize the effect of that which is socially and culturally transmitted. But this view, whether it is held by social engineers or those subscribing to critical theory, merely demonstrates a naive faith and pretension for the possibilities of controlled reason and method. "Actually, the historian, even the one who treats history as a 'critical science', is so little separated from the ongoing tradition (for example, those of his nation) that he is really engaged in contributing to the growth and development of the national state. He is one of the 'nation's historians; he belongs to the nation."[64] Hence, Habermas' faith in the possibilities of methodical, systematic appropriation of tradition fails to escape the same problems of earlier types of dogmatic objectivism, e.g. historicism, positivism and scientism.

Work, domination and the universality of hermeneutics. As we have seen, related to Habermas' claims concerning the necessity for methodical, systematic examintion of what is culturally transmitted is the denial of the universality of hermeneutics. If it were the case that everything that could be known was transmitted through existing everyday language, the need for a methodical examination of tradition would be either unnecessary or, as Gadamer claims, represent only one relativity within language itself. But if there are areas of social life, the truth of which lies outside the boundaries of everyday languge and ordinary transmission of tradition, it follows that some

form of understanding other than that achieved in everyday life is required. In his analysis of psychoanalysis, work and domination, Habermas attempts to show that there are such pre-linguistic and extra-linguistic areas of human experience and that knowledge of these areas is available to us only through the methodical, controlled examination of social and psychological life. Consequently, hermeneutics must restrict itself to the understanding of the transmission of tradition and culture.

Gadamer takes issue with Habermas' characterization of the problem and the inferences that he draws. First, Gadamer does not deny that there are pre-linguistic and extra-linguistic areas of human experience. In agreement with Habermas he cites Piaget's work on cognitive development as an example of the former and formal mathematics as an example of the latter. Furthermore, a passage we quoted earlier seems to indicate that Gadamer is sensitive to the influence of technology on language and culture:

> Unavoidably, the mechanical industrial world is expanding within the life of the individual as a sort of sphere of technical perfection. When we hear modern lovers talking to each other, we often wonder if they are communicating with words or with advertising labels and technical terms from the sign language of the modern industrial world. It is inevitable that the levelled life forms of the industrial age also affect language, and in fact the impoverishment of the vocabulary of language is making enormous progress....[65]

Hence, it seems clear that Gadamer is aware of the effects that technology can have on everyday life.

What Gadamer denies is what he sees as Habermas' total separation of the different spheres of social life from one another, the view that cultural tradition is something distinct from work and

relationships of power. To put the point more sharply, Gadamer argues that "the cultural heritage of a people is pre-eminently the heritage of forms and techniques of working, of forms and techniques of domination, of ideals of liberty, of objectives of order and the like. Who will deny that our specific human possibilities do not subsist in language."[66] To claim otherwise, implies Gadamer, would be to insist that in the living of our lives relationships of work and domination could be set aside from our language. "It would be totally abstract to consider that it was not through and in the concrete experiences of our human existence in domination and in work, and only here, that our human understanding of ourselves, our evaluations, our conversations with ourselves, find their fulfillment and exercise their critical function."[67] This fusion of language with work and domination places the latter squarely within the reach of hermeneutics. "From the hermeneutical standpoint, rightly understood, it is absolutely absurd to regard the concrete factors of work and politics as outside the scope of hermeneutics."[68]

This is not to deny that work and politics influence language and tradition, but rather that they are part of that tradition as well and hence, in order to come to know and recognize their influence, their impact must be articulatable in language. This is no less true for psychoanalysis than for social phenomena such as work and politics. In Gadamer's words, "I maintain that the hermeneutic problem is universal and basic for all interhuman experience, both of history and of the present moment, precisely because meaning can be experienced even where it is not actually intended."[69] Work and domination

could lie outside the realm of hermeneutics only if they existed in a world that did not enter our language, and hence our world, claims Gadamer.

Reason, language and the power of reflection. Gadamer's third counter-argument is directed at what he perceives to be an oversimplification of the power of reflection and the Habermasian insistence on an antithesis between reason and tradition. Gadamer begins by denying Habermas' characterization of his position, stating that he does not insist that tradition is the only ground for acceptance of prejudice, belief or social practice: "the idea that tradition as such, should be and should remain the only ground for acceptance of presuppositions (a view that Habermas ascribes to me) flies in the face of my basic thesis that authority is rooted in insight as a hermeneutical process.... Tradition is no proof and validation of something, in any case not where validation is demanded by reflection."[70]

Habermas' mistake lies not just in misinterpreting Gadamer's position concerning the fallibility of tradition, argues the latter. It extends to an over-estimation of the independence of reason. Gadamer interprets Habermas as saying that the exercise of reason necessarily shatters the constellation of prejudices that we inherit from our linguistic tradition. As Gadamer reads him, Habermas sees an antithesis between language and reason. From Gadamer's point of view this misses the intimate connection between the two: "our human experience of the world, for which we rely on our faculty of

judgement, consists precisely in the possibility of our taking a critical stance with regard to every convention. In reality we owe this to the linguistic virtuality of our reason and language does not, therefore, present an obstacle to reason."[71] The linguisticality of our reason is not a cause for despair or something to be overcome. Indeed, it is this linguisticality that enables us to take up a critical attitude toward our prejudices. "The fact that it is in the midst of a linguistic world and through the mediation of an experience pre-formed by language that we grow up in our world, does not remove the possibilities of critique. On the contrary, the possibility of going beyond our conventions and beyond all those experiences that are schematized in advance, opens up before us once we find ourselves, in our conversation with others, faced with opposed thinkers, with new critical problems, with new experiences. Fundamentally in our world the issue is always the same; the verbalization of conventions and of social norms behind which there are always economic and dominating interests."[72] Habermas' mistake, his unexamined prejudice from Gadamer's standpoint, is to assume that reason is only active when one confronts and rejects what already exists. But that is a one-sided view of reason. "The real question is whether one sees the function of reflection as bringing something to awareness in order to confront what is in fact accepted with other possibilities - so that one can either throw it out or reject the other possibilities and accept what the tradition is de facto presenting - or whether bringing something to awareness <u>always dissolves what one has previously accepted</u>."[73] What Habermas fails to appreciate, according to Gadamer, is that

reason is operative in the examination and acceptance of tradition and true prejudice no less that in the rejection of false prejudice. This final point carries us to the question of authority.

The question concerning authority: Its necessity and function. Owing primarily to the fact that the question of authority is so intricately tied to the question of tradition and prejudice, Gadamer's response to Habermas' critique of the former's position on authority runs parallel to his remarks concerning tradition. First, Gadamer denies the unqualified defense of authority that Habermas attributes to him: "It is an inadmissible imputation to hold that I somehow meant there is no decline of authority or no emancipting criticism of authority."[74] To make such a claim would require that one believe that authority never stood in relation of domination to those over whom authority is exercised. Gadamer flatly denies that he holds such a view and the direction of his own work in trying to contain the growth of scientific authority testifies to the importance of that issue for him. In Gadamer's words, "Certainly I would grant that authority exercises an essential dogmatic power in innumerable forms of domination, from the ordering of education and the mandatory commands of the army and government all the way to the hierarchy of power created by political forces or fanatics."[75]

What Gadamer does claim is that it is myopic to see authority as opposed to freedom, an enemy of reason, or founded on and the advocate of illegitimate prejudices. Such a view is itself a false prejudice, one left over from the Enlightenment: "Here indeed is operating a

prejudice that we can see is pure dogmatism, for reflection is not always and unavoidably a step towards dissolving conviction. Authority is not always wrong. Yet Habermas regards it as an untenable assertion, and treason to the heritage of the Enlightenment, that the act of rendering transparent the structure of prejudgements in understanding should possibly lead to an acknowledgement of authority. Authority is by his definition a dogmatic power. I cannot accept this assertion that reason and authority are abstract antitheses as the emanciptory Enlightenment did. Rather, I assert that they stand in a basically ambivalent relation, a relation I think should be explored rather than casually accepting the antithesis as a fundamental conviction."[76] Authority may or may not stand opposed to freedom, be irrationality founded, or the proponent of illegitimate prejudice. But to assume that it necessarily is all these things is to make the same type of mistake as the unqualified authoritarians who believe that every act of authority is defensible.

Habermas' misunderstanding of authority, argues Gadamer, rests on a misconception, inherited from the Enlightenment, of the relationship between reason and authority. It is a view that sees a necessary antithesis between the two, a "mistake fraught with ominous consequences. In it reflection is granted a false power and the true dependencies involved are misjudged on the basis of fallacious idealism."[77] If we wish genuinely to understand authority, argues Gadamer, we must see that the key to authority, its essence, is not obedience to arbitrary command but rather the recognition of the superior insight of those with whom we place ourselves in a

reltionship of authority:

> Now the mere outer appearance of obedience rendered to authority can never show why or whether the authority is legitimate, that is, whether the context is true order or veiled disorder that is created by the arbitrary exercise of power. It seems evident to me that acceptance or acknowledgement is the decisive thing for relationships of authority... One need only study the processes of forfeiture and decline of authority (or its rise) to see what authority is and that out of which it grows. It lives not from dogmatic power but from dogmatic acceptance. What is dogmatic acceptance, however, if not that one concedes superiority in knowledge and insight to the authority and for this reason one believes the authority is right. Only on this crucial concession, this belief, is acceptance founded. Authority can rule only because it is freely recognized and accepted. The obedience that belongs to true authority is neither blind nor slavish.[78]

In sum, Gadamer is arguing that to construe the relationship of authority in terms of obedience is to misunderstand what is central to authority. Authority rests not so much on dogmatic obedience but on dogmatic acceptance that recognizes the superior knowledge of another. Given this acceptance, it makes little sense from Gadamer's perspective to construe authority as a form of domination.

Finally, any attempt at the critical evaluation of authority, at determining its legitimacy, must itself refer back to the language and tradition that form the background of authority. This further ties reason to language and tradition. There is no possibility of abstracting oneself from one's linguistic background and confronting authority in the manner that the Enlightenment aspired to. The critical evaluation of authority is always and only made possible by the shared understanding that a linguistic community inherits. Even in the case of disagreement between those in authority and those subject to it, there must exist commonalities that enable the two

parties to recognize what they disagree on. "This is something that hermeneutical reflection teaches us: that social community, with all its tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again leads back to a common area of social understanding through which it exists."[79] For authority no less than any other phenomena language is the metainstitution by which we confront, examine and reject or accept authority. There are, as Habermas points out, illegitimate examples and instances of authority. But it is only through language and the commonalities and arguments that is supplies to social actors that these distortions of genuine authority can be recognized. Consequently, rather than completely rejecting existing tradition and language in the critical evaluation of authority we must affirm them.

In sum, Gadamer persists in his argument that reason, truth and freedom on the one hand are not inherently antithetical to authority, tradition and language on the other. Claims to that effect, such as Habermas', misunderstand the nature of these phenomena. In particular, they represent a misunderstanding of the possibilities of reason and its relationship to language, tradition and authority.

The Habermasian Rejoinder

Habermas' response to Gadamer's counter-argument is not simply a reiteration of his original critique, summarized earlier, concerning the role of reason as a liberating force, the necessity of a methodical and self-reflective employment of reason as a defense against the growing technologization of contemporary society, and its

antithetical relationship to authority. Taking up the question of the necessity and inescapability of referring to commonalities and common understanding in the process of coming to an understanding devoid of domination, manipultaion and force, Habermas in effect argues that Gadamer is begging the question. For the common understanding that Gadamer insists is the necessary requirement for social communication may itself be the result of manipulation, coercion and domination, and hence a false consensus. In order to insure that the underlying consensus or commonalities are not themselves the result of ideological domination, we have to go beyond that 'common understanding' to the origins of that consensus that goes on 'behind the backs' of social actors. In effect Habermas is arguing that Gadamer fails to see that "The dogmatic recognition of tradition, and this means the acceptance of truth-claims, can be equated with knowledge itself only when freedom from force and unrestricted argument about tradition have already been secured within this tradition. Gadamer's argument pre-supposes that legitimizing recognition and the consensus on which it is founded can arise and develop free from force. The experience of distorted communication contradicts that presupposition."[80]

Habermas goes on to point out that it us often only through false or manipulated consensus that force becomes legitimized, and not through voluntary recognition. "Force can, in any case, acquire permanence only through the objective semblance of an unforced pseudo-communicative agreement. force that is legitimized in such a way we call, with Max Weber, authority. It is for this reason there

has to be that principle process of a universal agreement free from domination in order to make the fundamental distinction between dogmatic recognition and true consensus. Reason, in the sense of the principle of rational discourse, represents the rock which factual authorities have so far been more likely to crash against than build upon."[81] Gadamer's underestimation of the extent to which authority has historically rested on false consensus represents a serious flaw in philosophical hermeneutics and compromises its ability to protect practical life from the encroachments of increasing technological control and domination of social life. A social theory that would measure up to this task must provide a theory of communication that would delineate the contours of rational discourse and uncoerced consensus, and provide social theorists and actors with the means to determine manipulated consensus and uncover distorted communication. Habermas attempts to provide such a theory of communication with his theory of universal pragmatics and communicative competence. In this respect this project can be seen as the latest chapter of his response to Gadamer.

Universal pragmatics and communicative competence. The importance of the theory of communicative action for Habermas' project cannot be overestimated. It represents his attempt to formulate the conditions of rationality in ordinary, i.e. institutionally unbound, speech acts. It represents Habermas' attempt to make explicit the conditions of consenual agreement that Gadamer would insist must always remain in the shadows of language or partly obscured. One sympathetic

commentator has described its importance this way:

> In short Habermas entire project, from the critique of contemporary scientism to the reconstruction of historical materialsim, rests on the possibility of providing an account of communication that is both theoretical and normative, that goes beyond pure hermeneutics without being reducible to a strictly empirical-analytic science.[82]

It represents an attempt to outline the criteria of rationality against which individual systems of communication can be evaluated.

The foundation upon which Habermas attempts to build a theory of communicative competence he calls universal pragmatics, a project of which it is the task to "identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding."[83] Habermas begins his outline of universal pragmatics by distinguishing it from logical analysis of language, formal linguistics, and sociolinguistics. The failure of the first two of these approaches to the study of language is that in their attempt to outline universal criteria for the formation of logically or grammatically correct sentences, they fail to understand the place of pragmtic conditions of understanding." The logical analysis of language that originated with Carnap focuses primarily on syntactic and semantic properties of linguistic formations. Like structuralist linguistics, it delineates its object domain by first abstracting from the pragmatic properties of language and subsequently introducing the pragmatic dimension in such a way that the constitutive connections between the generative accomplishments of speaking and acting subjects, on the one hand, and the general structure of speech on the other, cannot come into view."[84] This isn't so much wrong as it is an arbitrary restriction on what is

required for comprehensive, theoretical understanding of communication:

> This abstraction of language from the use of language in speech (langue vs. parole), which is made in both the logical and structuralist analysis of language, is meaningful. Nonetheless, this methodological step is not sufficient reason for the view that the pragmatic dimension of language from which one abstracts is beyond formal analysis. The fact of the successful, or at least promising, reconstruction of linguistic rule systems cannot serve as a justification for restricting formal analysis to this object domain.... Like the elementary units of language (sentences), the elementary units of speech (utterances) can be analyzed in the methodological attitude of a reconstructive science.[85]

The logical analysis of language and structural linguistics, along with a variety of other formal analyses of language developed from logic, linguistics and the analytic philosophy of language, are subject to a variety of criticisms[86] claims Habermas, not the least of which is the failure to understand the importance of the pragmatic dimension to understanding.

To remedy this shortcoming Habermas turns to the theory of speech acts developed by Searle and Austin, and using their works as a springboard, reconstructs the universal pragmatic conditions for understanding. By reconstruction Habermas means the making explicit "the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects."[87] Habermas uses Ryle's distinction between know-how and know-what in explicating what he means by reconstructive science. In this respect reconstruction attempts to make explicit the rules, criteria, and requirements of understanding that the speaking subject employs in making himself understood but of which he may or may not be conscious of or be able to articulate:[88]

> To the extent that his utterance is correctly formed and thus

> comprehensible, the author produced it in accordance with certain rules or on the basis of certain structures. He understands the system of rules of his language and their context-specific application; he has a pre-theoretical knowledge of this rule system, which is at least sufficient to enable him to produce the utterance in question. This implicit rule consciousness is a know-how. The interpreter in turn, who not only shares but wants to understand this implicit knowledge of the competent speaker, must transform his know-how into a second-level know-what. This is the task of reconstructive understanding, that is of meaning explication of the sense of rational reconstruction of generative structures underlying the production of symbolic formations.[89]

The shortcoming of formal linguistics lies in the limiting focus on comprehensibility, i.e. the requirement that the utterance by grammatically correct. While linguistics might be able to tell us what rules must be met to utter a grammatically correct sentence, it does not tell us what is required for successful communication between two agents. The meaning of an utterance is dependent upon more than just the grammatical rules operative in language; it requires an understanding of the interpersonal relationships that form the context of an utterance and the substantive content of that utterance. Hence, to understand what is required for successful understanding one must understand the double structure of speech, argues Habermas, i.e. "the two communicative levels on which speaker and hearer must simultaneously come to an understanding if they want to communicate their intentions to one another. I would distinguish (1) the level of intersubjectivity on which speaker and hearer, through illocutionary acts, establish the relations that permit them to come to an understanding with one another, and (2) the level of propositional content which is communicated... "[90] It is this double structure of speech which enables the successful communication between two

subjects. "In filing out the double structure of speech participants in a dialogue communicate on two levels simultaneously. They combine communication of a content with communication about the role in which the communicated content is used."[91] If either of these dimensions is unfulfilled, if a speaker fails to communicate the propositional content or if the intersubjective relationship between two actors remains obscure, the meaning of an utterance threatens to remain indeterminate, and successful communication is threatened: "communication in language can take place only when the participants, in communicating with one another about something, simultaneously enter upon two levels of communications - the level of intersubjectivity on which they take up personal relations and the level of propositional contents."[92]

From this double structure of speech Habermas infers that there are two possible uses that language can be put to. We can use language to thematize either personal relations or the propositional content of an utterance. To be sure both levels of communication must be present in every instance of successful communication. But we are able to emphasize one or the other. "In the interactive use of language we thematize the relations into which speaker and hearer enter - as a warning, promise, request - while we only mention the propositional content of the utterances. In the cognitive use of language, by contrast, we thematize the context of the utterances as a proposition about something that is happening in the world (or what could be the case) while we only indirectly expresss the interpersonasl relations."[93]

Each of these two different uses of language, the interactive and the cognitive, raises a different type of validity claim that must be redeemed or met for successful, undistorted communication. The validity claim raised by the cognitive use of language that makes propositional content thematic requires constative speech acts that raise the most basic of all validity claims, the claim to truth. Habermas furthermore insists that the validity claim of truth is presupposed in all types of speech, i.e. it is a universal validity claim. "Truth claims are thus a type of validity claim built into the structure of possible speech in general. Truth is a universal validity claim; its universality is reflected in the double structure of speech."[94]

Though truth is the universal validity claim, different types of validity claim are made thematic with uses of language other than the cognitive. "In the interactive use of language, in which interpersonal relations are thematically stressed, we refer in various ways to the validity of the normative context of speech action."[95] Reference to the normative contexts raises validity claims other than truth:

> Truth is merely the most conspicuous - not the only - validity claim reflected in the formal structures of speech. The illocutionary force of the speech act, which produces a legitimate (or illigitimate) interpersonal relation between participants, is borrowed from the binding force of recognized norms of action... In promises,..., in recommendations, prohibitions, prescriptions and the like,... the speaker implies a validity claim that must, if the speech acts are to succeed, be covered by existing norms, and that means by (at least) de facto recognition that these norms rightfully exist. This internal relations between validity norms implicitly raised in speech actions and the validity of their normative context is stressed in the interactive use of

> language. Just as only constative speech acts are permitted in the cognitive use of language, so in the interactive use only those speech acts are permitted that characterize a specific relation that speaker and hearer can adopt to norms of action or evaluation. I call these regulative speech acts."[96]

Regulative speech acts raise different types of validity claims than constative speech acts; they raise the claim of rightness or appropriateness.

The distinction between cognitive and interactive languge use, constative and regulative speech acts, and validity claims of truth and appropriatness do not, however, exhaust the range of use, speech acts and validity claims that are required for successful communication. There is a third validity claim, truthfulness or sincerity: The truthfulness with which a speaker utters his intentions can, however, be stressed at the level of communicative action in the same way as the truth of a proposition and the rightness (or appropriateness) of an interpersonal relations. Truthfulness guarantees the transparency of a subjectivity representing itself in language. It is especially emphasized in the expressive use of language."[97] Truthfulness, or sincerity, is as universal a condition of successful communication as truth or appropriateness: "truthfulness too is a universal implication of speech, as long as the presupposition of communicative action are not altogether suspended."[98] If the validity claim of sincerity were absent from a speech act, communicative action aimed at coming to an understanding would be jeopoardized if not impossible. For we would then have grounds for questioning a speaker's intentions and desire for achieving an understanding that is the goal of communicative action.

Habermas further argues that it is only because of the validity claims that are raised in speech that institutionally unbound speech acts, i.e. speech acts that occur in everyday speech, outside the norms of (at least) tacitly recognized institutions, can have the illocutionary force that they do when they are successful. "In the case of institutionally unbound speech acts, however, illocutionary force cannot be traced back directly to the binding force of the normative context. The illocutionary force with which the speaker, in carrying out his speech act, influences the hearer, can be understood only if we take into consideration sequences of speech acts that are connected with one another on the basis of a reciprocal recognition of validity claims."[99] Moreover, these validity claims are the foundation of the rationality of speech acts, i.e. it is only because speech acts raise these validity claims that the illocutionary force of speech can rationally influence the hearer:

> With their illocutionary speech acts speaker and hearer raise validity claims and demand that they be recognized. But this recognition need not follow irrationally since the validity claims have a cognitive character and can be checked.... In the final analysis the speaker can illocutionarily influence the hearer and vice versa because speech act typical commitments are connected with cognitively typical validity claims - that is, because the reciprocal bonds have a rational basis. The engaged speaker normally commits the specific sense in which he would like to take up an interpersonal relationship with the thematically stressed validity claim and thereby chooses a specific model of communication.[100]

The validity claims raised in speech acts, and particularly those made thematic in the use of specific types of speech acts, provide the basis for determining what types of reasons, evidence, and justifications must be provided to legitimize the speech act that is

made; the type of evidence, reasons and justification considered acceptable will vary with the use of language. "In the cognitive use of language, the speaker proffers a speech-act-imminent obligation to provide grounds. Constative speech acts contain the offer to recur if necessary to the experiential source from which the speaker draws the certainty that the statement is true. If this immediate grounding does not dispel ad hoc doubt, the persistingly problematic trugh claim can become the subject of a theoretical discourse."[101] Similarly in the interactive and expressive uses of language the speaker incurs the obligation to recur to the normative context, i.e. to provide justification, and the obligation to prove trustworthy, respectively. Here again, if doubt remains, further justification at a different level of discourse is available. In the case of the interactive use of languge this means engaging in practical discourse; in the case of the expressive use of language the doubts concerning the trustworthiness of the speaker "can only be checked against the consistency of his subsequent behavior."[102]

In sum, Habermas claims to have constructed a model of linguistic communication, a model in which the tacit presuppositions and requirements for any successful communication are outlined: "Institutionally unbound speech acts owe their illocutionary force to a cluster of validity claims that speakers and hearers have to raise and recognize as justified if grammatical (and thus comprehensible) sentences are to be employed in such a way as to result in successful communication. A participant in communication acts with an orientation to reaching understanding only under the condition that,

in employing comprehensible sentences in his speech acts, he raises three validity claims in an acceptable way. He claims truth for a stated propositional content or for the existential presuppositions of a mentioned propositional content. He claims rightness (or appropriateness) for norms (or values), which, in a given context, justify an interpersonal relation that is to be performatively established. Finally, he claims truthfulness for the intentions expressed."[103]

In any particular speech act one of these validity claims may be addressed explicitly or thematically while the others are temporarily assumed. Nonetheless, each validity claim is at least still raised in every speech act, even if it is not the validity claim that is primary in a particular speech act: "Of course, individual validity claims can be thematically stressed, whereby the truth of the propositional content comes to the fore in the cognitive use of language, the rightness (or appropriateness) of the interpersonal relation in the interactive,and the truthfulness of the speaker in the expressive. But in every instance of communicative action the system of all validity claims comes into play: they must always be raised simultaneously, although they cannot all be thematic at the same time."[104] While one validity claim is thematized, the truth of the others remains at the level of assumption unless and until they are subsequently brought into question.

The theory of universal pragmatics represents the core of Habermas' theory of communicative competence. There are other features of his account of undistorted communication that require

mention in order to give a complete account of his communicative theory. In addition to the three validity claims discovered in universal pragmatics and the one claimed by linguistics (i.e., comprehensibility), Habermas insists that for undistorted communiction to take place each actor must have equal chances or opportunity to engage in communicative actions. If one or more actors is denied the opportunity to engage in communicative action or if that engagement is prejudiced by the actions of others, then the requirement of undistorted communication has been violated, and any consensus that emerges is suspect and may not be characterized as a legitimate, uncoerced consensus.

The second requirement concerning communicative competence is that each of the actors must be committed to discussion until universal agreement is reached. Only in the case of such universal agreement can it be said that the consensus that emerges is a totally uncoerced consensus. If speakers are not committed to dialogue until consensus is reached, they may begin to engage in strategic action that would undermine the process of undistorted communication resulting in a false consensus.

Universal Pragmatics and Authority

Habermas' theory of communicative competence and universal pragmatics seems to deny the practice of authority any positive or constructive role in the formation of a genuine consensus and the pursuit of rational action that would emerge from that consensus. If

the model of undistorted communication resulting in universal agreement is the paradigm or guiding ideal of democratic action, then it would follow that the exercise of authority must represent an abbreviation, interruption and substitute for genuinely democratic action. Authority is that set of relationships that are substituted for genuine agreement, for when a dialogue has not been allowed to continue to the point of universal agreement. Hence, the exercise of authority is also a substitute for rational action. This point is substantiated by what Habermas says concerning the public sphere. The promise of bourgeois ideology was the replacement of rule of authority of the absolutist state with the rule of reason exercised through public opinion. The growth of scientific forms of social control has eroded the public sphere within liberal capitalist societies and replaced the rational, practical public decision making with a technologically oriented decision making process. The point that is relevant here for our purposes is that Habermas' account of the public sphere guided by reason seems to have no place for authority, or at least would limit the duties of authority to the carrying out of policies consensually arrived at through rational discussion in the public sphere. Those in authority would have no independence and limited responsibility.

Habermas has indicated that the ideal speech sitution, the setting in which undistorted communication is realized, is to be regarded as a regulative ideal by which to measure existing patterns of communication and consensual agreements. This seems to imply that a recognition that the ideal of undistorted communication is not in

practice realizable and hence the possibility that authority also is not a dispensible aspect of social life. If this is an accurate characterization of Habermas' qualifications of the ideal speech situation and the implications that flow from those qualifications for the practice of authority, it seems incumbent upon Habermas to address the question of authority anew, specifying how that authority could be made democratic or outlining the relationship between the theory of universal pragmatics and the practice of authority.[105]

One possible impact of Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics can be projected. His elucidation of the pragmagtic requirements for successful, undistorted communication could supply social actors with a framework for analyzing the policies, pronouncements and directives of those in authority. Habermas' account of the validity claims that speech acts raise would enable those over whom authority is exercised to determine what types of arguments, evidence, reasons an appeals must be provided or made in order to justify the vailidity claims raised by the pronouncements of those in authority or by the justifications for policies those in authority embark on. For example, if an authority 'A' engaged in a communicative action (justification for policy X) that raised validity claims that could only be redeemed by reference to data on the performance of the economy, but in fact relied for justification of that policy on claims to sincerity of the individual in authority, Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics would enable us to determine the inappropriate justification for that policy as well as clarify what types of evidence need to be offered but are in this instance missing. If this

seems to be too obvious or modest a contribution to the questions of authority, it should be pointed out that precisely this phenomena of substituting sincerity for truth in the redemption of constative speech acts is commonplace with the Reagan administration and either downplayed or ignored by the media and many professional students of American politics. In other words, Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics, if correct about the pragmatic requirements for successful communication, would supply extended and more specific criteria for the determination of the rationality of particular policies, pronouncements, etc., than would be possible otherwise. It would enable us to determine when a particular action, policy or course of action by those in authority was justified and whether or not the justification for what policy was appropriate.

The Habermas-Gadamer Debate Evaluated

Having completed our exposition of the positions of both Habermas and Gadamer we will now offer our evaluation and criticisms of their respective positions. As we pointed out in the beginning of the previous chapter, Gadamer sets the protection of practical and political life from the potential total domination by scientific method and technological control as the primary goal of philosophical hermeneutics. In this respect he can be interpreted as taking up the challenge that Heidegger outlines in The Question Concerning Technology. Moreover, Gadamer is aware of the magnitude of this problem; he understands the possibilities of technologically

controlled forms of life slipping gradually into our everyday discourse. In light of the magnitude and persistence of the problem one must question, however, whether Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics could supply the resources to political and practical everyday life to resist the encroachments of technolocical control. At times Gadamer seems to place his faith in the infinity of language and philosophy. Speaking of the capacity of modern industrial societies to technologically substitute artificial language for authentic or spontaneous language he says, "the impoverishment of the vocabulary of language is making enormous progress, thus bringing about an approximation of language to a technical sign-system. Leveling tendencies of this kind are irresistable. Yet in spite of this the simultaneous building up of our own world in language still persists whenever we want to say something to each other. The result is the actual relationship of men to each other. Each one is at first a kind of linguistic circle, and these linguistic circles come into contact with each other, merging more and more. Language occurs once again, in vocabulary and grammar as always, and never without the inner infinity of the dialogue that is the progress between every speaker and his partner. Genuine speaking, which has something to say and hence does not give prearranged signals, but rather seeks words through which one reaches the other person, is the universal human task - but it is the special task of the theologian, to whom is commissioned the saying further of a message that stands written."[106] The implication is that in spite of the perserverence of technology, language will always provide us with a refuge, resevoir

and resource to enable us to elude the encroachements of technological domination of everyday life. Given the infinity of language, any attmpt at the creation of a totally, technologically controlled language is futile.

In part what the questions comes down to, I think, is to what extent does the threat of a technologically controlled form of life consist primarily or totally of artificially created language, a sign language as Gadamer calls it. Gadamer seems to imply that such artificially created meaning, coupled with the self-misunderstanding on the part of science, concerning its universality, is the most important dimension, if not exhaustive, of the problems concerning the relationship between everyday life and the ever increasing, 'irresistable' tendencies toward technological control. If these two phenomena are what are at question then the independence and infinity of language and the inherent disposition toward philosophy on the part of science might be sufficient to guarantee the long run integrity of everyday social life.

This characterization of Gadamer's perception of the problem would make two other positions of his more intelligible. First, it would explain why he insists in the preface of the second edition of Truth and Method that he is not, and philosophy has no business, telling science what it should and should not do and why he claims not to be prescribing methods for the human sciences, but that he is only giving an account of what actually is the case regarding language, truth and science. Second, it would make his appeal to commonalitites, i.e. common concerns that all of us face as human beings, as the basis of

practical action, more understandable. For if the political problems of technological society consist primarily in artificially created meaning and scientism, both of which are resolvable by features tendencies of language and inherent in science itself, then questions of conflict are minimized. Political problems begin to appear as misunderstandings which are resolvable because of the universality of language. We need only come to recognize or discover the deep common accord between conflicting parties that will serve as the basis for further dialogue. Moreover, the infinity of language would guarantee that even in the face of a self-conscious attempt to create an exhaustive meaning system for an entire society, new meanings would emerge that would constantly elude the net of technological control and many older meaning would slip throught the net itself.

Even if we grant the accuracy of this characterization of the problems confronting modern society from the growth of science, questions emerge that challenge the optimism that Gadamer exhibits. First, the infinity of language does not guarantee that the meanings that escape the net of the technological sign system and the new ones that emerge in response to the growth of science are necessarily rational or sufficiently strong to resist or reverse the infiltration of science and scientific control into everyday life. Counterculture responses to the Americn way of life as well as those political responses that borrowed from primitive societies or revolutionary movements in pre-industrial societies proved either helpless in the face of the technological society they confronted, or were themselves co-opted by the institutions of those technological societies, or,

dissappointed by the failure of those alternatives, dissolved when their proponents realized the futility of those responses, and in some instances became apologists for the very societies they once opposed (e.g., former Maoists in France). In short, the infinity of language and meaning does not guarantee that the responses that emerge will be rational responses. In this respect the accusation of irrationalism that Habermas levels at Gadamer is, in some respects, correct.

Second, it is not clear that the tendency to philosophy that Gadamer believes is inherent in science would itself serve as a countervailing power regarding the growth of tehcnological society. Certainly in Angolo-American philosophy the tendency has been for professional philosophy, one without the German humanist tradition that Gadamer seems to place some faith in, to become the hand-maiden of precisely the tendencies that Gadamer wants to resist. This problem is exacerbated by the popular view that the practical and philosophical issues that philosophy must address are themselves not subject to rational discussion and resolution. They appear as the decisions of private individuals, mere value judgements that can clash but never be completely adjudicated. Hence, the faith that Gadamer places in the inherent philosophical tendencies of science or scientific society seems misplaced in a society that has co-opted philosophy, views it as irrelevant, or removed it to the realm of private decision, immune to rational deliberation.

But Gadamer's characterizaton of the nature of the problem facing everyday practical, political life and its relationship to technological forms of control is itself questionable. It is perhaps

here that Habermas' criticisms are most important. If in addition to the problems of meaning that emerge between everyday practical life and forms of technological control there are structural problems posed by the spheres of work and political power, problems that reach beyond the resources available to a society, the resolution of these problems would seem to require the self-conscious, methodical application of reason that Habermas advocates and that Gadamer disparages. The structural contradictions and constraints that face many liberal capitalist societies today are not just problems of the conflict between created meanings of technological forms of control and the meanings of everyday life. They represent conflicting imperatives for action that either totally undermine other imperatives (structural contradictons) or jeapordize the success of other imperatives (structural constraints). The result, according to Habermas, is a series of economic crises that are displaced to other spheres of life and translated into crises of legitimacy, motivation, etc.[107] What Habermas does in examining these crises is pay close attention to the breakdown of traditional meanings regarding work, politics and social life and show how changes in those meanings have potential impact on other spheres of social life. In effect he has paid much closer attention than Gadamer has to the relationship between work and politics and traditional meanings that Gadamer makes so much of. Although Gadamer insists that the problems of work and politics must ultimately be articulated in language, Habermas offers us an account of how this has happened and the ways that issues and meanings lose their force, change, or become problematic in the process.

Moreover, even if the self-misunderstanding of science were corrected the question remains as to whether the common problems that fact society could be addressed without the interference of private interests. Suppose, for the sake of argument, it became obvious that the increasing pollution of the earth was understood as the result of a misconceived view of the earth as a mere reservoir of disposable resources and that this view hid other perspectives of our possible relationship with nature. The question remains as to whether those who stood the most to privately gain or lose, those organizations whose private wealth is dependent upon the instrumental approach to harvesting resources and disposing of pollution, would comply with demands for changes in the use of resources and disposal of pollution. Gadamer seems to believe that the realization of commonalities and the change in misunderstanding of scientific ways of thinking would lead to changes in our economic and industrial relationships with nature. This is at best contentious. It threatens to mark philosophical hermeneutics with a political naivite that would condemn it to political irrelevance and manipulation. In this context Gadamer's positions on several other issues come into question and thereby jeapordizes his account of authority. We will deal specifically with the universality of language and his account of the connection between reason and authority.

In some respects the most fundamental issue between Gadamer and Habermas is the question concerning the universality of language. Gadamer believes that Habermas fails to understand and appreciate the extent to which language influences, affects, enables and constrains

us even in our most reflective moments. Habermas, on the other hand, insists that Gadamer fails to appreciate the power of reflection regarding language, and ignores the pre-linguistic dimension of our personal and social lives. The issue might be resolved if we clarify what Gadamer means when he says that language is universal.

The statement that 'Being that can be understood is language' can have two meanings. First, it can be interpreted as a claim of radical, linguistic idealism that only those things that enter language can be understood because language completely constitutes reality. On this reading language and the world emerge into one; all I need do is know a language to know the reality of the world. In the face of competing languages this position is pushed to linguistic relativism of the type Peter Winch is often (and wrongly) accused. In this most radical form nothing exists outside of language. It is possible to interpret Gadamer this way at times, and at times I believe Habermas does.

But the phrase 'Being that can be understood is language' can have another meaning. It can be interpreted as claiming that what distinguishes man from other animals in his understanding of the world is that understanding is, in principle, articulatable, that it finds its most perfect expression in language. This view need not make the linguistic idealist claim that the world per se is constituted linguistically, but it might make the somewhat more modest claim that only those things that find linguistic expression can be understood by me and thereby enter my world as something I can act on, take account of, avoid, discuss, deny, desire, etc. Other things may exist in the

world and impinge on or influence my existence in the world; but for them to enter my world for me to understand they must enter my language. In this respect the world that is available to me is available only through my language, and my understanding of other cultures, other historical periods, or previously unnoticed dimensions of my own world will take place only through my language.

It is this last claim that I take Gadamer to be making when he says 'Being that can be understood is language' and that our world is linguistically constituted. But if this is the case, then he must be willing to admit that there can exist things in the world that have a reality that is unknown to me or misunderstood by me because my language is inappropriate for their understanding. One example of this would be cargo cults of the South Pacific which mistook airplanes for God's messengers. A second might be the paleo-symbols that psychoanalytic theory claims come into existence in the pre-linguistic stage of personality development. A third would be the political tensions and dilemmas that citizens experience in contemporary society but which do not seem to find expression in the political vocabulary available to them.

But having admitted this, one of Gadamer's primary claims regarding the universality of language remains defensible, i.e. that these things must find expression in the language of actors before they can be understood. Hence, even Habermas points out that in the analytic situation the analyst must be able to translate, through scenic understanding, the paleo-symbols that remain at the unconscious level into language that is familiar to the patient. Only then is it

possible for the patient to act on, take account of, or attempt to change his behavior. His world is broadened only when the analyst's knowledge finds expression in the patient's language. This I think is Gadamer's point. In the end even a critical philosophy with practical intent must rely on everyday language as the last metainstitution just as psychoanalysis does.

The issue concerning the universality of language blends into the questions involving the autonomy of reason with respect to language and the force of reason vis a vis language. Habermas himself argues that a language game that is congealed internally and hermetically sealed externally would permit an identity of meaning, but that this identity of meaning would prevent the autonomous development of ego-identity. Habermas seems to be implying a connection here between freedom and the indeterminacy of language, i.e. that the former is dependent upon the alienation and distanciation enabled by the latter. Yet this throws into question the status of the ideal speech situation based on a theory of undistorted communication and the redemption of validity claims that Habermas identifies as constituting the pragmatic requirements of communication. The achievement of the ideal speech situation would seem to result in an identity of meaning. If this is the case, and it the identity of meaning would close off the alienation and distanciation required for autonomous self-identity, the achievement of the ideal speech situation would result in the type of repressive constraint on freedom that Habermas aims at preventing. On the other hand, to grant the indeterminacy of language, to allow that meaning embodied in language is greater than

the capacity to reflectively appropriate that meaning, seems to grant Gadamer's point that the limits of reason are greater than Habermas seems willing to admit.

That the boundaries of language and claims to truth may exceed the capacity of langluage to clarify language and redeem validity claims seems to be an implication of the pragmatic requirements of communication that he so carefully details. If communication involved only the single use of language, raising only one type of validity claim at a time, one could conclude that the conditions for rendering the meaning of any particular speech act totally transparent could be met. But Habermas insists that all three pragmatic validity claims, truth, appropriateness, and truthfullness, are present in any speech act, but that only one of them can be made thematic and redeemed at any particular time. He says, "individual validity claims can be thematically stressed whereby the truth of the proposition content comes to the fore in the cognitive use of language, the rightness (or appropriateness) of the interpersonal relation in the interactive, and the truthfulness of the speaker in the expressive. But in every instance of communicative action the system of all validity claims comes into play; they must always be raised simultaneoulsy, although they cannot be thematic at the same time."[108] This implies that the redemption of even the validity claim made thematic might provisionally presume that the other validity claims could be redeemed as well. Moreover the redemption of the speech validity claims themselves assume that the speech acts engaged in the redemption of the initial communication can also meet these validity claims, ad

infinitum. But this is precisely the type of restriction or limit on reason that Gadamer insists that Habermas ignores.

It appears that this account of the redemption of validity claims admits two points that Gadamer makes. First, whenever one engages in a speech act, because only one of the validity claims can be thematized and redeems at a given time, it follows that the institutions and norms that form the background of those other validity claims will always form part of the context of the redemption of any single validity claim. It may be possible to go on to redeem other claims but it is possible only by assuming the redemptions of previous validity claims remains in tact and is unchanged by the redemption of or failure to redeem subsequent validity claims.

Second, Habermas' account of how each validity claim is redeemed further substantiates Gadamer's argument concerning the inescapability of language. Habermas argues that each validity claim is redeemed differently. Truth, appropriateness, and sincerity ultimately appeal to experiential sources, normative context, and subsequent behavior respectively. But one of Gadamer's points is that what can count as experience, what determines the normative context, and what in a person's behavior will be taken as evidence of sincerity are all influenced (determined is too strong a word) by the historical period and linguistic traditions one finds oneself in.[109] In short, no matter how far one wishes to press one of the validity claims of speech, that further scrutiny must always take place in the language one has inherited.

The final issue between Gadamer and Habermas, and one that flows

from the previous issue, is the question of the necessity of authority and its relationship to reason. It will be recalled that Gadamer's defence of authority denied that authority stood in an antithetical relationship to reason. The existence and influence of tradition being ineliminable, it was an abstraction, he claimed, to imagine ourselfes acting in ways that were not partly influenced by the authority of tradition. Moreover, the decision to acknowledge a particular individual as an authority rests on the recognition of his superior skill or insight and hence itself is a matter of choice and an exercise of freedom.

However, latter in his rejoinder to Habermas, Gadamer characterizes the relationship between those in authority and those over whom authority is exercised as dogmatic acceptance rather than dogmatic obedience. Unfortunately, it is unclear how dogmatic acceptance is any more rational that dogmatic obedience, and does nothing to enable us to determine which instances of dogmatic acceptance are rational and which are not. It could even be argued that it is precisely dogmatic acceptance that characterizes the relationship between everyday practical life and technological society. Hence, Gadamer's account of authority threatens to undermine the earlier case he made for the compatibility of authority with reason. The problem could be resolved if he were willing to make the move that Winch makes when Winch claims that the pronouncements of those in authority can always be checked by those over whom authority is exercised by reference to the way of life that gives rise to positions of authority and of which the authoritative pronouncements

or actions are meant to extend, defend or develop. But Gadamer's insistence on dogmatic acceptance precludes this possibility. It changes Winch's triadic relationship into one in which those in authority are the only source of information that those over whom authority is exercised have concerning the way of life or tradition in question. To describe this type of acceptance of authority as rational is to stretch the meaning of reason beyond recognizable limits. Moreover, and contrary to Gadamer's purposes, it could easily be used to legitimize the most complete forms of technological control of practical life.

Habermas' alternative account of authority is not, however, a satisfactory response. Habermas' account of reason leaves little room for authority in rational discourse and the formation of rational consensus. In this respect he tends to focus on those forms of authority that are also forms of domination. Even his account of teacher student relationships is interpreted in these terms:

> Gadamer has in mind the type of educational process through which tradition is transferred into individual learning processes and appropriated as tradition. Here the person of the educator legitimizes prejudices that are inculcated in the learner with authority - and this means, however we turn it around, under the potential threat of sanctions and with the prospect of gratifications.[110]

But this is one-sided view of authority in the educational relationship, one that is characteristic of a distorted or perverted educational process. It may be true that some forms of education are systems of socialization. But surely other forms of education are aimed at knowledge, at providing the student not with traditional

values or goals but with skills and the development of critical capacity that eventually make the educational relationship unnecessary. To describe such a relationship as a system of domination is something of a distortion.

Interestingly enough, the example of psychoanalysis that Habermas offers in this critique of Gadamer's claims regarding the universality of language, and one which he thinks provides the basis for rejecting Gadamer's claims regarding the identity or reason and authority, itself involves an authority relationship that Habermas seems to ignore. In the analytic situtation the analyst occupies an epistemologically privileged position regarding the structure of mind, personality development, and the dynamics of the analytic situation that are necessary for the success of the analytic experience. The analyst is 'an authority' on these things. Although the ultimate success of the psychoanalytic experience rests on the patient's acceptance or validation of the explanation offered by the analyst, the analyst is still in the position of determining which parts of the raw material that comes to the surface in the analytic relationship will be worked up and offered as an explanation to the patient. Hence there is a dependence between the patient and the analyst made possible by the analyst's privileged knowledge and skill.

This point has serious implications for Habermas, for he takes the example of psychoanalysis and the analytic relationship between patient and analyst as the paradigm of emancipatory knowledge and application of critical theory. If the relationship between the critical theorist and other social actors is analagous to that between

the analyst and patient, the problem of authority remains unresolved for Habermas. Indeed, the nature of the analyst's authority is almost identical to the genuine authority defended by Gadamer.

The final flaw in Habermas' account of authority is more accurately described as an error of ommision. In offering the theory of communicative action as an ideal of undistorted communication upon which one would build genuine consensus, Habermas admits that the ideal speech situation that would result in consensus is unlikely to be achieved in practice. Hence, any political decisions that result in actual political life,, even one guided by critical theory, are likely to be less than the genuine consensus that Habermas believes is the mark of true democracy. Presumably, in the absence of genuine consensus, some type of political authority would be required to carry out those decisions that were made before genuine consensus could be reached. This means that the probability that those decisions will conflict with the political wills of at least some of the political actors of that society will remain. Unfortunately, Habermas offers no positive account of what this authority might look like, how it may be made more democratic, or how it may be held accountable.

One final problem that both Habermas and Gadamer face is the depoliticization of the problem both attempt to redress. There are several aspects of Gadamer's work that contribute to this depoliticization. First, his model of the dialogue as the primary form of social interaction, though it provides a number of insights concerning hermeneutic understanding,does not reflect many of the problems that emerge in political life. This was partly reflected in

our discussion of the promise of philosophical hermeneutics in solving the problem concerning the growth of technological society. But it is also reflected in Gadamer's claim that political practice must begin with commonalities. Though I think this is in part correct for reasons that will become clearer in the next chapter, the examples he offers such as the aversion of nuclear war, the solution of world hunger, and world-wide pollution are problematic in a sense. There is no agreement on what the nature and causes of these problems are and some contemporary political leaders, particularly those in the current Reagan administration, deny the unqualified undesirability of those problems. Indeed, on some political questions, one example being abortion, one would be hard put to find any deep common accord that would unite the interested parties in a dialogue.

Moreover, in Gadamer's example, the dialogue relies on further discussion between the participants whenever agreement is not reached or misunderstanding occurs. In politics such furhter discussion is often cut off, (sometimes necessarily), if it is present at all. Hence, though philosophical hermenuetics may contribute to our understanding of social action in importantt ways, it falls short of providing us with an account of political life. This inability or failure to take accunt of the political dimension of social meaning prevents Gadamer from being able to develop a theory of political authority, democratic or otherwise.

If Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics includes an apolitical strain, Habermas' version of critical theory is no less guilty of the same flaw. For Habermas, democracy seems to be identical with

consensus agreement and the process by which true consensual agreeement is reached. Only when an uncoerœd, total consensus has been achieved has the ideal of true democracy been realized. If the process of coming to a consensus is interrupted before genuine consensus has been achieved, then the outcome cannot be descsribes as truly democratic. But if the process by which consensus is achieved had the characteristic that Habermas claims it has; if all the validity claims that are necessary for undistorted communication are fulfilled; if actors also refrain from engaging in strategic action and suspended their commitment to action altogether while the process of coming to consensus works itself out, it is difficult to see what role politics would play in the emancipatory ideal. The interruption of the process of coming to consensual agreement can be interrupted either by the exercise of authority or by the political engagement of some of the participants. Either route results in the compromise of the system of undistorted communication and the ideal speech situation. The implication of this seems to be that political authority per se is indicative of the pre-emption of rational action and consensus.

In spite of their disagreements several important similarities emerge between Habermas and Gadamer. First, and most obviously, both recognize the importance of language and the fact that it has assumed a central place in social theory. Habermas, in the Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, says:

> The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature

> we can know: language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. Taken together, autonomy and responsibility constitute the only Idea we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophical tradition.[111]

An elsewhere, "Today the problem of language has replaced the traditional problem of consciousness; the transcendental critique of language supercedes that of consciousness."[112] The importance of language of Habermas is further evidenced by the centrality of speach in his theory of communicative action and his elaboration of universal pragmatics. Ironically, the requirements that Habermas sets down for the successful completion of undistorted, institutionally unbound speech acts are all requirements that would have to be met by the participants in Gadamer's dialogue.

Second, though they may disagree about the efficiency of reflection and its ability to neutralize, disperse and penetrate established meanings, I think their disagreement is best seen as a difference of emphasis rather than an unresolvable conflict. At times Gadamer admits that meanings that we reflect on often no longer have the same force that they previously had, but that this does not free us from the language we inherit or the net of traditional meanings that our language transmits. Habermas, on the other hand, admits that we can no longer aspire to complete independence from our language, that even the validity claims of universal pragmatics are dependent on established norms and institutions, but that the exercise of reason can be made methodical and can engage traditional meanings in ways that allows us to distance ourselves from them and limit the claims

they have on us. Habermas in fact intimates at one point that the differences that separate Gadamer and himself are ones of emphasis: "In present conditions it may be more urgent to indicate the limits of the false claim to universality made by criticism rather than that of the hermeneutic claim to universality. Where the dispute about the grounds for justification is concerned, however, it is necessary to critically examine the latter claim, too."[113]

Thirdly, both seem to believe that the practice of authority is such that it absolves those in authority from having to offer reasons explanations, and justifications for their actions. Habermas focuses on authority as a form of domination, as force that has legitimized itself, usually ideologically. Gadamer's insistence that authority is that which is dogmatically recognized threatens to preclude the possibility of criticising authority. In this respect Gadamer differs somewhat from his counterpart in England, Peter Winch. Indeed, it could be argued that the dogmatic <u>obedience</u> to authority (a characterization the Gadamer explicitly rejects as being to inconsistent with the exercise of reason), promises greater possibilities for democratic authority. In the case of dogmatic obedience I might insist on retaining my right of judgement while obeying those commands or complying with those policies that I believe to be wrong or misguided. But I at least reserve my right of judgement. In the case of dogmatic acceptance, I surrender even my right of judgement. Hence, my basis on which to hold authority accountable, to chasten authority, is somewhat more restricted.

Finally, as we have pointed out, there are apolitical tendencies

in both thinkers. For Gadamer the model of the dialogue, his faith in philosophy and the infinity of language, and the faith in commonalities between participants/antagonists in the dialogue would seem to leave substantial areas of political life that he would have difficulty accounting for. Similarly, Habermas' model of consensual agreement as the model of democratic decision making would eliminate politics from his view of true democracy. It implies that those who would favor democracy must see politics and the imposition of authority that results as the interruption of the formation of democratic will or decision. It implies that a truly democratic way of life, even if only an ideal, entertains no politics and that a way of life that celebrates politics will always fall short of democracy.

In spite of their shortcomings, both Gadamer and Habermas advance the debate concerning authority some distance. As Habermas points out, Gadamer's project of philosophical hermeneutics provides an important corrective to science's self-understanding, even if Gadamer does underestimate the necessity of methodically applied reason. In addition, Gadamer's focus on the connections between language and reason emphasizes the extent to which the latter is both constrained and enabled by established social meanings. Habermas, on the other hand, provides the necessary counterbalance to Gadamer's faith in the anonymous authority of tradition. Moreover, Habermas' examination of the pragmatic requirements of understanding make explicit the tacit assumptions we all hold in our attempts at communicative action, and he thereby helps to outline the foundations of a form of rational discourse that could address the problems of

social practice.

CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS A THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY

The Rationalist and Interpretive Positions Recapitulated

In the preceding chapters we have seen how the debates in contemporary philosophy and political theory, though they raise the question of the nature of authority and its relationship to language and reason, fail to provide satisfactory answers to that question and particularly fail to resolve the problem of political authority. Both of the interpretive theorists we have examined insist that the relationship between authority on the one hand, and reason and freedom on the other, is not an antithetical relationship that thinkers since the Enlightenment have thought it to be. This claim hinges on the connection that reason, freedom and authority have to language and a common way of life. Gadamer insists that the internal connection between reason and language, i.e. that reason is embedded in a language that we are historically delivered up to, means that there need not be a conflict between reason and traditional authority. But Gadamer's insistence on the dogmatic acceptance of authority would make submission to authority rational only in an extremely restricted sense of the term. Moreover, he downplays the coercive potential of some types of authority, a result of his apolitical tendencies in his examination of meaning, language and social life. Winch, on the other hand, recognized the need for critical leverage regarding authority and argues that the common way of life that those over whom authority

is exercised and those in authority share, provides not only the defining features of authority but the standards for justification and critical evaluation as well. But his identity of those 'in authority' with those who are 'an authority'itself attempts to resolve the problem of political authority by conceptual fiat. Like Gadamer, Winch in the end downplays or underestimates the coercive potential of authority.

Hollis' notion of autonomous man, with its concept of objective real interest and strong personal identity that is distanced from language and traditions, leaves absolutely no room for the authority of either tradition, individuals or institution. Of the thinkers we have examined Hollis comes closest to the Enlightenment account of the relationship amongst language, reason, freedom, authority and tradition. But in spite of his attempt to avoid the pitfalls of the Enlightenment, and particularly the mistake of positing a pre-social form of personal identity , Hollis fails to resolve the tension between strong personal identity and an identity that is also social identity. This failure is due primarily to an acceptance of a theory of language that is insufficient for supplying the link between autonomous personal identity and social identity that Hollis attempts to make.

Habermas avoids the mistakes that Hollis makes by recognizing the importance of language and the insight of the interpretive or hermeneutic approach. But in the end he tends to construe the relationship between authority and reason as purely antithetical and hence focuses on authority as pure domination. Hence the possibility

of developing a theory of authority that is consistent with democratic practice is closed out for Habermas, particularly in light of his seeming identity of democracy with total, genuine consensus.

In spite of the failure of the thinkers in these debates to resolve the problem of authority, and the problem of political authority in particular, I think that these debates provide a springboard from which we might reach a solution to the problem of political authority. The insights gained from these debates, along with those provided by some of the work done in analytic political philosophy on the concept of authority, will help to provide us with a solution to the question of the relationship amongst language, authority, reason and freedom (i.e. human agency).

Political Authority: 'In Authority" vs 'An Authority'

One of the most insightful treatments of the problem of political authority has been Richard Friedman's distinction between being 'in authority' and being 'an authority.' Friedman claims that most approaches to the study of authority treat the problem too narrowly by focusing on the relationship of authority to conduct. This approach only addresses one type of authority, claims Friedman. Authority is exercised not just in the influence of behavior or conduct, it can also be defined as the ability to influence others' ideas, beliefs and opinions. "Concommitantly, a person may be said to 'have authority' in two distinct senses. For one, he may be said to be 'in authority,' meaning that he occupies some office, position or status which

entitles him to make decisions about how people should behave. But secondly, a person may be said to be 'an authority' on something, meaning that his views or utterances are entitled to be believed (including, to complicate matters, beliefs about the right and wrong way of doing things). And so we speak of teachers, priests, parents, and experts (of various kinds) as having authority over beliefs as well as legislators, judges and generals having authority over conduct." [1]

Those who occupy positions of 'in authority' do so because of some set formal rules defining the procedure for determining who shall be in authority. There existence is a purely pragmatic feature, according to Friedman, meant to create and insure organization and order that would otherwise be absent without the existence of authority. Since the point of 'in authority' is to regulate conduct and prevent chaos, belief in the correctness, justice or morality of the commands, decisions and policies of those in authority is irrelevant to obedience. In Friedman's words, "the basis of the claim to obedience made by a person 'in authority' is of a very special kind. This claim does not derive from any special personal characteristic of the person invested with authority such as superior powers of judgement or special knowledge (as in the case of the being 'an authority'). His claims to be obeyed is simply that he has been part put 'in authority' according to established procedure, rather than his decisions. What makes an act obligating is the fact the it has been declared obligatory by the person invested with authority over that class of actions... the merits and demerits of the actual

decisions are irrevelant to the obligation to obey, and therefore the claim to obedience is not comprised by showing that it is inferior to some other decisions that might have been taken. (Indeed the whole point of setting up this sort of authority is to dissociate the claim to obedience from the merits of the particular decisions one is being asked to accept. For as long as the claim to obedience is left contingent on the judgement of merits, the disagreement among men at the substantive level is bound to reintroduce the chaos the system of authority was set up to avoid in the first place. At the same time it is not contradictory to defer to the decisions of this sort of authority and yet also the case that his internal assent is also irrelevant." [2] Hence, on this view those in authority need not legitimate their actions, policies or commands. Those actions, policies or commands are made authoritative because they originate with someone who is established by some set of rules as being 'in authority,' and not because they adhere to or are consistent with, some set of principles, goals or values of those over whom the authority is exercised. As Friedman puts it, "This type of authority produces a decision to be followed, not a statement to be believed. Belief is both unjustified (since no decision can make something true, but only obligatory) and unnecessary (since it is common action not common opinion that constitutes the purpose behind the establishment of this type of authority)." [3] It is this type of authority that is exercised in legal, administrative, and political authority.

The second type of authority that Friedman claims to detect he describes as 'an authority.' 'An authority' relies on an

epistemologically privileged position for its force. Authority in this instance rests on some superior knowledge or insight that those in authority claim and which is at least in practice, unavailable to those who accept it or over whom it is exercised. It is the type of authority that both Gadamer and Winch emphasize or take as the paradigm of authority. In contrast to the first type of authority, 'an authority' produces statements to be believed and not just decisions to be followed.

Finally, the two types of authority are unrelated according to Friedman. The fact that someone is placed 'in authority' has nothing to do with their being 'an authority' on anything: "But someone who is 'in authority' is not necessarily an authority on anything; his decisions do not have to be presented as authoritative expressions, deliverances, or interpretations of logically prior beliefs or principles. On the contrary, it is precisely the key point about the concept of 'in authority' to be dissociated from any background of shared beliefs." [4] Whereas 'an authority' presupposes a background of shared beliefs, 'in authority' presupposes just the opposite, an absence of shared beliefs that threaten chaos.

The two types of authority do have one thing in common, claims Friedman. He insists that both types of authority involve the surrender of private judgement on the part of those over whom it is exercised: "to have authority is not to have to offer reasons in behalf of what one has prescribed as a condition of being paid obedience. In this sense, obedience to a command 'simply because X gave it'... entails abdication of one's own judgement to the

particular act in question and the adoption in its place of the judgement of someone else as guiding one's conduct."[5] It is this suspension of private judgement on the part of those accepting authority and the absence of the need of those who hold authority to have to offer reasons that distinguishes authority from rational argument.

Friedman's distinction between 'in authority' and 'an authority' helps to clarify several issues that remained confused in much of the literature concerning the concept of authority. But in spite of this contribution several flaws in his account of the two types of authority and the notion of authority in general remain. I will begin by examining specific problems in his account of authority, later tracing it to a misunderstanding of the nature of political life. I will use this criticism as a foundation for an alternative theory of democratic political authority.

Political Authority and the Surrender of Judgement

The characterization of authority as involving the surrender of private judgement is not peculiar to Friedman. It is a fairly common way of defining authority, particularly by those trying to distinguish authority from rational persuasion. However, it is a misinterpretation of what is involved in the obedience to authority, mistaking what occurs in specific or isolated instances of authority for a general characteristic of authority. In one sense the surrender of private judgement occurs when, say, one accepts the pronouncements

fo someone who is 'an authority' as in the case when we ask a recognized authority on Hegel about the meaning of a specific passage in the Phenomenology. But if we look at other aspects or different instances of authority it becomes clear that the surrender of private judgement cannot be said to typify authority relations as a whole or to be a defining characteristic of them.

In the first place, as Richard Flathman points out,[6] the acceptance of authority minimally involves the judgement that someone or some institution legitimately holds a position of authority and that the command, policy or action taken is consistent with the rules and procedures that establish the authority. Hence, we would refuse to take a traffic officer's advice on the meaning of a particular passage in the Phenomenology.

But there is a second sense in which the authority relation does not require the suspension of judgement. Referring back to the traffic officer, we generally obey his commands concerning the regulation of traffic. But our obedience to those commands, our acceptance of his authority, does not require us to surrender our private judgement concerning how traffic should be managed. Indeed, many of the less patient of us often develop quite explicit ideas and make harsh judgements about the correctness of the traffic officer's decisions. What we surrender in such cases is not our right of judgement but our right of action based on our judgement.[7] The same holds true for any number of other decisions made by those 'in authority.' I may not believe in the soundness of a particular government policy and even insist on my right to criticize it, but

nonetheless obey it while it is in effect. This point, in fact, is consistent with Friedman's own characterization of 'in authority' as the making of a decision to be obeyed, not the pronouncement of a statement to be believed.

From here it is tempting to conclude that the surrender of judgement is characteristic of 'an authority' relations. But even this must be qualified in important ways. Let us examine the relationship between those who are taken to be 'an authority' on something ahd those over whom that authority is exercised. Friedman points out that in order for someone to be accepted as 'an authority' there must be what he calls an epistemological framework that is shared by those involved in the authority relation. This epistemological framework supplies the subject area over which those who are 'an authority' claim expertise, it defines the procedures (formal or informal) by which one achieves recognition as an authority, and finally the types of statements that will be accepted as authoritative. Hence, judgement is involved here in what Friedman describes as second-order claims that provide the background for authority.[8] Judgement is involved on the part of those over whom authority is exercised then at least at this second-order level.[9]

But if we examine one of the paradigm cases of 'an authority' I think we will see that the exercise of judgement pervades the authority relationship. Let us take the example of the academician who is said to be 'an authority' on Hegel. One becomes an authority on a particular subject matter, in our case Hegel's philosophy, by being able to offer convincing interpretations of his work and

philosophy. These interpretations are, quite obviously, not arbitrary. They are backed up by reason, argument and evidence, including references to texts, Hegel's relationship to other thinkers, his historical situation, etc. One does not, in short, become recognized as an authority on Hegel by simply dogmatically announcing some interpretation. One is required to offer reasons why one should be considered 'an authority' on Hegel in order to gain that position. Having established oneself as an authority on Hegel one's opinions or interpretations of Hegel or particular passages from his works would generally be accepted with little or no rational argument needed for their support.

But imagine that having established oneself as an authority on Hegel, that one newly recognized Hegel expert consistently and repeatedly refused to offer justification for interpretations of particular works or passages of Hegel's. Perhaps in the classroom our new Hegel expert insisted that students dogmatically accept his interpretation without his having to justify it. When pressed by his colleagues whose interests also included Hegel, he denied the necessity of having to offer a reasoned argument as to why his interpretation of Hegel was better than competing interpretations. If this behavior continued, at some point the recognition of our new Hegel expert would be withdrawn, and it would be withdrawn precisely for his refusal or inability to offer reasoned argument for his pronouncements. Put another way, the continued recognition of being 'an authority,' at least in some paradigm instances, rests upon one's ability to demonstrate superior knowledge or insight. The refusal or

inability to demonstrate that insight would lead people to challenge that authority. The point here is not that recognition of 'an authority' constantly involves justification of one's status or expertise. That would surely indicate a loss of authority. What it does indicate is that those who are 'an authority' must, in principle, be able to provide reasoned arguments for the correctness of their interpretations or pronouncements. In the case of the Hegel expert it requires that he be able to offer convincing grounds or arguments for the correctness of his interpretations. Indeed in the example we are considering, the ability to offer more convincing arguments for one's interpretation might enhance one's standing as 'an authority.'[10]

That the surrender of judgement is not an inherent characteristic of authority is further demonstrated by the fact that in any particular subject matter people who are recognized as authorities can offer conflicting interpretations of the same thinker, work of art, play, political philosophy, etc., and both still be recognized as an authority. Those insisting that recognition of authority involves the surrender of private judgement have yet to explain how one could surrender private judgement simultaneously to two conflicting authorities.

Returning to the example of our traffic officer, I would like to make a further point concerning judgement and authority. Friedman, like many other writers on the subject, insists on the suspension of judgement on the part of those over whom authority is exercised in an attempt to eliminate the dependence of obedience to authority on the merits or demerits of the particular decisions made by those in

authority. Indeed many thinkers have argued that one of the earmarks of authority is that obedience to it is not dependent on the correctness, validity, morality or any other criteria by which it might be judged. Friedman is in many respects typical of this position when he says that the whole point behind setting up authority is "to disassociate the claim to obedience from the merits of the particular decision one is being asked to accept."[11] If those 'in authority' were required to give reasons to justify their actions, authority would be indistinguishable from rational persuasion. Indeed, in instances in which those 'in authority' are questioned, we often say that their authority is being challenged.

If this point regarding the disengagement of the requirement of obedience from the merits or justification for an action were correct, and if this disengagement were total, three things would follow.

First, authority would unquestionably be the antithesis of rational choice and autonomy. For now the obedience to authority would preclude my acting according to my own rational purposes. It may sometimes be the case that the decisions of authority coincide with the decisions I would make if given the chance to deliberate and exercise my choice according to that deliberation. But such coincidence would be purely that, i.e. accidental. Second, the exercise of authority would be purely arbitrary. Obedience would be required simply because some one or group in authority made a decision that required one to do this or that. If the requirement of obedience is <u>totally</u> disengaged from the merits of the decision, I have absolutely no basis on which to justifiably disobey. The requirement

of obedience cannot be suspended because of any criticisms I may make of the decisions of those in authority.

Third, this requirement would make all obedience to authority authoritarian. Obedience is required not because those in authority know what they are doing, have a better perspective, or are trying to achieve some common good. Obedience is required simply because authorities have made decisions that require obedience. It is precisely this view of authority, that is common to Oakeshott as well, that I wish to challenge. I should like to do so by going back to our example of the traffic officer, an example that is sometimes given as the paradigm case of the requirement of obedience to authority being divorced from the merits of the decisions.

No one, I think, would disagree that obedience to the commands of the traffic officer are obeyed in spite of the fact that some drivers believe particular decisions to be wrong, idiotic or inefficient. This is true even when we are inconvenienced by such decisions, when we are late for an appointment or when the ice cream in the grocery bag is melting on a hot summer day. The fact that in such instances our personal ideas about how traffic should be directed is at odds with the decisions of the traffic officer, yet we still obey his commands, is given as evidence that obedience is disengaged from the merits of the decisions made by those in authority.

But imagine a situation in which the traffic officer, directing traffic near an elementary school, has the habit of waving on automobiles traveling simultaneously at perpendicular directions toward an intersection; tends to ignore children crossing in school

patrols; and at other times seems to ignore traffic altogether. It would not take long for motorists and pedestrians to notice that his decisions concerning the directing of traffic were questionable decisions, sometimes hazardous to the health of those traveling near or through the intersection. Consequently, they would obey the officer's commands selectively (if at all), feeling safe to proceed only when it was obvious the officer was holding other traffic, but wary and even disobedient if the commands did not seem to take account of other traffic and pedestrians. In effect the disobedience and selective obedience that emerges does so because those over whom authority is being exercised deem those decisions to be bad decisions; they undermine the very point behind having someone direct traffic, i.e. the common purpose of the safe regulation of traffic amongst motorists and pedestrians (which may or may not coincide with some other set of purely private, particular interests, e.g. getting the ice cream home before it melts). The point here is that obedience to authority is not divorced from the merits or demerits of the decisions made. Rather, the decisions that are made must be consistent with some common purpose or way of life that provides the point behind the existence of that authority, delimits its sphere of control, the types of decisions it can and cannot make, and the standards by which those decisions will be evaluated as good or bad, better or worse decisions. We may say that there is a prima faciae assumption that the exercise of authority is in fact directed at achieving that common purpose. But that common purpose always stands as the background against which we can evaluate and criticize the decisions of authority

and which authority appeals to when called to justify its decisions, commands and policies.

At times Friedman almost seems to recognize this. In his account of 'in authority' he distinguishes between first order beliefs that X is command by Y to be obeyed, and second order beliefs that there are some set of procedures that establish Y as 'in authority.' He makes a parallel distinction in his discussion of 'an authority,' arguing that in addition to the first order belief that there are pronouncements to be believed, there are second order beliefs, consisting of an epistemological background, that those in the authority relation share. But he does not draw these connections thoroughly enough and in failing to do so fails to show the extent to which these so-called second order beliefs establish the point behind authority, as well as help determine how it will operate, what types of decisions and pronouncements and policies it can legitimately make or carry out, and how these provide the standards of criticism and justification for particular decisions, commands, pronouncements, and policies.

If our argument to this point has been correct, if the obedience to those <u>in</u> authority is not completely disengaged from the merits of their decisions, but rather if there exists a prima faciae belief that the policies, decisions, etc. are consistent with the common purposes or way of life that provides the justification and standards of criticism for authority, then the concepts of 'in authority' and 'an authority' are not completely unrelated, but rather the two notions are variably present in all instances of political authority in a democratic polity. That is, even where those 'in authority' are not

formally established as 'an authority' on something, there is the assumption and expectation that their decisions, etc. will achieve some common purpose or be consistent with a way of life. This is not to make the extreme claim that Winch makes that all who are 'in authority' are eo ipso 'an authority.' But it does imply that the notion of being 'an authority' provides the background for evaluation, criticism, and justification of those 'in authority.'

That this common way of life, or common good, is partly constitutive of authority I want to demonstrate in another way, by examining not isolated instances of authority but the practice of authority extended over time. Imagine our questioning a group of individuals about a particular person or group that stands in authority in their culture or society. We ask them about a particular policy that those in authority pursue but which the group is critical of and ask them why they comply with that policy. It is imaginable that they would respond that they are complying in spite of their criticisms because the policy was made by those in authority and the former are obligated to obey it. Imagine further that we ask the same question each time a new policy is announced, and each time the group in question disagrees with the policy but complies anyhow. Imagine finally that we survey everyone affected by those policies, i.e. everyone over whom those in authority exercise authority, and everyone to the last man and woman insists that the policies of those in authority are always wrong but they obey them anyhow.

The first example is easily understandable. We could explain it any number of ways. Perhaps the individual group supports other

policies of those in power, perhaps the objectionable policy concerns matters of relatively little importance, or perhaps the group in question feels obligated to give the questionable policy a chance. The second example is somewhat less easily explained. The dissenting group might respond by saying that in spite of its disagreement with the policies of those in authority, it derived other benefits that outweigh its objections to the policies in question. Or perhaps the group in question saw no alternative to compliance, there being no practical way to escape this authority relationship or to change those in authority. THe former case might be still explained as a relationship of authority; we would be tempted to describe the latter as a relationship involving power or coercion, rather than authority. Finally, in the last example, to say that everyone in a society objected to all the policies that those who claimed to be 'in authority' pursued, and then to explain that this is an example of authority and not power, total domination, or coercion, would be unintelligible. For the question that would emerge would be why those who objected to the policies did not replace those in authority. To say that those in authority retained the instruments of violence, or brainwashed the entire population, and to insist that what existed is still a case of authority, is to eliminate the difference between authority, manipulation and coercion. Yet for accounts of authority that insist that obedience to authority is totally disengaged from the merits of particular decisions, none of these examples would appear unintelligible or anomolous. The last example is as consistent with their account of authority as the first.

In some respects the characterization of the authority relationship as involving the suspension of judgement on the part of those over whom it is exercised is the result of focusing on only one type of activity that those who occupy positions of authority engage in, i.e. the giving of commands. But in addition to the giving of commands, those in political authority also decide on implement and follow public policies. These activities cannot be reduced to the giving of commands without doing violence to them. In many instances the carrying out of policy does not involve the giving of commands, even though those policies do have effects on others. For example, when the Federal Reserve decides to follow a policy of high interest rates, that decision is not strictly a command for me to obey. Rather, it partly establishes the conditions or context for my economic activity. In effect, the implementation of policies is more a question of what happens to those affected by the decisions than a question of obedience to a command to do this or refrain from doing that. In such instances those affected by the decisions of those in authority often make judgements about the wisdom or correctness of the policies implemented. Moreover, the appeals of those in authority for support of those policies is often baded on the correctness of those policies. One recent example of this latter point is the appeal on the part of the Reagan administration to the business sector to increase investment in light of the Reagan administration's pursuit of policies that were ostensibly designed to encourage investment.

In sum, the claim that the authority relationship involves a surrender of judgement on the part of those over whom authority is

exercised misrepresents the relationship of judgement to authority and specifically fails to take account of the role of judgement in the establishment and continued performance and acceptance of authority. The decisions made by those 'in authority' do depend on their merit for their continued obedience; the decisions must be consistent with the common way of life that is the basis for that authority. Those over whom authority is exercised obey that authority because they assume that the decisions could be legitimized if pressed for justification. In political life this common way of life includes a notion of the common good. Hence, the position of being 'in authority' is circumscribed by the idea of being 'an authority.'

What I would now like to demonstrate is that this concept of authority is consistent with a notion of freedom that relies on a strong theory of human agency. It is not to say that there is an identity between freedom and authority, but that the common way of life that is the foundation of authority is also the foundation of a strong theory of human agency. I shall proceed by first summarizing that notion of human agency and then the general features of the common good.

The Strong Theory of Human Agency

The theory of human agency that I will rely on is one developed by Charles Taylor. Taylor connects a theory of human agency to the possibilities of evaluation that are available to human beings. Whereas both human beings and animals have desires, it is a

distinctively human trait to be able to evaluate those desires. The "capacity to evaluate desires is bound up with our power of self-evaluation, which in turn is an essential feature of the mode of agency we recognize as human."[12]

Taylor goes on to distinguish two types of evaluation. The first Taylor describes as weak evaluation, and is typified by mere preferences for things, such as certain flavors of ice cream, the choice between two types of pastry, or where I will vacation for the summer. Two things characterize evaluation in terms of mere preferences. First, in weak evaluation the fact that something is desired is sufficient for calling it good. For example if asked why I prefer to vacation on Cape Cod rather than in the Berkshires, the simple answer that I prefer the ocean is sufficient explanation and justification for my preference. The second characteristic of weak evaluation is that the incompatibility between alternatives is contingent. My preference for vacationing on Cape Cod does not require that I dislike vacationing in the Berkshires. I may in fact, pretending to be a Californian, spend time in both areas during my vacation.

The second type of evaluation Taylor calls strong evaluation. This type of evaluation does not remain at the level of mere preferences; it describes alternative in a much stronger, richer language, referring to the qualitative worth of the alternatives, e.g. the nobility or ignobility, courage or cowardice, justice or injustice, admirability or inadmirability of the desires entertained or alternative offered. In contrast to weak evaluation, the mere

preferences or desires for something are not sufficient warrant for doing or fulfilling it. "In weak evaluation, or something to be judged good it is sufficient that it be desired, whereas in strong evaluation there is also a use of 'good' or some other evaluative term for which being desired is not sufficient, indeed some desires or desired consummation can be judged bad, base, ignoble, trivial, superficial, unworthy, and so on."[13]

Connected with this first distinction between weak and strong evaluation is a second distinction. Whereas with weak evaluation the incompatibility between alternatives is contingent, in the case of strong evaluation the incompatibllity between alternatives is of a contrastive nature. The fulfilling of one desire precludes the fulfilling of the contrasting alternatives. "That there should be incompatibility of non-contingent kind is not adventitous. For strong evaluation displays a language of evaluative distinction, in which different desires are described as noble or base, integrating or fragmentary, courageous or cowardly, clairvoyant or blind, and so on."[14] Although it is possible to re-describe weak evaluation in ways that make it contrastive and strong evaluation in ways that make it non-contrastive, Taylor insists that in the end with weak evaluation the preferences and dislikes are independent of each other and hence conflicts are contingent, accidental and circumstantial, whereas with the contrastive language we employ in strong evaluation our decision in favor of some alternatives over others is not circumstantial or contingent.

This contrast between different types of evaluation has

implications for the notion of the self. Each type of evaluation implies a different type of subject. A person whose evaluation of his desires were only evaluation in the weak sense would be unable to articulate his preferences beyond saying that he merely preferred A to B. Without recourse to the contrastive language of strong evaluation, the weak evaluator can say no more than that he prefers one desire (say a nuclear arms freeze) to another (chocolate ice cream). His ability to articulate preferences stops at the point of this assertion of the preference of one alternative over the other.

With strong evaluation, on the other hand, there is a vocabulary available to the subject that allows him or her to describe, explain, justify and criticize the choice of alternatives. In contrast to the simple weigher of alternatives the strong evaluator "is not similarly inarticulate. There is the beginning of a language in which to express the superiority of one alternative, the language of higher and lower, noble and base, courageous and cowardly, integrated and fragmented, and so on. The strong evaluator can articulate superiority just because he has a language of contrastive characterization."[15] The simple evaluator lacks the depth and richness that is available to the strong evaluator.

Along with the articulacy that is available to the strong evaluator comes a deeper form of reflection. The strong evaluator, because he is not limited just to evaluation in terms of preferences, is able to describe his desires, motivations and intentions in qualitative terms that also describe the possibilities of his being in the world. "A strong evaluator by which we mean a subject who

strongly evaluates desires, goes deeper, because he characterizes his motivation at greater depth. To characterize one desire or inclination as worthier, or noble, or more integrated, etc. than others is to speak of it in terms of the kind of qualtiy of life which it expresses or sustains. I eschew the cowardly act,... because I want to be a courageous and honorable human being. Whereas for the simple weigher what is at stake is the desirability of different consummation, those defined by his de facto desires, for the strong evaluator also examines the different possible modes of being of the agent. Motivations or desires don't only count in virtue of the attraction of the consummation but also in virtue of the kind of life and kind of subject that these desires properly belong to."[16] This type of reflection goes to the heart of the type of life or agent we wish to be, it "brings us to the center of our existence as agents."[17] The most basic questions of our existence are raised, examined, answered and criticized, questions that are beyond the vocabulary of the simple weigher. It is in this sense that the strong evaluator is more deeply reflective, has more depth, and is a stronger subject, than the weak evaluator.

This connection between strong evaluation and human agency has implications for the question of personal identity as well. Our identity is determined in large part by the evaluations that we make in this strong sense of the term. The strong evaluator, because he sometimes is concerned with those questions that go to the heart of what type of human agent he is to be, is addressing questions of personal identity. "Our identity is therefore defined by certain

evaluations which are inseparable from ourselves as agents. Shorn of these we would cease to be ourselves, by which we do not mean trivially that we would be different in the sense of having some properties other than those we now have - this would indeed be the case after any change however minor - but that shorn of these we would lose the very possibility of being an agent who evaluates, that our existence as persons, and hence our ability to adhere as persons to certain evaluations, would be impossible outside the horizon of these essential evaluations, that we would break down as persons, be incapable of being persons in the full sense."[18] The elimination of these evaluations without their being replaced with others would not simply mean that I would have a different personal identity, it would mean that I would have none at all. For I would have lost precisely those characteristics of a human agent that enable me to determine the meaning of things for me as a human agent, my relationship to them, the role they play in the type of life I wish to pursue, etc.

Taylor's argument concerning strong evaluation, human agency, and identity are part of a more comprehensive view of the nature of language per se. Taylor's position is derivative of an expressivist view of language, a view that contrasts with the designative theory of language typical of empiricism, that holds that language cannot be understood simply as a medium for objective description of the world. Rather, language is the medium in which we achieve reflective awareness. Reflective awareness is tied to the expressive potential of language; subsequently a rich vocabulary enables reflection with greater depth while the simpler vocabulary of mere preference limits

the speaker to shallower forms of reflection. In contrast to designative theories of language characteristic of Hobbes, Locke and contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, the "expressive theory opens a new dimension. If language serves to express-realize a new kind of awareness, then it may not only make possible a new awareness of things, an ability to describe them; but also new ways of feeling or responding to things. If in expressing our thoughts about things we can come to have new thoughts, then in expressing our feelings, we can come to have transformed feelings."[19] This intimate connection between reflection and expression in language underscores several of the points Taylor makes elsewhere. In particular, it emphasizes the claim that there is a connection between the language available to a speaker and the speaker's identity. I can identify, reflect and decide on feelings, desires and ways of being only to the extent that I can articulate those feelings, etc. They can become the object of reflection and choice only if they find a place in my language. My possibilities for reflective self-identity are thus circumscribed by the language available to me. In this respect Taylor's position resembles that of Winch and Gadamer.

Taylor would also insist, as do Gadamer and Winch, that language is not a private possession, but exists only in and through a linguistic community. Because my language grows only in dialogue with others, i.e. within a speech community, "The language I speak, the web which I can never fully dominate and oversee, can never be just <u>my</u> language, it is always largely <u>our</u> language."[20] It follows that if I can express and realize my identity only through language which is a

social product, i.e. the language of a speech community, it further follows that I can only come to know myself through the speech community I grow up in. My relations with others will be determined by that language; language will both make possible and circumscribe the relationships that I have with other members of my speech community as well as those outside my immediate speech community. In Taylor's words, "Speech also serves to express/constitute different relations in which we may stand to each other: intimate, formal, official, casual, joking, serious and so on. From this point of view, we can see that it is not just the speech community that shapes and creates language, but language which constitutes and sustains the speech community."[21]

In sum, the strong notion of human agnecy that Taylor ties to strong evaluation and the strong notion of personal identity requires an expressivist view of language. Moreover, due to the social character of language that enables strong evaluation, the strong notion of personal identity that results from strong evaluation is in no small part a social identity. If Taylor's argument is correct, the flaws in Hollis' account of autonomous man and his notion of personal identity and rationality become somewhat clearer. The strong evaluator that Taylor argues is dependent on the expressivist view of language is precisely the strong personal identity that Hollis is seeking. But it is also a type of social identity that Hollis believes compromises the independence of autonomous man. In refusing to acknowledge the connection between the expressivist view of language and strong evaluation, Hollis fails to provide this

autonomous man with the depth he requires for a strong personal identity.

The Expressivist Theory of Language and the Common Good

Against the background of Taylor's argument that a strong notion of human agency requires strong evaluation which in turn is provided by the expressivist nature of language and hence a common way of life, I would like to argue that the notion of a common way of life implies a politics of the common good that we have shown to be the foundation of political authority.

In politics, no less than in other areas of social life, language provides us with the capacity for reflection about our political life. It provides us not only with intersubjective meanings with which to talk about that way of life, i.e. criteria of judgement, identification, evaluation, praise, blame and so on. In addition to these there is a set of common meanings which those in a community share. These common meanings are "notions of what is significant which are not just shared in the sense that everybody has them, but are also common in the sense of being in the common reference world. Thus, almost everyone in our society may share a susceptibility to a certain kind of feminine beauty, but this may not be a common meaning. It may be known to no one, except to market researchers, who play on it in their advertisements. But the survival of a national identity as francophones is a common meaning of Quebecois; for it is not just shared, and not just known to be shared, but its being a

common aspiration is one of the common reference points of all debate, communication, and all public life in a society."[22]

Taylor goes on to say that "Common meanings are the basis of community. Intersubjective meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feelings. These are objects in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes a community."[23]

The common meanings that enter into political life, that form the basis of shared aspirations, values, beliefs and actions, constitute the common good. The common good is the "set of shared purposes and standards which are fundamental to the way of life prized together by the participants."[24] It consists of the common reference points that provide the criteria for determining the collective political goals of the community and the legitimate pursuit of those goals.

The notion of the common good in modern society could not include a notion of specific, unchanging political good, such as Plato's forms, which once arrived at could be used for all time to evaluate the policies of those in authority. The connection between language and the capacity of actors to reappraise and re-evaluate even the central features of their society means that the common good will be in large part conventional, i.e. that it is the result of human social action and language and the possibilities of social organization. This is not to deny that there may be what some thinkers have described as quasi-transcendental dimensions to the common good: i.e.

social arrangements that we insist must be present in any society in which strong evaluators and complex forms of human agency are found. Neither does this conventional dimension mean that the constituent elements of the common good could be changed at will. It does mean that the common meanings around which we organize social life, that inform our institutions and practices such as family life, work, politics, and personal relationships, could be otherwise. For political life this means that the common meanings that constitute the goals and limits of political action in our modern society cannot be completely identical with the common meanings that help constitute the goals and limits of other cultures and historical periods (e.g. feudal Japan, the Azande, or the Lele).

One implication of this conventionality is that the common good is subject to change, revision and modification. This is not to say it is constantly in flux, but only that parts of it can come under scrutiny in appropriate historical circumstances.

Second, the common good is not uni-dimensional; no single value such as justice, equality, liberty, is likely to totally make up the common good or occupy an overriding position. In contemporary American society I would say there are a variety of constituent elements to the common good, among them are individual liberty, equality of opportunity, due process of law, a certain degree of political equality, a degree of personal freedom concerning life-style, a stable, private family life and what William Connolly has called the "civilization of productivity which brings affluence, freedom and leisure to future generations."[25] The

multidimensionality of the common good does not guarantee that the constituent elements of it will always complement or reinforce the others. As interpretations of the constituent elements of the common good change, or as historical circumstances change, it might be the case that the constituent elements begin to conflict. I think something like this has occurred concerning the dispute surrounding abortion, the plethora of problems that exist between work and family life, the conflict between the imperatives of the civilization of productivity, and the value of a multiplicity of life styles. When the conflicts between the constituent elements become so great that every course of action available to those in authority undermines some part of the common good, those in authority run the risk of being accused by some constituencies of undermining that common good. Hence, Judge Arthur Garrity's insistence that the Boston City School Committee employ busing as a means to desegregate the Boston School System can be interpreted as a conflict between equality of opportunity and the local sense of community that some citizens of Boston claimed was being undermined. When the conflict between important elements of the common good becomes so fierce and constant that those in authority are unable to act without alienating substantially large constituencies within the polity, a crisis of authority may result.

A third characteristic of the common good flows from the two preceding characteristics. Due in part to its conventionality and its multidimensionality, the common good can never be perfectly articulatable or made completely transparent. Conventionality

guarantees that it is subject to modification and change, and the process by which these changes come about, including the way they find their way into various spheres of social life, means that any particular account of the common good is unlikely to capture it entirely. Similarly, the multidimensionality of the common good will mean that in some instances we will emphasize some of the elements in one situation and other elements of it in other situations.

An example might be useful here. Equality of opportunity has been one of the longstandiing constituents of the common good in American political life. With the Supreme Court's decision in Brown vs. Board of Education interpretations of what constituted equality of opportunity began to change. By the late 1960's it had come under fire from two directions. On the one side were those members of the black community who saw equality of opportunity as a facade, the primary purpose of which was to justify systematically imposed inequality between whites and blacks. At the same time some court decisions insisting rules concerning seniority in the hiring and firing of personnel be qualified because such rules systematically excluded blacks from obtaining the type of seniority that would give them the same job protection as whites were attacked by some unions and many white workers as a violation not only of the golden calf of seniority but actually an attack on equality of opportunity itself. Equality of opportunity is still one of the constituent elements of the common good in the United States. But it is not the same equality of opportunity that existed in 1953, and the changes that have taken place have had implications for other dimensions of American life and

other elements of the common good that underlies American political life.

Fourth, the very nature of language contributes to the lack of transparency of the common good. Because, as Winch would put it, the rules governing a way of life can never be completely specified, or as Gadamer would put it, we are always in the process of testing our prejudices and moving between horizons, language itself is never completely transparent to us. This is no less true of the language of politics and the common good. Though we may be able to specify the more important features of the common good, we could never completely set down its details and interpretations once and for all. Before the notion of the common good could be made transparent, we would need to secure the external boundaries of the language of politics and congeal the internal rules of political language and political life. But as Habermas has pointed out, such a situation would eliminate the possibilities for freedom. A policy in which the common good becomes completely transparent would be a society without politics; the only problems that would remain would be technical questions of administration and dissenters from the common good would be the object of political repression and terror.

Finally, the common good, because it prescribes the right and wrong, better and worse, good and bad ways of organizing political life, is the likely object of political re-interpretation and intense disagreement. Constituencies often organize for the very purpose of influencing and changing what a political community considers to be in the common good. This does not necessarily mean that authority

becomes undermined in such circumstances. Indeed, it is precisely in such instances that political authority is called upon to adjudicate between competing notions of the common good. But the sometimes tacit, often explicit arguments of political authority are based upon the claim that in resolving such disputes its decisions and policies are those that reflect the common good. I think, for example, that the debate about supply-side economics versus Keynesian fiscal policy is at heart a debate about the common good. It is a debate that is in many respects fundamental to American political life and the future of the American political economy. And the political arguments offered on both sides have been in terms of the long range benefits that the respective policies provide for the American polity.[26]

Even when there is agreement concerning the general notion of the common good or where there is agreement that some collective action falls within the loose notion of the common good, it still remains that there are instances in which the common good conflicts with the particular interests of individuals or groups. Whenever members of a political community contest what constitutes the common good, or when the interests of private groups or individuals conflict with what is claimed to be the common good, the state has three sources of compliance at its disposal. First, it can construct market-incentive systems that channel behavior in ways consistent with the policies designed to achieve or realize the public good. Second, those in public authority can rely on force. In extreme cases, when groups or individuals contest the legitimacy of the actions of those in authority (or the state), public authorities can employ some type of

force or coercion to obtain compliance. But few or no states have relied totally on force; to claim that force is the only resource for gaining compliance with policies is to claim that those in authority ultimately rely on te In fact the complete reliance on force would be indicative of the loss of authority.

I would argue that any political community if it is to avoid the manipulation of its citizens through market incentives or the intimidation of its citizens through political terror, must rely on a third source of compliance with its policies, laws and pronouncements and that is civic virtue. Civic virtue is the tacit belief that at times individuals or particular groups must forego the fulfillment of particular interest in favor of some broader notion of the common good when the two are in conflict. It is civic virtue that explains why citizens obey or comply with the dictates of authority when the policies followed conflict with citizens' private interests. Obedience and compliance resulting from the exercise of civic virtue rests on the assumption that the policies in question somehow advance the common good.

The military draft in the post World War II period can serve as an example. It was expected that some young men were obligated to military service (and in the sixties to thereby risking their lives in Viet Nam) while other members of the same group avoided military service either by college deferment or by medical disqualification. It was assumed and recognized that even though some individuals were able to avoid any military obligation, that a majority of others would

fulfill that statuatory obligation without being compelled to do so by force. Though not explicitly formulated, the policy of partial selective service relied on a tacit notion of civic virtue. This is not to say that the background possibility of force was not also compelling. But the availability of force was insufficient to guarantee the scope of the compliance with the selective service system that was required during the 1960's. Moreover, those from working class families often never even considered refusing to fulfill what they considered their military obligation even when aware that those from more privileged families would escape the disruption of their lives that military service presented. The widescale compliance among those from the lower strata cannot be explained simply in terms of the threat of force or the failure to understand the options that provided escape; it was the result of the exercise of civic virtue based on the presumption that those in authority were following a policy that was somehow in the public good.[27]

Political Authority and the Celebration of Politics

The view that the exercise of democratic political authority is tied to a notion of the common good has one other implication that distinguishes it from the positions of Winch, Gadamer, Hollis and Habermas. The critical basis that the common good makes available, coupled with (a) the recognition that authority is unlikely to achieve a purely epistemic basis in political life and (b) the recognition of the connection between the theory of the common good and the theory of

strong evaluation made possible by the expressivist view of language, implies the permanence of politics in social life. Unlike Winch and Gadamer, whose accounts of understanding focus away from political life, or Hollis and Habermas whose views of rationality and respective views of real interests and consensus leave little room for either politics or authority, the view of the connection amongst the expressivist view of language, strong evaluation, the common good, and authority advanced in this chapter implies the permanence of political dialogue concerning authority and lays the foundation for it in a democratic society. Moreover, I think the stronger claim can also be sustained that this view of political authority results in a celebration of politics. The connection between the theory of strong evaluation and the common language and way of life that give rise to the common good and authority implies that one is most perfectly a human agent when one is engaged in the fundamental questions of what type of life is most desirable to lead. The expressivist character of language that makes strong evaluation possible is that which provides the possibilities for argument and discourse over the common good and the justification of the policies followed by those in political authority. The justification of political authority is tied to the possibility of political dialogue and critical scrutiny of authority. To foreclose the possibility of political dialogue concerning the common good would be, on this reading, to pre-empt the possibility of evaluating those in authority or the legitimacy of their policies.

The Individualistic and Foucaultian Critiques

We shall now consider two objections to our account of political authority, language, human agency and the common good. The first could be characterized as the individualist response and is best characterized by Richard Friedman: "But someone who is 'in authority' is not necessarily an authority on anything: his decisions do not have to be presented as authoritative expressions, deliverances, or interpretations of logically prior beliefs or principles. On the contrary, it is precisely the key point about the concept of 'in authority' to be disassociated from any background of shared beliefs. It is, then, in those circumstances in which a society has lost the sense of a common framework of substantive moral beliefs and has grown sceptical of the idea of a homogeneous moral community that the notion of being 'in authority' may present itself as the appropriate form of authority for defining the general rules all men must conform to."[28] Political life, according to Friedman, is the area of social life where commonalities or common shared meanings and beliefs are absent, where irreconcilable interests dominate, and authority is required to reinforce decisions that are inimical to the interests of one or more parties.

It is precisely this view of political life and its relation to authority that I want to take issue with. I shall argue that in order to retain this view of political life as being without common meanings, beliefs, and ideals, one would have to explain obedience to authority in terms that either transform authority into some form of

coercion or manipulation, or in ways that cannot be reconciled with developments in contemporary society.

Thinkers who interpret political life as simply the aggregate of individuals with incommensurable interests, i.e. no shared set of values, meanings and ideals that each citizen entertains simply by the fact of his or her membership in polity, must interpret the actions of the state as either arbitrary or, because of its role is to adjudicate between the conflicting interests of its citizens, as satisfying the interests that one of the contestants in a conflict advances as a private interest. Hence, the best that can be hoped for according to this view is that the policies, laws, etc. of those in authority will be in the net interest of most citizens resulting in the achievement of what has been called the public interest. There is, of course, on this reading no guarantee that the policies pursued will be in the net interest of the majority of citizens. It may very well happen that those in political authority succomb to the pressure to adopt policies that are in the interests of only a small minority.

In practice this means there are three possible motivations for acting in accordance with the dictates and policies of authority: (1) they are consistent with my private interests (which I may have pressed political authorities to pursue, subsidize or support); (2) the dictates of authority are against my interests but the sanctions and penalties for refusing to obey outweigh benefits I would gain by ignoring them; or (c) I obey because those in authority are able to construct a system of market incentives that 'encourage' me to behave in ways that are consistent with the policies pursued.

William Connolly has shown that a society that relies on (1) and (3) to obtain obedience for its policies could not long endure. The problem of the free rider would mean that those whose private interests were at odds with the policies that those in political authority attempted to enforce through market incentives and bureaucratic control would seek avenues of avoidance and escape that would only require more regulations and market incentives resulting in still more avoidance. Those whose behavior is to be regulated, by seeking loopholes, contesting laws and regulations in the courts, conforming only to the letter of the law, engaging in various illegalities and subterranean activities, launch a "dialectic of dissolution". In short, "Men, women, ethnic minorities, consumers, workers, parents, children, and owners are all encouraged to contest creatively the boundaries of explicit rules regulating their conduct once the tendency to do so acquires initial momentum. For to be left out of the process is to be deprived of the benefits of general compliance and to face the burdens of personal compliance. Employees can work according to rule; owners can shift investments abroad to evade domestic regulation; parents locked into an internal struggle over the sexual division of labor, can rear their children in conformity with the law while losing touch with the psychic economy of child development. Controversies will proliferate over the precise 'stipulations' governing tax payments, welfare allocations, equal opportunity, the rights of and duties of parents and children, the discretionary use of public funds, job performance evaluation, and conflicts of interest in public life."[29] In short the "polity

possesses limited resources to will policies in the public interest, to sustain allegiance to the letter of the law and to interpret the letter of the law in particular cases; the members possess powerful incentives to oppose public interest laws to their private advantage, to evade compliance and to contest the applicability of the law to their particular case. Each of these sources feeds the development of the others, and the dialectic which unfolds progressively thins out the supply of public will, integrity and knowledge."[30] Without some notion of civic virtue at work in society, argues Connolly, the order threatens to duplicate the Hobbesian system in which compliance is motivated only through fear of penalty and sanction.

There is a fall back position for those who deny a connection between political authority and the common good. Those whose interests conflict with the policies of those in authority obey out of fear and terror. The first objection to this claim is that it translates political authority into political terror, hence, those who occupy positions of authority are obeyed out of fear of punishment. But this fall back position thus transforms political authority into political coercion or power. Indeed, it is often when those in authority must rely on threats and the use of force that we say that they have lost their authority.

A second objection, one that cuts somewhat deeper, is posed by Michael Foucault. Foucault argues that in any given episteme[31] sets of discursive practices are established with two primary results. First, these practices establish certain positions as positions of authority and power. Individuals holding these positions are

empowered to make pronouncements concerning a range of topics determined by the discursive practice that result in networks of control over large segments of the population. One example is the judge, whose pronouncements concerning the guilt or innocence or length of sentence of a defendent has quite a different effect than the same pronouncements made by someone not recognized as a judge in the discursive practice. In modern medicine, psychiatry, and criminology, the doctor, analyst and criminologist respectively are the positions from which pronouncements concerning physical health, mental health and criminal rehabilitation emanate. Second, and as part of the process establishing some people as authorities to make the types of pronouncements cited above, the discourses that establish these discursive practices privilege some forms of knowledge while hiding others. These latter form subjugated knowledges, "a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated; naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath that required level of cognition of scientificity."[32] The impact of these privileged forms of discourse and knowledge is the set of discursive practices that identify, individualize and control populations caught in their discursive web. The paradigm of the individualized object of knowledge for Foucault would, I think, be the alcoholic. Diagnosed by modern reformers as the victim of illness, treated by welfare workers as incapable of self-control, and held criminally responsible by the police and courts of his or her 'illness' or psychological 'shortcomings,' the alcoholic or the individual identified as such, is the perfect example of an

individual on whom these several discourses converge, albeit somewhat independently, to identify a class of persons for treatment, paternalism and punishment.

Several characteristics of this network of control need emphasizing. First, it is not a network that is at the command of any single person or group; the techniques and micro-cosms of power and control have a life of their own. Second, the problem is not simply a question of freedom and autonomy on the one hand versus power and authority on the other. According to Foucault those who are the advocates of freedom and autonomy, with their notions of the self, self-conscious reflection, and responsibility, are as implicated in the extension of techniques of control as those who explicitly advocate the extension of and tighter forms of authority.

Foucault's response to any project that would attempt to make authority consistent with strong human agency, and I think the project presented here in particular, would be that the limits it sets on authority and the case it makes for strong human agency are a trap. What we have done, Foucault might argue, is enable the further extension of the discourse of control and power. Indeed, he might go so far as to say that the connection we have drawn amongst the common good, political authority, and strong evaluation indicates the extent to which the extension of authority is dependent upon notions of the self and theories of strong human agency.

As an alternative to the privileged forms of knowledge with their modern notions of the self which are part of the establishment of techniques of power, Foucault offers what he calls, following

Nietzsche, genealogy. Genealogy is Foucault's attempt to provide a link between those erudite forms of knowledge that were disqualified by more systematic and specialized forms of knowledge with those subjugated knowledges that he calls popular knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the patient, the delinquent, the mad, and the criminal. "Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. This then will be a provisional definition of the genealogies which I have attempted to compile with you over the last few years."[33]

Central to this project is the demonstration of the conventionality of our notions of self-identity and the language along with which we construct our notions of self-identity. Foucault's works on reason and madness, criminality, health and sexuality are aimed at showing how the self-identity that these discourses provide us with are themselves the foundation of techniques of control. Hence he seeks to dismantle those notions of self-identity, to demonstrate their conventional nature. In one of his more radical formulations of his project he characterizes his project this way: "'Effective ' history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions.

Knowledge, even under the banner of history, does not depend on 'rediscovery,' and it emphatically excludes the 'rediscovery of ourselves.' History becomes 'effective' to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being - as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself. Effective history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millenial ending."[34] Neither our physical bodies nor a teleological view of history or society can serve as the basis for identity according to Foucault. We must come to see ourselves, and even this is perhaps incorrectly phrased from Foucault's perspective, as a group of emotions, feelings, thoughts and ideas that are disconnected; inte
continuity, is the goal of genealogy (effective history)
attempts to dismantle the self. "The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshhold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us."[35] Foucault uses the imagery of the carnival and masquerade to convey the type of effect genealogy. No single identity, either for social actors or for the subject of knowledge, should be the goal of genealogy. Rather, the genealogist offers alternate identities, a multiplicity of choice of identity. "The new historian, the genealogist, will know what to make of this masquerade. He will not be too serious to enjoy it; on the contrary

he will push the masquerade to its limit and prepare the great carnival of time where masks are constantly reappearing. No longer the identification of our faint individuality with the solid identities of the past, but our 'unrealization' through the excessive choice of identities - Frederick of Hohenstaufen, Caesar, Jesus, Dionysus, and possibly Zarathustra. Taking up these masks, revitalizing the buffoonery of history, we adopt an identity whose unreality surpasses that of God who started the charade.... Genealogy is history in the form of concerted carnival."[36]

This dissipation of modern forms of identity is to be achieved through the examination of the growth of modern forms of knowledge, the growth of the will to knowledge that takes the form of criminology, psychoanalysis, medicine and psychology: "the critique of the injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present becomes the destruction of the man who maintains knowledge by the injustice proper to the will to knowledge."[37]

Foucault's work presents the most serious challenge to any project directed at showing that authority is consistent with a strong form of human agency. The latter project itself inherently involves the extension of modern notions of identity, forms of authority, discourses of control, in short, an extension of the will to know that underlies modern techniques of power, argues Foucault.

Response and Conclusion: In Defense of Political Authority

Foucault's works present a compeling case; the boldness of the

theses; the imaginative deployment of language; the relentless pursuit of his themes; and a style that draws the reader to new locations from which to survey a range of phenomena in new ways, complement each other to produce new perspectives and ways of thinking. It is impossible to return exactly to old ways of thinking having taken Foucault's work seriously.

Nonetheless there is a certain amount of resistance that emerges to Foucault's work. Those who seek a critical perspective from which to evaluate authority and protect autonomy find Foucault's account a compelling description of those phenomena they are critical of and those who would defend patterns of authority in contemporary society. At the same time the critics of established authority patterns are repulsed by the claim that they are as complicitous in modern forms of control as the defenders of the system of discipline. This resistance makes it easy to forget that the pictures of modern forms of discipline that Foucault uncovers are not simply pictures, they are mirrors as well. Having recognized this tendency toward resistance there are nonetheless several counter arguments to Foucault's works and specifically to his critique of those who attempt to rehabilitate or strengthen strong notions of human agency.

Foucault's criticism of contemporary techniques of control and discipline, coupled with his rejection of liberal and radical reforms and alternatives, leaves open the question of what would be an acceptable alternative for Foucault. He explicitly refuses to engage in normative discourse, arguing that it results in complicity in extending extablished forms of control: "I think to imagine another

system is to extend our participation in the present system.... Reject theory and all forms of general discourse. The need for theory is still part of the system we reject."[38] And again later, "If you wish to replace an official institution by another institution that fulfills the same function - better and differently - then you are already being reabsorbed by the dominant structure."[39] And finally, "'The whole of society' is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed. And then we can only hope that it will never exist again."[40] Neither does he see the hope of the future in the type of order that inspired nineteenth century anarchism. Indeed, his harshest contempt, when not directed at Marxists, is reserved for anarchists.[41]

Foucault's faith seems to be lodged in the emergence of a new episteme, the emergence of which will be facilitated by the proliferation of resistances through the rehabilitation of subjugated forms of knowledge. Given Foucault's rejection of what he would consider naive anarchism and his account of the way that epistemes include limits to the way that language and knowledge develop, several objections can be raised against Foucault's rejection of the strong notion of human agency defended here.

First, Foucault seems to recognize that in the new episteme some forms of order will exist. This flows from his rejection of naive anarchism and his account of the way epistemes circumscribe the use of language, the development of knowledge and ways of viewing the world. This seems to be a recognition that, as Hampshire, Gadamer, Taylor and Connolly have emphasized, any order implies a set of limits. By

implication we must be willing to believe that the limits of the new order will be more desirable than the limits imposed in the contemporary episteme. Without specifying how those limits could be changed and in what ways they will be an improvement, I think Foucault's faith in the future episteme may be unjustified.

Consider the following. Bruno Bettleheim has chronicled how in German concentration camps those most susceptible to breakdown in the face of attempts at total forms of control were those with the weakest forms of personal identity. Members of the middle class, whose identity was tied to their status and personal possessions, succumbed most quickly and completely under the weight of total control. The question that emerges is what if Foucault is successful in weakening or even shattering some forms of identity and yet some forms of social control remain in place. Foucault assumes that the fracturing of those modern forms of identity will itself not lead to strengthening of social control. This follows from his claim that that control itself is dependent upon the notions of self, identity and self-consiousness that pervade our discourse and discursive practices. But if existing forms of discipline and control are only partially tied to modern forms of identity for their efficacy, it might be possible to destroy the foundations of personal identity and leave (at least some) networks of control intact or in a somewhat revised form.

A second point can be made regarding the possibilities of criticism and the notion of human agency. Foucault clearly supports the proliferation of criticism. At times he has, for example, called

for the politicization of the self. Moreover the language he deploys, or that deploys him, clearly reflects the belief that there are better and worse forms of social life and of coming to know that social life. Even though his vocabulary is not exactly the vocabulary of Taylor's strong evaluator, it is the language of criticism. But it is precisely criticism (beyond the mere preferences of the utilitarian individual) that is consistent with human agency, that partly constitutes human agency, Taylor argues. As the possibilities for criticism and evaluation proliferate, so do our possibilities for choice and action. It is precisely to that possibility of criticism that Foucault has contributed; hence it is not clear that he has escaped the problems that revolve around the notion of human agency and the subject.[42]

A third point can be made regarding the project of genealogy itself. Foucault describes it as the rehabilitation and fusion of two forms of subjugated knowledges, local knowledges and erudite knowledges that are generally available only to the intellectual. Foucault's own work, particularly on the development of the penal system,[43] is a glowing example of how this project is to be carried off. However, the relationship between the two types of knowledge seems to establish a privileged space for the intellectual; it is the intellectual who because of his erudition, is in the position to forge the links between the various subjugated local knowledges. Yet this privileged position of the intellectual would seem to place him in a position of potential authority; it establishes the space from which to speak, even if one rejects permanent occupancy of it. In light of

this, one is tempted to turn his own form of interrogation on Foucault: who is allowed to speak as the genealogist; what positions does genealogy privilege; what forms of knowledge does it subjugate; why do the local, subjugated knowledges need the erudite knowledge of the genealogists?

Finally, for those who seek a sustained political life, who would celebrate politics, Foucault's work plays and ambivalent role. In many respects it represents the type of political criticism that cuts deepest and extends political discourse in imaginative ways. Yet it seems to preclude a sustained political action; politics is eposidic (at least until the new episteme is ushered in); sustained political action threatens to enable techniques of discipline to locate, identify and individualize the opponents of contemporary forms of control. But those who are not as confident as Foucault about the possibilities of social life in the new episteme; those who believe that crisis in the contemporary political economy may precede the emergence of the new episteme that Foucault anticipates, and that resulting changes may be for the worse, cannot afford the luxury of episodic politics. They must feel compelled to engage in political discourse in attempts to ward off new extensions of already existing forms of control.

In light of these reservations, those who seek to strengthen human agency, to lay the foundation of criticism of authority, and insure the integrity of democratic authority, are unlikely to adopt Foucault's rejection of their project. Indeed, they are <u>justified</u> in continuing the project. In spite of the fascination with and

temptation to surrender to the Foucaultian challenge, Foucault can at best play the role of the lens through which those wishing to defend human agency critically examine their own work.[45]

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Roultledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 8-9.

2. Ibid., p. 15.

3. Ibid., p. 20.

4. Ibid., p. 23.

5. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

6. Ibid., p. 128.

7. Ibid., p. 45.

8. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

9. Ibid., p. 58.

10. Ibid., p. 155.

11. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

12. Ibid., p.89.

13. Ibid., p. 100.

14. Ibid., p. 101.

15. Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," in Bryan Wilson, ed., Rationality (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 97.

16. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 107.

17. Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 82.

18. Ibid., pp. 98-99.

19. Martin Hollis, Models of Man (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), p. 119.

20. Ibid., p. 3.

21. Hollis, "My Role and Its Duties," in R.S. Peters ed., Nature and Conduct (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 183.

22. Ibid., p. 182.

23. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 10.

24. Hollis, "My Role and Its Duties," p. 184.

25. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 120.

26. Hollis, "Winch and Winchcraft." Philosophy of Social Science, 2, Spring 1972, p. 91.

27. Ibid., p. 95.

28. Ibid., p. 96.

29. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 120.

30. Hollis, "Winch and Winchcraft," p. 98.

31. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 120.

32. Hollis, "Winch and Winchcraft," p. 96

33. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 78.

34. Ibid., pp. 70-74: see also Hollis, "My Role and Its Duties," pp. 186-188.

35. Hollis, Models of Man, pp. 84-85.

36. Ibid., p. 101.

37. Ibid., p. 104.

38. Ibid., p. 105.

39. Ibid., p. 21.

40. Ibid., p. 126.

41. Ibid., p. 135.

42. Ibid., p. 138.

43. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 33.

44. Hollis, "Winch and Winchcraft," pp. 94-96.

45. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 92.

46. Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 97.

47. Ibid., p. 82

48. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 126.

49. Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 94.

50. Ibid., p. 99.

51. Ibid., p. 93.

52. Ibid., p. 100.

53. Hollis, "My Role and Its Duties," p. 198.

54. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 198.

55. I shall elaborate on this theme in the last chapter where I discuss the connection between language and human agency.

56. Hollis, "My Role and Its Duties," p. 196.

57. Ibid., p. 195.

58. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 128.

59. There is another alternative that Hollis might have considered. He could have argued that the two forms of explanation are complementary, that explanation in causal terms is acceptable when explanation in terms of real interests and rationality does not explain the actors' behavior. But Hollis explicitly denies that this type of compromise is possible, as we have already noted.

60. Hollis, Models of Man, p. 128.

61. Hollis, "My Role Its Duties," p. 198.

62. Charles Taylor, Hegel (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975), p. 7.

63. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), p.359, paragraph 589.

64. Winch, "Authority," in Anthony Quinton ed., Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967) p. 100.

65. Ibid., p. 99.

66. Ibid., p. 102.

67. Ibid., p. 102

68. Ibid., p. 105.

69. Ibid., pp. 98-100.

70. Ibid., pp. 110-111.

71. William E. Connolly has examined the internal relation between the state and personal identity in Appearance and Reality in Politics, (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981).

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. For example see Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), and David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

2. John Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1979), pp. 104-105, 110-119.

3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Social Science," in Cultural Hermeneutics, 2, February 1975, p. 316.

4. Gadamer, "Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," in Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated and edited by David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 3.

5. Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1960), p. xvii.

6. Ibid., p. xiii.

7. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 3.

8. Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," p. 11.

9. Gadamer, "The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century," in Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 109.

10. Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," p. 10.

11. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

12. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 410.

13. Ibid., p. 409.

14. Ibid., p. 407.

15. Ibid., p. 408.

16. Ibid., p. 408.

17. Ibid., p. 432.

18. Ibid., p. 401.

19. Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," p. 3.

20. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 3.

21. This example comes from Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (London: Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1960). Kovesi's discussion of our moral concepts and the notion of a moral point of view complements Gadamer's claim that language is something we inherit, that our use of it is tied to the way our concepts have developed, and that we cannot simply make our concepts mean anything that we want.

22. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 402.

23. Ibid., pp. 338-339.

24. Ibid., p. 267.

25. Ibid., p. 268.

26. Ibid., p. 268.

27. Ibid., p. 269.

28. Ibid., p. 269.

29. Ibid., p. 271.

30. Ibid., p. 272.

31. Ibid., p. 273.

32. Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 99.

33. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 240. Some commentators have argued that the translation of the term 'vorurteil' as 'prejudices' is misleading and that a better translation is 'prejudgement.' I think this is incorrect. The concept 'prejudgement' implies that the action involved is in some respects at my disposal. We often ask others not to prejudge a person or a situation. At times, at least, it is something we can refrain from doing; it is in some respects an activity that is at our command. The term 'prejudice,' on the other hand, implies something that is not at my disposal, something that may be so close to me that I am not even aware of it. In this respect it more accurately captures the effect that language has on us than the term 'prejudgement' does.

34. Ibid., p. 245.

35. Ibid., p. 240.

36. Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," p. 9.

37. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 239.

38. Ibid., p. 244.

39. Ibid., pp. 245-246.

40. Ibid., p. 263.

41. Truth and Method, p. 236.

42. Ibid., p. 236.

43. Ibid., p. 238.

44. Ibid., p. 238. The wiley reader will note similarities here between Gadamer's claims that understanding forces itself on us and a similar claim made by Winch and illustrated by the latter with the fable of Achilles and the tortoise.

45. Ibid., p. 247.

46. Herbert Ma cuse, Critical Studies in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968) p. 51.

47. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 248.

48. Ibid., p. 248.

49. Ibid., p. 249.

50. Ibid., p. 249.

51. Ibid., p. 250.

52. Ibid., p. 250.

53. Ibid., p. 253.

54. Ibid., p. 401.

55. Ibid., p. 345; my emphasis.

56. Ibid., p. 100.

57. Gadamer, "Man and Language," in Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 62-63.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

1. Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 263.

2. Ibid., p. 264.

3. Ibid., p. 254.

4. Ibid., p. 265.

5. Ibid., p. 254.

6. Ibid., p. 265.

7. Ibid., p. 264.

8. Ibid., pp. 254-255.

9. Ibid., p. 282 This comment is almost Foucaultian, though the vocabulary of the class nature of the division would put Foucault off.

10. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," in Joseph Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 186.

11. Ibid., p. 185.

12. Ibid., p. 182.

13. Ibid., p. 184.

14. Habermas, "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," in Thomas McCarthy and Fred Dallmayer ed., Understanding and Social Action (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), p. 336.

15. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 187.

16. Ibid., p. 186.

17. Ibid., p. 186.

18. Habermas, "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," p. 340.

19. Ibid., p. 340.

20. Ibid., p. 341.

21. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 186.

22. Habermas, "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," p. 351.

23. Ibid., p. 353.

24. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 187.

25. Ibid., p. 187.

26. Ibid., p. 188.

27. See the "Introduction" to Truth and Method.

28. Habermas, "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," p. 358.

29. Ibid., pp. 359-360.

30. Ibid., p. 357.

31. Ibid., p. 357.

32. Ibid., p. 357.

33. Ibid., p. 356.

34. Ibid., p. 355,

35. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 189.

36. Ibid., p. 190.

37. Sigmund Freud, "Psychoanalysis," in Character and Culture (New York: Macmillan, 1963) pp. 235-236.

38. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 238.

39. Ibid., p. 297.

40. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 194.

41. Ibid., pp. 195-197.

42. Ibid., p. 197.

43. Ibid., p. 200.

44. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

45. Ibid., p. 201.

46. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 217.

47. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," pp. 202-203.

48. Ibid., p. 190.

49. Ibid., p. 203.

50. Habermas, "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," p. 361.

51. Ibid., p. 360.

52. Ibid., p. 360.

53. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 207.

54. Habermas, "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," p. 357.

55. Ibid., p. 358.

56. Ibid., p. 358.

57. Ibid., p. 359.

58. Ibid., p. 358.

59. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 208.

60. Ibid., pp. 205-206.

61. Ibid., p. 206.

62. Gadamer, "The Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection," in Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 26-27.

63. Ibid., p. 28.

64. Ibid., p. 98.

65. Ibid., p. 17.

66. Truth and Method, p. 495.

67. Ibid., p. 495.

68. Gadamer, "The Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection," p. 31.

69. Ibid., p. 30.

70. Ibid., p. 34.

71. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 496.

72. Ibid., pp. 495-496.

73. Gadamer, "The Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection," p. 35.

74. Ibid., p. 34.

75. Ibid., p. 33.

76. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

77. Ibid., p. 33.

78. Ibid., pp. 32-34.

79. Ibid., p. 42.

80. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 207.

81. Ibid., pp. 207-208.

82. Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977) p. 272.

83. Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 13.

84. Ibid., p. 5.

85. Ibid., p. 6.

86. Ibid., p. 8.

87. Ibid., p. 9.

88. There appear to be similarities between this project and that Winch describes as rule-governed behavior.

89. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 13.

90. Ibid., p. 42.

91. Ibid., p. 42.

92. Ibid., p. 53.

93. Ibid., p. 53.

94. Ibid., p. 52.

95. Ibid., p. 53.

96. Ibid., p. 54.

97. Ibid., p. 57.

98. Ibid., p. 58.

99. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

100. Ibid., p. 63.

101. Ibid., pp. 63-64.

102. Ibid., p. 64.

103. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

104. Ibid., p. 66.

105. I realize that it has not been Habermas' project to offer a theory of democratic authority. But the qualifications on the ideal speech situation, and specifically the claim that it now functions as a critical ideal, implies that authority must now enter the picture at some point. It seems to me that, given his own goals and project, the question of authority must assume a place of importance for Habermas.

106. Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 16-17.

107. See Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974).

108. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 66.

109. For the difficulties in determining even the sincerity of a person see Stuart Hampshire's essay "Sincerity and Single-Mindedness," in Hampshire, Freedom of Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 232-256.

110. Habermas, "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," p. 357.

111. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 314.

112. Habermas, Zur Logik du Sozialwissenschaften, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 220, as cited in McCarthy, p. 273.

113. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 209.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. Richard Friedman, "On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy," in Richard Flathman ed., Concepts of Social and Political Philosophy (New York: Macmillian, 1973), pp. 122-123.

2. Ibid., p. 141.

3. Ibid., pp. 141-142.

4. Ibid., p. 129.

6. Richard Flathman, The Practice of Political Authority: Authority and the Authoritative (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 90-108.

7. Ibid., pp. 100-108.

8. Friedman, p. 145.

9. This is a point that Flathman also makes; see Flathman, pp. 91-99.

10. The authority of the church might seem to be a reasonable counter-example to our claim that underlying authority is the ability to and occasional need to give arguments in support of one's commands or proclamations. We will limit our claim to the practice of political authority, but it is nevertheless interesting that even the Church maintains an entire religious order one of whose primary tasks is the philosophical justification of religious dogma, i.e. the Jesuits.

11. Friedman, p. 141.

12. Charles Taylor, "A Theory of Human Agency," in T. Mischels ed., The Self (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), p. 104.

13. Ibid., p. 107.

14. Ibid., p. 107.

15. Ibid., p. 113.

16. Ibid., p. 114.

17. Ibid., p. 115.

18. Ibid., pp. 124-125.

19. Taylor, "Language and Human Nature," Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lecture, Carleton University, Ontario, unpublished manuscript, p. 25.

20. Ibid., p. 27. Taylor's emphasis.

21. Ibid., p. 27.

22. Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics, 26, Sept. 1971, p. 30.

23. Ibid., p. 30.

24. William E. Connolly, Appearance and Reality in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), p. 91.

25. Ibid., p. 112.

26. I do not mean to imply that these two alternatives exhaust the range of possibilities concerning the common good, and I would not endorse either. They are, however, the two primary contenders within the American polity at this moment.

27. This is not to argue that those complying with the draft laws were right about the Vietnam War, only that their willingness to submit to the selective service system was predicted on the belief that those in authority were following a policy in the common good.

28. Friedman, p. 145.

29. Connolly, p. 118.

30. Ibid., p. 118.

31. The concept of an episteme in Foucault is somewhat difficult to pin down. I take it to mean the structure of language, concepts and knowledge that determine the space in which thought is allowed to play.

32. Foucault, Power and Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 82. Note the similarities between the relationship between of subjugated knowledges to scientific knowledge and Gadamer's view of the relationsip of practical life and philosophy to science and technology.

33. Ibid., p. 83.

34. Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 157-158.

35. Ibid., p. 162.

36. Ibid., p. 161.

37. Ibid., p. 164.

38. Ibid., pp. 230-231.

39. Ibid., p. 232.

40. Ibid., p. 233.

41. Foucault himself subscribes to a form of anarchism, but one that is critical of traditional concepts of community and individualism that inform traditional anarchist thought.

42. Foucault himself claims to eschew evaluation arguing that the deployment of evaluative language implicates one in relations of knowledge and power. But Foucault himself argues that there are better and worse, insightful and superficial ways of understanding human action. For example, in describing the Enlightenment he says, "Even so we should speak not of darkness but of a somewhat blurred light, deceptive in its apparent clarity, and hiding more than it reveals: it seems to us, in fact, that we know all there is to be known about the Classical knowledge if we understand that it is rationalistic, that, since Galileo and Descartes, it has accorded an absolute privilege to Mechanism, that it presupposes a general ordering of nature, that it accepts the possibility of an analysis sufficiently radical to discover elements or origins, but that it already has a presentiment, beyond and despite all these concepts of understanding, of the movement of life, of the density of history, and of the disorder, so difficult to master, in nature. But to recognize Classical thought by such signs alone is to misunderstand its fundamental arrangement; it is to neglect entirely the relation between such manifiestations and what made them possible." The Order of Things (New York: Vintage, 1973) p. 303. It seems to me that Foucault must be willing to agree that there is an evaluative dimension to language that he is not totally in control of or that his intentions as an author limit or control the evaluative impact of his work. Neither is consistent with his views of the relationship of the subject to language.

43. See for example Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Pantheon, 1977). Foucault would also deny that his intention or the effect of his work is to systematize subjugated knowledges. Indeed, he argues that the claim to speak for others is itself an example of knowledge operating as power: "In the most recent upheaval, (May 1968; my addition) the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing

themselves.... Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power - the idea of their responsibility for 'consciousness' and discourse forms part of the system. The intellectual's role is no longer to place himself 'somewhat ahead and to the side' in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather it is to struggle against forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge', 'truth', and 'discourse'." (Language, Counter-Memory and Practice, pp. 207-208.) In spite of this denial, works such as Discipline and Punish are not only very systmatic, claiming to detect similar patterns of discipline in the prison, school, workplace, etc., but also make available an understanding that many who are the object of that control do not have and would not have otherwise.

44. In order to maintain a political dialogue it must be assumed that some questions are settled; there must be some shared meanings and understandings. This is precisely what Foucault wants to contest with his notion of effective history, i.e. genealogy. It is not clear to me what type of political life would exist in this state of flux that Foucault is pursuing, but one possibility does present itself. In times of disorder, those who are the first to attempt to impose order on others are often the most successful, examples being the Bolshevik and Nazi successes.

45. This is the position taken by William Connolly, "The Politics of Disciplinary Control," forthcoming.

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